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 1Land use systems determine our well-being to a considerable extent, which is 
why so many policies have been formulated to regulate them. When land use sys-
tems are not fully understood, due to all kinds of  nonlinearities and consequent 
complex behaviour, such policies may fail. An improved understanding of  the 
behaviour of  land use systems can help to predict how they will react to policies, 
thereby offering insights to improve policy design. Especially, policy makers and 
other stakeholders would like to avoid unexpected behaviour in land use systems. 
Therefore, the aim of  this thesis is to improve our understanding of  unexpected 
behaviour in land use systems. One specific type of  unexpected behaviour, related 
to complex systems, is the regime shift, which will be the topic of  this thesis.
Regime shifts 
Regime shifts are a well-known concept within the study of  ecological systems. In 
ecology, amongst other disciplines, the term regime shift is used to describe a sud-
den, rapid transition of  a system from one stable state to another once a certain 
tipping-point is passed (Rietkerk et al., 2004; Scheffer et al., 2001). When studying 
unexpected behaviour in land use systems, this concept can be elucidating as well. 
It may be able to explain why sometimes small changes in circumstances lead to 
abrupt responses, or, contrarily, why sometimes a change in circumstances evokes 
no response from the land use system at all. The concept of  resilience is related to 
regime shifts. Resilience indicates the maximum disturbance that can be applied 
to the system without causing a regime shift (Scheffer, 2009). This implies that 
shocks can be absorbed until a critical point is reached where a small change in a 
driving factor would be enough to set a regime shift in motion.
What exactly creates a disposition for regime shifts is subject to scientific de-
bate. They are associated with a range of  system properties, such as the presence 
of  feedbacks, interactions between building blocks, excess of  buffer capacity, etc. 
(Strunz, 2014; Brandt et al., 2013; Renaud et al., 2010; Foley et al., 2003). In this 
thesis I propose three mechanisms to be responsible for regime shifts in land 
use systems, being the existence of  thresholds, cumulative effects, and feedbacks 
and interactions. Of  course, other mechanisms may also evoke regime shifts, but 
this thesis focuses on these three mechanisms, which will be further explained 
hereafter.     
In a system susceptible to regime shifts (at least) two alternative stable states 
exists (Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003), a phenomenon referred to as bi-stability (or 
multi-stability). The states are relatively stable in the sense that a small change 
in the driver will – most of  the times - not lead to a clear change in the system 
property. However, a gradual process might take place which decreases the attrac-
tion of  the current state relative to the attraction of  the other state, without any 
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apparent changes occurring. In this case the driver gradually reduces the buffer 
capacity of  the system until a certain threshold is reached and the system moves 
to the new state, i.e. the tipping point has been passed. This is nicely illustrated by 
the case described in Bakker et al. (2005), in which a sudden shift from agriculture 
to land abandonment took place, due to a gradual process of  soil depth reduction. 
At first these reductions had no visible effect on the agricultural system, until the 
crop roots did not have enough space anymore, and there was a sudden drop in 
crop yields. As a consequence, the land was abandoned (Bakker et al., 2005). If  a 
policymaker would be unaware of  the decreasing buffer capacity of  the system, 
which is moving towards a threshold, (s)he might incorrectly assume the policy 
has no effect at all. The policy might then be terminated just before reaching the 
threshold while it would have taken only a little bit longer to achieve the desired 
effect.  
A transition of  the system from one stable state to another does not necessarily 
result from a single driver, but can also result from the cumulative effects of  
several drivers. In this case several drivers work together to set off  a shift within 
the system. Each of  the drivers separately might not be strong enough to lead to 
a change, but a specific combination of  these drivers might push the system past 
a tipping point. In this case, each driver gradually diminishes the strength of  the 
prevailing processes, and once a threshold is passed another set of  processes can 
prevail and the system restructures towards a new regime (Biggs, Schluter, and 
Schoon 2015; Peerlings, Polman & Dries 2014). A policymaker might experience 
a much larger response to a policy measure than expected, if  the small effect of  
the policy measure combined with the effects of  the already existing drivers is just 
enough to reach a tipping point. 
Interactions and feedbacks can also provide an explanation for abrupt responses 
within the system. Interactions between agents are the starting point for a number 
of  self-reinforcing processes (Mercure et al., 2016). Agent interaction can take 
place when agents communicate, but can also take place when they observe each 
other. Social norms, networks and informal rules are a product of  such agent-
interaction, as are learning and social influence (Bell & Hernandez, 2017; Cialdini 
& Goldstein, 2004; Maru, McAllister & Smith, 2007). Feedbacks as considered 
in this thesis are directed from the micro level to the macro level and vice versa. 
They play an important role in the understanding of  land use systems. Feedbacks 
can also take place between different components on the same scale level, but 
these are less relevant for explaining the sudden transitions in land use systems 
that are described in this thesis. Furthermore, a distinction can be made into posi-
tive feedbacks and negative feedbacks. A positive feedback is self-reinforcing, and 
can lead to a point-of  no return, after which the system changes (Manson, 2001). 
11
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 1A negative feedback reinforces the current state of  the system, leading to a more 
stable system (Keane, 2016). A policy maker not thinking of  feedbacks might be 
puzzled as to why his policy has no effect (in the case of  a negative feedback) or 
a much larger effect than expected (in the case of  a positive feedback).
Complex Adaptive Systems
Within complexity theory, systems are considered not to be deterministic but to 
be process-dependent. Feedbacks between different scale levels allow the systems 
to self-organize (Folke, 2006) and interactions between its agents may underlie 
the emerging properties of  the system (Levin et al., 2013). In a complex adap-
tive system (CAS), information, both from inside and outside the system, can 
be produced and processed (Mitchell, 2009).  In this way the system is able to 
adapt to changing circumstances. Complex adaptive systems often exhibit strong 
autonomous and internal dynamics (Grimm et al., 2005): gradual changes in 
circumstances can result in non-linear responses. As a result, sometimes small 
changes lead to abrupt responses, while at other times the system may not respond 
to a change at all. The combination of  small changes inducing large responses 
and large changes inducing small or no responses evokes an association with the 
phenomena of  tipping points and regime shifts.  
Land use systems 
Land use systems can be perceived as an example of  a complex adaptive system. 
They often result from human efforts to make a living on the biophysical environ-
ment (Bakker et al., 2012; Foley et al., 2005; Kalnay & Cai, 2003; Matson et al., 
1997; Tilman et al., 2001). These attempts to make a living include cultivating 
land for food production, creating buildings and infrastructure, and distributing 
and consuming goods and services. This has spatial and ecological consequences, 
such as nutrient displacement, changes in hydrological systems and greenhouse 
gas emissions (Bakker et al., 2012). We define land use systems in terms of  the 
agents and their context. Agents are land users, i.e. the individuals who determine 
how the land is used. Often these are natural persons who own or lease the land 
(e.g. farmers or estate owners), but they can also be organizations or institutions 
(e.g. nature conservation organizations or water boards). Although these agents 
may interact with other actors (e.g. plants, animals, factories, policymakers), we 
do not consider these other actors as agents. The context is formed by the bio-
physical and socioeconomic environment which both facilitate and constrain the 
community of  land users. The biophysical environment concerns the available 
natural resources (soil, water, nutrients) while the socioeconomic environment 
concerns the infrastructure, markets, and governance. Within the land use system 
Chapter 1
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a specific spatial land cover emerges as a result of  the production choices made 
by land users. 
To better understand unexpected system behaviour in land use systems, we take 
the Dutch dairy sector as an example of  a land use system. 
The Dutch dairy sector
An example of  a complex land use system can be found in the Dutch dairy sector. 
The agricultural sector is the biggest land user in the Netherlands, taking up 54% 
of  the total Dutch surface area in 2012 (CBS, 2016e). Within Dutch agriculture 
the dairy sector is an important player; about 31% of  the farms in the Nether-
lands in 2016 were dairy farms (CBS, 2017a). In 2016 the dairy sector contained 
about 17 000 farms, which together kept 1.8 million cows that produced about 
14 billion kg milk. The number of  dairy farms has diminished over time, while 
the average number of  cows per farm has increased over time (LEI Wageningen 
UR, 2016). The dairy sector faces continuous change, both in the policy and 
technological domain. These changes are partly driven by concerns about the 
negative effects of  intensive agricultural practices. Policies can be aimed at the 
individual farm, but the focus can also be on farm groups. The response of  the 
farms to these changes is influenced by thresholds, cumulative effects, feedbacks 
and interactions. 
MeChAnISMS of LAnD uSe ChAnge In The DuTCh DAIRy SeCToR
Effects of thresholds, illustrated by production limitations 
Production limitations create thresholds after which a farm is no longer allowed 
to produce or producing becomes more costly. As long as the farm is far from the 
threshold, his decisions will not be constrained by the limitations and his decisions 
with and without the production limitations do not differ. If  the farm produces 
at a level above the threshold, his decisions will differ between the situation with 
and without limitations. So, introducing or removing production limitations could 
result in a change in the land use system. Next, we describe the most important 
production limitations that form thresholds in the Dutch dairy sector.  
In 1968 the EU introduced market-related price and income support for dairy 
farms. To prevent overproduction due to the price support the EU introduced 
supply quotas for milk in 1984 (Keane & O’Connor, 2011). Because of  the distor-
tion to global trade, price and income support for milk received a lot of  criticism 
and the EU took steps to gradually liberalise its dairy policy (Binfield et al., 2004; 
European Commission, 2017). Over time, support prices decreased and supply 
13
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 1quotas increased (Keane & O’Connor, 2011). Therefore, the difference between 
EU prices and world market prices became much smaller, and the EU decided to 
completely abolish the supply quotas for milk in 2015 (European Commission, 
2015). 
An increase in the amounts of  nitrogen and phosphate produced in the dairy 
sector was expected as a consequence of  the milk quota abolishment. The re-
sulting environmental concerns led to an additional law, the “Wet verantwoorde 
groei melkveehouderij” or “Dairy law”, which was introduced in January 2015 
(Rijksoverheid, 2015b). Increasing the amount of  phosphate produced on the 
farm has become more expensive in the new policy situation. Since the Dutch 
government also deemed it undesirable for dairy farms to become very inten-
sive, an “Order of  Council” that ensures land based-growth was introduced in 
September 2015. For intensive farms this new restriction means that additional 
farmland needs to be purchased when increasing the dairy herd.  
The EU allows the Dutch farms to apply more nitrogen per hectare than other 
European farmers (known as derogation), in exchange for which the Dutch gov-
ernment agreed to a phosphate ceiling that limits the total amounts of  phosphate 
that can be produced by the Dutch livestock industry (Tweede Kamer der Staten 
Generaal, 2015). Since the milk quota abolishment resulted in an increase in the 
phosphate production, there is a danger of  losing the derogation. Therefore, 
additional legislation that introduces phosphate rights for dairy farms was intro-
duced that limit phosphate production of  the dairy sector. The phosphate rights 
are implemented from January 2018 onwards (RVO, 2018). 
Since the abolishment of  the milk quotas has removed a threshold that limits 
production, one might expect a shift in production choices, leading to large and 
intensive dairy farms. The associated Dairy Law, Order of  Council and phosphate 
rights introduce new thresholds, after which producing becomes more expensive 
or requires the purchase of  additional land or rights. These new thresholds might 
be expected to prevent a shift from occurring. 
Effects of cumulative effects, illustrated by innovations
The adoption of  an innovation, such as a new technology (e.g. an automatic milk-
ing system) or a new farming practice (e.g. on-farm processing of  organic waste), 
can lead to land use change. Whether and when an innovation is adopted depends 
on multiple factors and their cumulative effects (Sinha & Noble, 2008). There 
are multiple factors that might lead to innovation, but to illustrate the effect of  
cumulative effects we mention three. One factor that aids the diffusion of  innova-
tions is the existence of  external economies of  scale. External economies of  scale 
exist when average costs decrease when the number of  users of  the innovation 
Chapter 1
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increases (Agnolucci & McDowall, 2007). Another factor that will help the uptake 
of  an innovation is the possibility to see the effects of  the innovation demon-
strated (Brown et al., 2016). Farms can learn about innovations by observing and 
interacting with other farms (Small, Brown & Montes de Oca Munguia, 2016). A 
third factor that aids the spread of  an innovation is social capital (Perman et al., 
2011). The social norms and networks within the community can influence the 
values and beliefs of  the farmer (Atwell, Schulte & Westphal, 2009). Social norms 
establish the expectations on how one should behave, and thereby influence farm 
behaviour (Knight & Ensminger, 1998). 
When we consider the effects of  the three mechanisms separately one might 
expect that although the innovation becomes more attractive, it does not become 
standard practice. However, the interaction between the mechanisms might lead 
to a higher uptake of  the innovation. For example, if  a few farmers innovate, 
the effects of  the innovation are demonstrated, which might convince some 
other farmers to innovate as well. Then, because of  these other farmers are now 
innovating, the costs go down due to external economies of  scale. This might 
convince a few more farmers to innovate. At that stage the group of  innovating 
farmers might have become big enough to socially influence other farmers, which 
might finally convince the remaining farmers to innovate. Thus, each of  these 
factors might explain part of  the adoption of  an innovation, but to understand 
the complete picture we expect that it is necessary to take their cumulative effects 
into account as well. 
Effects of feedbacks and interactions, illustrated by Agri-Environmental Schemes
Agri-environmental schemes (AES) have been introduced in an effort to pre-
vent the negative environmental consequences of  intensive farming practices. 
The AES are focused on environmental protection, nature conservation, and 
landscape enhancement (Primdahl et al., 2003). Farms can voluntarily join in an 
AES, in which payments are offered to farms that modify their farming practices 
to the benefit of  the environment (Kleijn & Sutherland, 2003). Within AES the 
environmental benefits achieved depend on the number of  farms participating. 
However, the number of  farm participating might also depend on the level of  
environmental benefits achieved in the region. This is an example of  a feedback 
in the land use system. An extra feedback has been introduced in the Dutch AES 
system in 2016 when group application by farm collectives became compulsory. 
In this new system the farm collective is responsible for the application and the 
implementation of  the AES on the regional level (Ministry of  Economic Affairs, 
2016). AES payments will only be available if  the collective can submit a plan for 
a region that contains sufficient environmental benefits to the government. If  not 
15
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 1enough farms are willing to join in the AES the required environmental benefits 
cannot be promised and the AES payment will not be available. In turn, if  AES 
payments are not available, it will be harder to develop a plan that contains suffi-
cient environmental benefits. Therefore, we suspect that the collective application 
for AES will not always result in higher farm participation and biodiversity.   
The collective AES system is also expected to result in a broader social support 
for the AES system (Portaal Natuur en Landschap, 2017; Stichting Collectief  
Agrarisch Natuurbeheer, 2016). Most members of  the farm collectives feel con-
nected to the collective. Farm collectives also organise activities like member meet-
ings in which farmers can interact (Nieuwenhuizen et al., 2014). The increased 
farmer interaction might increase the social influence or peer pressure between 
farmers, causing farmers to adopt behaviours that comply with the social norm. 
Therefore, we expect that the introduction of  a collective system might result in 
higher farm participation and biodiversity if  social influence indeed increases as 
a result of  this introduction. 
objeCTIve AnD ReSeARCh queSTIonS
In this thesis we aim to answer the following overarching research question: 
Can thresholds, cumulative effects, feedbacks and interactions be responsible for 
unexpected system behaviour in land use systems? 
By answering this research question our understanding of  regime shifts and 
inertia in land use systems will be improved, thereby gaining further insights in 
the functioning of  land use systems. To achieve this aim, the case of  the Dutch 
dairy sector is taken as an example of  a complex adaptive system. Due to its 
importance for land use in the Netherlands and the high level of  policy interven-
tion this sector is subject to, this case seems well suited for this purpose. In this 
thesis we define the following four sub questions:  
1. Will the abolishment of  the milk quotas lead to a shift towards larger and 
more intensive farms in the Netherlands? 
2. How will the uptake of  a new farming practice for processing of  organic 
waste into compost in the “Friese Meren” in the Dutch province of  Friesland 
be influenced by economies of  scale, learning, and changing social norms? 
3. What will be the effect on the resilience of  the system of  the shift from an 
individual to collective application for agri-environmental contracts in the 
Chapter 1
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Netherlands and how is the resilience of  the land use system affected by the 
value farmers attach to biodiversity?
4. Does social infl uence due to the introduction of  the collective AES system in 
the Netherlands result in a shift towards increased farm participation and a 
higher level of  biodiversity?
Figure 1.1. shows an overview of  the structure of  this dissertation: 
figure 1.1. overview of the structure in this dissertation
DATA AnD MoDeLS
To answer the fi rst research question on the abolishment of  milk quotas we defi ne 
10 farm types, based on size. We assume that the farm types can be represented by 
10 individual farms. To model the decisions of  the individual dairy farm we apply 
mathematical programming. Mathematical programming models are commonly 
used to determine the optimal value of  an objective function subject to a set 
of  constraints. Mathematical programming models consist of  a set of  linear or 
nonlinear equations that determine the decision-making space (Kaiser & Messer, 
2011). In classical optimization theory usually an equality constraint is introduced. 
In contrast, mathematical programming techniques optimize an objective func-
tion subject to both equality and inequality constraints (Chiang, 1984). A possible 
non-linear relationship could result from multiple restrictions that are potentially 
binding. To answer the fi rst research question we maximize farm profi t given 
technological constraints like the use of  inputs to produce milk and institutional 
constraints like milk quotas and Dutch manure laws. 
17
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 1Data come from a wide variety of  sources e.g. the BIN dataset (LEI Wagenin-
gen UR, 2015), the Quantitative Information Livestock Industry Report  (KWIN 
2014-2015 (Buisonje et al., 2014) and  KWIN 2016-2017 (Blanken et al., 2016) 
and the handbook on the dairy sector (Remmelink et al., 2014; Remmelink et al., 
2016). The BIN dataset contains economic data on a representative sample of  
Dutch dairy farms. The Quantitative Information Livestock Industry Report is 
an annual report containing up-to-date technical information on milk production 
(e.g. feed use of  livestock). The Handbook on the dairy sector contains additional 
information on dairy farming such as manure production and composition, feed 
use and composition and data on soil quality. 
To answer research question 2 on the uptake of  on-farm processing of  organic 
waste we use a mathematical programming model with multiple objectives. Goal 
programming was developed to deal with multiple objectives and is the most 
widely used multi-criteria decision making technique (Colapinto, Jayaraman & 
Marsiglio, 2017). Goal programming models can be divided into lexicographic 
and weighted goal programming models. We develop a weighted programming 
model. In weighted programming models different goals receive different weights 
in the overall objective function (Colapinto, Jayaraman & Marsiglio, 2017). To 
determine the weights we compare observed levels of  each objective to the 
optimized level of  each objective using a technique described by Manos et al. 
(2009). Data come from semi-structured interviews with a group of  farmers that 
participated in a pilot project for the introduction of  a new farming practice for 
processing of  organic waste into compost. We combine farm-specific data with 
the data sources used for answering research question 1. 
To answer research question 3 on the effects on farm participation and biodi-
versity of  individual versus collective application for agri-environmental contracts 
in the Netherlands we again use a multi-objective goal programming model. The 
weights for the model are determined by asking farmers during semi-structured 
interviews to assign a weight to each farm objective. There are four farm ob-
jectives in our model, which are profit maximization, risk minimization, labour 
minimization and biodiversity maximization. To measure biodiversity we define 
key species, which are exemplary of  the biodiversity in the region. Data come 
from the semi-structured interviews again in combination with the data sources 
used for answering research question 1.
To answer research question 4 on the effect of  social influence on farm 
participation and a higher level of  biodiversity we use the same mathematical 
programming model and data as for research question 3. However, to incorporate 
social influence the model is extended with an Opinion Dynamics Model module 
(Sun & Müller, 2013). Moreover, the weights have been determined using the 
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technique of  Manos et al. (2009). Data sources used are the same as for answering 
research question 3.
Our first research question is answered in chapter 2, the second research ques-
tion is answered in chapter 3, the third research question is answered in chapter 4 
and the fourth research question is answered in chapter 5. In chapter 6 we present 
an overall conclusion and discussion. 
Chapter 2
The effect of milk quota abolishment on farm intensity: 
shifts and stability1 
1 Paper by Groeneveld, A.N., Peerlings, J.H.M., Bakker, M.M., and Heijman, W.J.M. (2016). The effect of  milk 
quota abolishment on farm intensity: shifts and stability. NJAS-Wageningen Journal of  Life Sciences, 77, 
25-37.
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AbSTRACT
We investigate whether milk quota abolition in the Netherlands is likely to 
lead to a shift towards more intensive farms, and whether the legislation 
introduced by the Dutch government to prevent this from happening is likely 
to be effective. To this end a mathematical programming model is developed 
and applied to ten Dutch dairy farms of  varying size. The mathematical 
programming model allows us to calculate shadow prices, which we use to 
evaluate the stability or likelihood of  a shift in the farmer decisions in our 
model. Our results suggest a strong increase in intensity for the largest farm 
type when milk quotas are abolished, while further intensification is limited 
for the smaller farm types. Although most farm types increase the number 
of  cows on the farm, for the smaller ones this can only be achieved when 
the costs of  expanding decrease considerably. The new legislation introduced 
by the Dutch government to prevent strong intensification appears to be 
successful.
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2.1. InTRoDuCTIon
Since 1984, the European Union (EU) has applied a supply quota for milk to 
prevent the overproduction that resulted from milk price support. This price sup-
port for milk was subject to critique, as it distorts global trade. In the 1990s, the 
World Trade Organisation urged the EU to abolish its system of  price support 
(Binfield et al., 2004; NRC, 2015), in response to which the EU decided to gradu-
ally liberalise its dairy policy. From 2003 onwards, support prices were reduced 
and the supply quotas were enlarged in steps. In recent years, world market prices 
for dairy products increased strongly, decreasing the gap between EU prices and 
world market prices. It is therefore that the EU has decided to abolish the supply 
quotas for milk completely (NRC, 2014), per 1st of  April 2015 (European Com-
mission, 2015). When production quotas such as those for milk are abolished, the 
industry structure (i.e. the number of  farms and farm size distribution) is likely to 
be influenced (Boere et al., 2015; Buysse et al., 2012; Straeten et al., 2009), which 
may have important consequences for the land use and landscape in rural areas 
dominated by dairy farming, such as the Netherlands. 
Within the Netherlands the abolishment of  milk quotas has led to environmen-
tal concerns, as further intensification (i.e. number of  livestock per hectare) is ex-
pected (Rijksoverheid, 2015b). Such intensification is likely to lead to an increase 
in the amounts of  nitrogen and phosphate produced, which poses a major threat 
to the fragile natural ecosystems that are – in the Netherlands – often spatially in-
terwoven into the agricultural area. Soon after the introduction of  the milk quota, 
the Dutch government issued regulations to protect the environment (Hees, 
Rougoor, & Schans, 2012) limiting the amount of  nitrogen and phosphate from 
manure and artificial fertilizer that can be put on the land. Excesses of  nitrogen 
and phosphate were to be removed from the farm (Buisonje et al., 2014), which 
led to a considerable trade in these excesses, among agricultural sectors and even 
with other countries. To prevent even larger excesses due to quota abolishment 
(the ceiling for the application of  phosphate on land has remained unchanged), 
an additional law, referred to as the “Wet verantwoorde groei melkveehouderij” 
(law to ensure responsible growth of  the dairy sector) or “Dairy law” (in Dutch 
Melkveewet), has been introduced in January 2015. Any phosphate surplus in 
excess of  the amount prior to the milk quota abolishment has to be processed 
(Eerste Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2014), meaning considerable extra costs for 
the farmer. 
Yet, more restrictions were deemed necessary. Although the Dairy law ad-
dresses environmental concerns by regulating potential phosphate surpluses, it 
still allows farms to grow and/or intensify. Intensive dairy farming has become a 
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topic of  societal debate for various reasons. Firstly, it is associated with cows that 
remain permanently indoors, which is considered to result in a loss of  cultural 
ecosystem services (meadows with cows are considered esthetically pleasing) 
(Yarwood & Evans, 2003). Secondly, animal welfare is considered to be at stake 
in high-intensity farms, also due to the fact that many cows never leave the stable 
(Shum et al., 2009; Stafford & Gregory, 2008).  Thirdly, many people consider the 
existence of  very large farms (and large stables in particular) undesirable. Most 
people associate farming with family farms, and oppose the idea of  industrializa-
tion of  farming (Lagane, 2014). Whether or not these arguments are justified, the 
ministry of  Economic Affairs accommodated them by implementing a further 
measure (i.e. the ‘Order of  Council’) in September 2015 that imposes a restriction 
on the intensification of  Dutch dairy farms (Rijksoverheid, 2015c). The measure 
specifically ensures land-based growth by demanding that – for intensive farms 
- further increases in the on-farm phosphate surpluses are only allowed when a 
certain amount of  land is available (Rijksoverheid, 2015a; Rijksoverheid, 2015c). 
This means that most farmers who want to increase their dairy herd can only do 
so if  they purchase additional farmland.
The objective of  this paper is to investigate whether the abolition will lead to 
a shift towards larger and more intensive farms in the Netherlands. In addition, 
we explore the effectiveness of  the Order of  Council. We do this for a range 
of  farm sizes, as we expect that responses to policy changes will differ strongly 
per size category. More specifically, we expect that large farms are more likely 
to intensify when milk quotas are abolished than small farms. This is because 
larger farms have higher economic and environmental efficiencies (Bos, Smit & 
Schröder, 2013), have lower per-unit production costs, and are therefore more 
likely to invest in more animals. Taking into account this variability within the 
farm population is thus essential to reveal the potential impact of  policy reforms.
A mathematical programming model is developed and applied to ten represen-
tative Dutch dairy farms of  different size as measured by Standard Output (SO). 
SO is the average monetary value of  the agricultural output at farm gate price, and 
is considered a good measure of  the economic size of  a farm (Eurostat, 2015). 
The model is used to analyse the likelihood of  a shift towards a more intensive 
farm. We formulated three policy options: one reflects the situation with the milk 
quota still in place, the second reflects the situation in which milk quotas are 
abandoned but the Order of  Council is not in effect, and the third captures the 
situation in which the Order of  Council is introduced. Section 2 provides a short 
background. Section 3 discusses the methods we use. The results are presented 
in section 4. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis and sections 6 and 7 provide 
the discussion and conclusion.
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2.2. bACkgRounD
Agricultural land takes up about half  of  the total surface area in the Netherlands 
(CBS, 2016a; CBS, 2016b) and about 40 percent of  agricultural land is used by 
dairy farms (CBS, 2015a). The majority of  Dutch dairy farms is specialised in 
milk production (Westhoek et al., 2004). In 2014 there were around 17,000 dairy 
farms in the Netherlands (CBS, 2015a) which had an average SO of  339,000 
euro. An average Dutch dairy farm as described by the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN) has 50 hectares of  land and 90 dairy cows, which comes down 
to an average intensity of  1.8 cows per ha in 2014 (LEI Wageningen UR, 2015). 
Considering an average phosphate production of  45.5 kg per cow, and an al-
lowed application rate of  95 kg phosphate on grassland (Buisonje et al., 2014), 
1.8 cow per ha would not require any manure to be exported off-farm. However, 
since most farms also apply artificial fertilizer, and keep young cattle which is 
not included in the average of  90 cows as recorded in the FADN, most dairy 
farms export or process manure. In 2014, 85.6 million kg of  phosphate (Tweede 
kamer der Staten Generaal, 2015) and 257 million kg of  nitrogen (CBS, 2016c) 
was produced by dairy farms. The Dutch government has made an agreement 
with the European Commission that allows farms to apply an additional amount 
of  nitrogen to their land when at least 80 percent of  their land is grassland. This 
is referred to as derogation and in exchange for the increased application of  
nitrogen allowed by the European Commission the Dutch government has to 
ensure that the total amounts of  nitrogen and phosphate from manure stay below 
a so-called phosphate and nitrogen ceiling (Tweede kamer der Staten Generaal, 
2015).  In 2014 77% of  the dairy farms had an excess of  phosphate that had to 
be exported from the farm or processed (CBS, 2016c). If  we consider the whole 
agricultural sector 172 million kg phosphate was produced of  which 137 million 
kg could be applied on land, 28 million kg was exported to other countries, and 
10 million kg was processed (CBS, 2016d).  
As for the other issues around farm size and intensification, 69% of  all dairy 
farms allow their cows to graze outside (CBS, 2015b). Within the Netherlands 
there is a general trend towards increasingly larger farms. This trend is also visible 
for the Dutch dairy sector. The number of  farms with more than 250 cows has 
increased from 44 in 1980 to 355 in 2015. From 2011 onwards, the number of  
dairy farms in the Netherlands has decreased, while the number of  dairy cows has 
increased. Thus, more cows are kept on bigger farms (CBS, 2015c). 
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2.3. MeThoD
Mathematical programming
Mathematical programming is a method for identifying an optimal allocation of  
resources (Mavrotas, Florios & Vlachou, 2010). Within a mathematical program-
ming model, an objective function is specified, which is maximized or minimized 
given a set of  constraints. In this paper we assume that farms’ main goal is to 
optimize their gross margin or profit. The assumption of  profit maximization 
is in line with assumptions that are generally made in economic modelling 
(Pedersen et al., 2012), although it should be mentioned that in reality farms 
might have other objectives such as the minimization of  labour use and risk or 
the environmental impact of  farming as well (Berbel & Rodriguez-Ocana, 1998; 
Rozakis, Sintori & Tsiboukas, 2012; Sumpsi, Amador & Romero, 1997; Willock et 
al., 1999). Mathematical programming allows us to study changes in the optimal 
farming decisions, which are the result of  constraints becoming more or less 
binding. 
In our model a farm maximizes gross margin given a set of  technological and 
institutional constraints. These constraints can be both equality and inequality 
constraints. The basic structure of  a mathematical programming model with only 
technological and inequality constraints is given in equation 1.
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I  our m del a farm maximizes gross margin given  set of tec nological and institutional 
constraints. These constraints can be both equality and inequality constraints. The basic 
structure of a mathematical programming model with only technological and inequality 
constraints is given in equation 1. 
max
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 = ∑ (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  (1) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1     ∀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] (1a) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0                     ∀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1b) 
Where: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 is gross margin defined as total revenues minus total variable costs, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 refers to revenues 
per unit of activity i, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the variable costs per unit of activity i, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the level of activity i, 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total availability of a resource k, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the quantity of resource k demanded by 
activity i, and  𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the shadow price of input k.  
Equation 1 states that farms maximize gross margin by choosing the optimal activity levels 
under the assumption of exogenous output and input prices. Optimization takes place 
according to two types of restrictions. First, restriction 1a gives inequality restrictions, for 
example that the total use of fixed inputs should be less than or equal to the endowments of 
these inputs. Second, restriction 1b states that activity levels cannot be negative.  
 (1)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 = ∑ (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  (1) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1     ∀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖[𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] (1a) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0                     ∀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1b) 
Where: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍 is gross margin defined as total revenues minus total variable costs, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 refers to revenues 
per unit of activity i, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the v riabl  costs per unit of act vity i, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the level f activity i, 
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total availability of a resource k, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the quantity of resource k demanded by 
act vi y i, and  𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the shadow price of input k.  
Equation 1 states that farms maximize gross margin by choosing the optimal activity levels 
under the assump ion of exogenous output and input pri es. Optimization t kes place 
acco ding to two ypes of restrictions. First, restriction 1a gives nequality restrictions, for 
example that the otal use of fixed inputs hould be less than or equal to the endowments of 
these inputs. Second, re triction 1b states t at activity levels cannot be negative.  
 (1b)
Where:
Z is gross margin defined as total revenues minus total variable costs, pi refers to 
r ve ue pe  u it of  activity i, wi is the variable costs per unit of  acti ity i, xi s he 
level of  activity i, bk is the total availability of  a resource k, aik is the quantity of  
resource k demanded by activity i, and πk is the shadow price of  input k. 
Equation 1 states that farms maximize gross margin by choosing the optimal 
activity levels under the assu ption of  exogenous out u  and put prices. Op-
timization takes place according to two types of  restrictions. First, restriction 1a 
gives inequality restrictions, for example that the total use of  fixed inputs should 
be less than or equal to the endowments of  these inputs. Second, restriction 1b 
states that activity levels cannot be negative. 
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Stability, regime shifts and shadow prices
Models such as the one developed here, are commonly used to identify the op-
timal allocation of  a set of  resources under specifi c conditions and constraints. 
Their static nature does not – at fi rst sight – qualify them for exploring temporal 
dynamics. However, we do think they can be used to reveal a potential disposition 
of  a system for regime shifts. This is because these models typically reveal non-
linear responses of  system properties (i.e. the resource allocation that leads to the 
highest profi t) to prices and availability of  the resources. The non-linear relation-
ship between the availability of  a factor and the optimal allocation of  resources 
is the result of  multiple factors that are potentially binding. If  a mathematical 
programming model contains only two factors that infl uence the objective we can 
give a graphical presentation of  the optimization problem (Figure 2.1.).
Figure 2.1. graphical representation of the optimization problem, based on (Kaiser & 
Messer, 2011) 
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Panel (a) shows the two factors A and B that can be combined to reach a certain 
gross margin level Z. In the initial situation constraint A1, B and C are given, and 
all choices for the levels of  A and B that are feasible form the feasible region. In 
the initial situation the feasible region is determined by the binding constraints 
A1 and B, while constraint C is not binding. The light grey lines labelled Z are 
the iso-profit lines. These lines connect all the combinations of  factor A and B 
for which the profit reaches the same level. In the initial situation the highest 
level of  gross margin that can be obtained is Z1, where point O1 indicates the 
optimal amounts of  factor A and B used in this case. Now imagine one more unit 
of  factor A would become available, shifting the constraint from A1 to A2. This 
would mean that the feasible region grows and the highest level of  gross margin 
that can now be obtained is Z2. The point O2 indicates the optimal amounts of  
factor A and B used in this case. The difference between Z1 and Z2 is the extra 
gross margin that results from having one more unit of  factor A available, which 
is referred to as the shadow price of  factor A. If  the decision maker would have 
the opportunity to obtain an extra unit of  factor A, the shadow price would be 
the maximum amount the decision maker would be willing to pay to do so.  If  we 
shift to constraint A3, constraint C, which was previously not binding the optimal 
solution, now restricts the optimal level of  gross margin that can be obtained. 
The point O3 indicates the optimal amounts of  factor A and B used in this case. 
Shifting the constraint even further out to A4 would no longer result in extra 
gross margin, since constraint C prevents this. In Panel (1b) we show the response 
of  gross margin to an increase in the availability of  factor A, if  we keep all other 
constraints fixed. Whenever binding factors change (i.e. the lines representing 
constraints in Panel (1a) change), the optimal solution and its associated resource 
allocation changes as well, but not in a linear way (Panel (1b)): As long as bind-
ing factors are relaxed or changed, the optimal solution will change as well; but 
once another constraint ‘takes over’ the binding role, the optimal solution will no 
longer respond to changes in the (now no longer binding) factor. 
Hence, it is possible that the optimal solution does not change when we change 
the value of  one of  the constraints (say from A4 to A3 in Panel (1b)), but when we 
continue changing the constraint value, at some point (A3) a small extra change 
will be enough to result in a different optimal solution. This is a clear analogy 
with the concept of  regime shifts as proposed by (Folke et al., 2004). Following 
this analogy, optimal solutions can be seen as domains of  attraction, the range 
over which a constraint can change without affecting the optimal solution can be 
seen as resilience, while the shift from one optimal solution to another could be 
seen as a regime shift. Although in this case the regime shift does not result from 
complex system behaviour (e.g. interactions between individual building blocks, 
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and feedbacks between scale levels), and the shift itself  is not characterized by an 
(uncontrollable) cascade of  positive feedbacks, there is a clear non-linear response 
that needs to be accounted for when anticipating the effects of  a policy measure. 
In a mathematical programming model the stability or resilience of  the optimal 
solution can be measured by its relative position within the range of  optimality. 
This range indicates the maximum change that the system can absorb due to a 
change in a driver (e.g. the amount of  manure that has to be processed) without 
changing the optimal solution (Kaiser & Messer, 2011).
Since a graphical representation is only possible in the case with two constrain-
ing resources (and we have many more), a useful indicator for the degree to 
which a factor is binding, is the shadow price. A shadow price indicates what 
the value is of  one more unit of  a resource to the decision maker (Gass, 2003). 
For example, if  a farm is constrained by the initial stable capacity (factor A) the 
shadow price indicates how much a farmer would be willing to pay to increase 
the stable capacity (shifting constraint A). If  the shadow price is zero, the stable 
capacity is not constraining the production. If  the shadow price is positive, but 
less than the actual investment costs, the farmer will not be willing to invest. Only 
when the shadow price equals or exceeds the investment costs the farmer would 
start investing in extra stable capacity. Hence, shadow prices allow us to quantify 
the likelihood of  a shift in one of  the constraints, and thus the optimal solution. 
We will use these concepts to interpret our results in terms of  the likelihood of  
a shift or stability. 
Model
Our model describes the decisions made by Dutch dairy farms. It is assumed that a 
farm maximizes gross margin given a set of  constraints. Gross margin is the result 
of  revenue from milk production and selling cows that are no longer suited for 
milk production against a fixed price, minus the maintenance costs of  cows and 
young cattle, the costs of  growing grass and maize, the costs of  buying feed, the 
costs of  removing phosphate (P2O5), the costs of  processing phosphate (which 
is higher than the costs of  removing phosphate), the costs of  hiring additional 
labour, the investment cost in additional stable capacity, the costs of  raising or 
buying extra cows and the cost of  renting extra land to a maximum of  20 ha.  It 
is possible that the farm rents out some of  its initial land, in which case the costs 
of  renting extra land are negative and result in extra revenue. A mathematical 
presentation of  our model can be found in appendix A. 
The farm is restricted by its initial endowment of  land, cows, stable capacity, 
own labour and policy regulations. There is a policy which limits the amount of  
phosphate that can be placed on land. In the situation where milk quotas are ap-
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plied policy restricts the amount of  milk that can be sold. In the case where milk 
quotas are abandoned and the Dairy Law is introduced policy restricts the amount 
of  phosphate that can be removed. In the case where milk quotas are abandoned 
and the Order of  Council is introduced policy dictates a certain amount of  land 
that needs to be bought when expanding production. 
In our model there are three shadow prices of  interest. First, the shadow price 
that indicates the value of  extending the initial stable capacity with one more 
cow. This is relevant as we assume that there is a maximum farm size in terms 
of  cow numbers (i.e. 500 cows) and the farm will only extend stable capacity 
when the shadow price is equal or higher than the yearly investment costs of  
additional stable capacity. Second, the shadow price indicating the value of  one 
more hectare of  land the farm can rent. This is relevant as we assume a farm 
cannot extend with more than 20 ha and the farm will only attract extra land if  
the shadow price is higher than the costs of  renting extra land (1200 euro per ha). 
Third, the shadow price indicating the value of  having one more hour of  labour 
available. This is relevant as below an external wage (16.74 euro per hour) a farm 
will not hire external labour. Our model provides a more simplified and stylized 
version of  a mathematical programming dairy model than for instance the model 
of  Berentsen and Giesen (1995), to allow a stronger focus on the possibility of  
a shift.
Our model allows farms to rent up to 20 hectares of  extra land, paying 1200 
euro per hectare. Farms can increase the number of  cows up to 500, which we 
consider to be the maximum number of  cows that can still be managed on a 
family farm. Each farm has 7000 hours of  own labour available, more labour 
from outside the farm can be hired, for which the farm pays a wage of  17 euro 
per hour.  As mentioned before we present all results compared to the initial 
situation in the BIN data set.
Data
The costs of  feed bought, the costs of  removing phosphate, the costs of  
maintaining young cattle, the costs of  extra cows, the yearly investment costs 
in the stable, the costs of  hired labour, the amount of  feed measured in KVEM 
(measure for energy content of  feed) produced on a ha of  grassland and maize 
land, the amount of  young cattle needed for replacement of  current dairy cows, 
the amount of  phosphate allowed on a ha of  grassland and maize land, and 
the percentage grassland needed to be able to apply for derogation are taken 
from the Quantitative Information Livestock Industry report KWIN 2014-2015 
(Buisonje et al., 2014).  The KVEM needed per cow, the KVEM needed for 
young cattle, and the amount of  own labour hours available are taken from the 
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handbook on the dairy farm sector 2014 (Remmelink et al., 2014). The kg P2O5 
per KVEM from grass, the kg P2O5 per KVEM from maize, the kg P2O5 per 
KVEM from feed bought, the kg P2O5 bound in milk, kg P2O5 bound in carrying 
cows and kg P2O5 bound in young cattle are taken from the assistance report 
for calculating phosphate production on dairy farms by the Dutch government. 
The labour hours needed for milk production, for cultivating grass land and for 
cultivating maize land are taken from (Meetjesland, 2016), the land rent is based 
on (BoerenBusiness, 2014a) and the costs of  cultivating a ha grass land and maize 
land are calculated using the “Kostenwijzer voedermiddelen” (Cost indicator for 
feedstuff) (Wageningen UR, 2015).
To be able to discuss the effect of  milk quota abolition we defined 10 farm 
types based on SO, describing farms with increasingly larger SO. Our starting 
point in creating these different farm types was the BIN dataset (LEI Wageningen 
UR, 2015). This dataset provided us with information on the total farm area, the 
initial number of  cows, the number of  cows sold, the production per cow, the 
price of  cows sold and the other costs of  keeping cows for three different farm 
sizes.
The data from BIN provided us with the opportunity to calculate the percent-
age of  the total farms represented by each of  the three farm types based on SO. 
In 2013 a 0.1 share of  the farms fell in the category 0 to 150,000 SO, a 0.2 share 
of  the farms fell within the category 150,000-250,000 and a 0.5 share of  the 
farms fell within the 250,000-500,000 category. These shares do not add up to 
one, since there are farms that fall in the category larger than 500,000. Using this 
information we searched for a distribution that fitted our data and that we could 
calibrate to our data. We considered a normal distribution, a gamma distribution 
and a Weibull distribution. The distribution that we found fitted our data the 
closest was the Weibull distribution. The probability density function of  a Weibull 
distribution has the following form:
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We then divided this distribution in intervals, looking at the SO of  farms at the 
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90 percent quantile. To present each group we 
took the average of  SO of  the farms at the beginning and end of  each interval. 
For example, for the farm type in the 0-10 percent quantile SO was the average 
of  SO at the 0 percent quantile and SO at the 10 percent quantile. In this way 10 
farm types based on SO were created which each present an equal share of  the 
farms.  
The next step was to calculate the value of  the exogenous variables that are 
used in the model. In order to do this the farm size in terms of  SO was plotted 
against each exogenous variable. Using the three data points a trend line was fitted 
to the data. The resulting equation was then used to estimate the values of  the 
exogenous variables for the different farm types.
The decisions made by the farm are influenced by policy, input prices and 
output prices.  The values of  the exogenous prices in the model can be found in 
Table 2.1.  Some values differ between the different farm types in which case a 
price range is given, while others are the same for everyone. A further description 
of  the data used in our model can be found in appendix B. Data were taken for 
the period 2013-2014.
Table 2.1. Values for the prices and costs used in the model
Price Value
Yearly maintenance costs in euro per cow on farm n 234 - 509
Yearly maintenance costs in euro per young cattle on farm n 45-97
Yearly costs in euro of growing one ha grass 1440
Yearly costs in euro of growing one ha maize 1540
Costs of feed bought in euro per KVEM 0.14
Costs of removing P2O5 in euro per kg 9.33
Costs of processing P2O5 in euro per kg 10.83
Costs of hired labour in euro per hour 16.74
Yearly investment costs additional stable capacity including young                                    
cattle capacity in euro per place for each extra cow  354.80
Yearly costs of raising or buying extra cows in euro per cow 294
Yearly costs of renting extra land in euro per ha 1200
Price of cows sold from the farm in euro per cow for farm n 515-770
Milk price in euro per 100 kg 42.18-43.78
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Policy options
We ran our model for the following three policy options: 
PO1: Milk quotas
This policy option fits the situation before 1 April 2015. In this policy option, the 
farm maximizes gross margin but is constrained by the milk quota, which limits 
milk production and thus the number of  cows. 
PO2: Milk quotas abolished, no Order of Council
In this policy option, the farm maximizes gross margin, and is no longer con-
strained by the milk quota. The number of  cows on the farm is now only limited 
by a supposed maximum amount of  500 cows that can be managed by a family 
farm; this assumption is based on (Boerderij, 2010; Gelderlander, 2015; Trouw, 
2015).  Any phosphate surplus in excess of  the amount that already was exported 
off-farm prior to the milk quota abolishment in the reference year 2013, has to be 
either processed (against a considerable cost), applied on land (but up to limited 
amounts per hectare), or a combination of  these two measures.
PO3: Milk quotas are abolished and Order of Council is introduced
In this policy option, the farm maximizes gross margin and is no longer con-
strained by the milk quota. However, the Order of  Council is introduced, ensuring 
land-bound growth. Farms that have a phosphate surplus below 20 kg phosphate 
per hectare are excluded from the Order of  Council and any phosphate surplus 
in excess of  the amount that already was exported off-farm prior to the milk 
quota abolishment in the reference year 2013 has to be either processed, applied 
on land, or a combination of  these two measures. If  the farm has an on-farm 
phosphate surplus above 20 kg phosphate per hectare, a certain share of  this has 
to be placed on additional land. Farms that have a phosphate surplus between 
20-50 kg per hectare are obliged to place 25 percent of  the additional phosphate 
production on land and farms that have a surplus above 50 kg per hectare are 
required to place 50 percent of  the additional phosphate production on land, the 
rest of  the additional phosphate surplus can be either processed, applied on land 
or a combination of  these two measures. 
Note that PO1 in a way reflects the situation of  the recent past, which could 
allow us to use existing data rather than model outcomes. However, the initial 
situation as presented by the BIN data might not be the gross margin maximizing 
situation. In the model we allow for an increase in the amount of  land rented and 
in the stable capacity on the farm, which is, in reality not always that simple, due 
to scarcity of  land or the requirement to obtain building permits. To capture this, 
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we compare the results from the three policy options with the actual situation as 
described by the BIN data.
2.4. ReSuLTS
Table 2.2. shows the amount of  extra land rented by the 10 farm types for the 
three policy options (PO). The farms in quantile 0-10 present the farms with the 
smallest SO and the farms in quantile 90-100 present the farms with the largest 
SO.  The smallest farm type rents out one hectare of  land for all policy options. 
With the number of  cows on this farm no additional land is needed for placing 
a phosphate surplus. The other farm types rent some extra land under PO1, as it 
provides them with feed and the option to put phosphate on land. The number of  
cows under PO2 is higher than under PO1, leading to a higher demand for land 
as well. Under PO2 Farm types in the 10-100 percent quantiles rent all available 
extra land (i.e. up to 20 ha, see Model section). Under PO3 this is largely the same, 
but somewhat lower for the farm type in the 10-20 quantile, who has a slightly 
lower number of  cows in this policy option.
Table 2.2. Extra hectares of land rented per farm type for the three policy options 
Farm type/ extra land rented PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No milk 
quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 -1 -1 -1
Quantile 10-20 3 20 19
Quantile 20-30 5 20 20
Quantile 30-40 6 20 20
Quantile 40-50 8 20 20
Quantile 50-60 9 20 20
Quantile 60-70 11 20 20
Quantile 70-80 12 20 20
Quantile 80-90 14 20 20
Quantile 90-100 20 20 20
Table 2.3. shows that the number of  cows for all but the smallest farm type is 
higher under PO2 and PO3 compared to PO1, but less so under PO3 than in 
PO2. Increase in cows is constrained by different factors for different farm size 
types. Farm types in the 10-30 percent quantiles would – under PO2 - have to 
start paying for the removal or processing of  excess phosphate when increasing 
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the number of  cows any further, while farm types in the 30-90 percent quantiles 
use all of  their own labour, so that increasing the number of  cows would result 
in more hired labour costs. Since the costs outweigh the extra gross margin, these 
farms will not expand their number of  cows any further. Since the larger farm 
types have a larger initial endowment of  land, they end up with more land than 
the smaller farm types. For the farm types limited by the availability of  own labour 
the consequence is that more labour is spent cultivating land and less labour is 
available for the cows, explaining the decreasing number of  cows with increasing 
farm size for those farms in the 30-90 quantiles of  PO2. The number of  cows 
is lower in PO3 for all farm types in the 10-100 percent quantiles than in PO2.
Table 2.3. Number of cows per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/number of cows PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 24 24 24
Quantile 10-20 45 71 69
Quantile 20-30 57 83 83
Quantile 30-40 68 168 99
Quantile 40-50 78 165 112
Quantile 50-60 88 161 126
Quantile 60-70 99 158 140
Quantile 70-80 112 154 154
Quantile 80-90 129 149 149
Quantile 90-100 215 500 276
As a measure of  intensity Table 2.4. presents the number of  cows per hectare 
under the different policy options for the ten farm types. The number of  cows 
per hectare for the farm types in the 0-20 percent quantiles is not affected by the 
policy options. Even though the farm types in the 10-20 percent quantile increase 
their number of  cows, they increase the amount of  land accordingly. The farm 
types in the 10-100 percent quantiles all rent extra land under PO2 and PO3. PO3 
is effective in terms of  avoiding intensification for the farm types in the 30-70 
and 90-100 quantiles as it results in a lower number of  cows per ha. The farms in 
the 30-90 quantiles use all of  their own labour available, limiting the total number 
of  cows. Because larger farms have a larger initial land endowment, and because 
all farms in the 30-90 quantiles rent all available extra land when milk quotas are 
abolished, the number of  cows per ha decreases when the farm size measured in 
SO increases under PO2.   
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Table 2.4. Cows per hectare per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/ number of cows per ha PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 10-20 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 20-30 1.5 1.6 1.6
Quantile 30-40 1.5 2.9 1.7
Quantile 40-50 1.5 2.6 1.8
Quantile 50-60 1.5 2.4 1.8
Quantile 60-70 1.5 2.1 1.9
Quantile 70-80 1.5 1.9 1.9
Quantile 80-90 1.5 1.7 1.7
Quantile 90-100 1.6 3.8 2.1
Table 2.5. shows that the phosphate surplus per hectare is larger for the farm 
types in quantiles 20-100 under PO2 and PO3 compared to PO1. Under PO2 and 
PO3 farm types 20-90 rent all extra land that is available. Larger farm types have a 
larger initial land endowment and a smaller number of  cows due to the restriction 
on own labour available. This explains how larger farm types can have a smaller 
surplus per hectare. PO3 effectively lowers the phosphate surplus per hectare for 
farm types in the 30-70 and 90-100 quantiles.
Table 2.5. Phosphate surplus per ha per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/ phosphate surplus per ha PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 0 0
Quantile 20-30 0 5 5
Quantile 30-40 0 113 15
Quantile 40-50 0 89 20
Quantile 50-60 0 68 25
Quantile 60-70 0 49 29
Quantile 70-80 0 31 31
Quantile 80-90 0 10 10
Quantile 90-100 3 173 39
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The results show that the differences between farm types in costs and rev-
enues in the model are determining the outcomes. Since small farms have higher 
maintenance costs per cow and a lower production per cow they are less likely to 
become big and very intensive when milk quotas are abolished. Only the largest 
farms found in the 90-100 percent quantile will increase the number of  cows per 
hectare under PO2 significantly, since they can afford to pay the investment costs 
in stable capacity, the hired labour costs, the rent for extra land, and the costs of  
processing phosphate.  More model results for the gross margin per farm type, 
the number of  cows exceeding initial stable capacity per farm type, the phosphate 
processing costs per farm type, the hectares per farm type and the phosphate 
surplus per farm type can be found in appendix C. 
Stability and shifts within the model
Table 2.6. shows the shadow prices for stable capacity for the different farm types 
in the different policy options. The shadow price for stable capacity indicates 
the extra gross margin a farm could achieve when having one more place in its 
initial stable capacity. If  this amount is equal to the costs of  investing in one 
more stable place (355 euro) the farm will choose to do so and there is no limit 
to the amount of  extra stable places a farm can invest in. The shadow price tells 
us how far the price of  stable capacity would have to go down for the farms to 
start investing in additional stable capacity. The shadow price can therefore be 
seen as an indicator for the distance to a tipping point where farms will no longer 
be kept from expanding due to the investment costs in stable capacity. Table 2.6. 
shows that this situation is reached for all farm types under PO2 and PO3 except 
the 0-10 quantile.
Under PO2 and PO3 only the smallest farm type in quantile 0-10 is constrained 
by the investment costs in extra stable capacity. The shadow price shows that these 
costs would have to go down considerably before this decision would change and 
a shift towards investment in extra stable capacity would occur. Therefore, the 
choice made by the farm type in the 0-10 quantile is quite stable with respect to 
investment costs for stable capacity.  The other farm types are not constrained by 
the stable capacity (as under PO1) or the investment costs in stable capacity (as 
under PO2 and PO3).
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Table 2.6. Shadow prices (euro per cow) for stable capacity per farm type for the three 
policy options
Farm type/shadow price stable 
capacity 
PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No milk 
quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 0 276 276
Quantile 10-20 0 355 355
Quantile 20-30 0 355 355
Quantile 30-40 0 355 355
Quantile 40-50 0 355 355
Quantile 50-60 0 355 355
Quantile 60-70 0 355 355
Quantile 70-80 0 355 355
Quantile 80-90 0 355 355
Quantile 90-100 0 355 355
The shadow price for land as presented in Table 2.7. measures what it would be 
worth to the farm if  there would be 1 more ha of  land that it could rent. Under 
PO2 all farms except those in quantile 0-10 and under PO3 all farms except 
those in quantile 0-20 rent the maximum allowed 20ha (see Table 2.2.). If  the 
maximum amount of  extra land available for rent to the farm is not constraining 
its production, the shadow price for extra land available for rent is 0. The shadow 
price is zero when the gross margin increase (excluding the costs of  buying land) 
of  buying land is less than 1200 euros (i.e. the price of  buying land) making the 
net gross margin increase of  renting land negative. So, the farm does not buy 
land and the shadow price is zero. A shadow price of  151 results when the gross 
margin increase (excluding the costs of  buying land) is 1351 making the net gross 
margin increase of  renting land positive and equal to 151.  
The shadow price for land shows that the farm types in the 10-100 percent 
quantiles in PO2 would be willing to rent extra land if  it became available, thereby 
becoming less intensive. In PO3 the availability of  extra land is constraining the 
gross margin for farm types in the 40-70 quantiles and 90-100 quantile even more. 
Especially for the largest farm type extra land for rent would result in a consider-
able increase in gross margin. The farm types with a shadow price larger than 
zero would rent extra land if  it became available, resulting in a shift towards a 
less intensive farming practice.  The high positive shadow prices indicate that the 
system is responsive, in the sense that this farm type will respond to extra land 
becoming available.  
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Table 2.7. Shadow prices (euro per ha) for land per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/shadow price land PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No milk 
quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 151 0
Quantile 20-30 0 291 291
Quantile 30-40 0 339 347
Quantile 40-50 0 326 347
Quantile 50-60 0 313 347
Quantile 60-70 0 299 347
Quantile 70-80 0 285 285
Quantile 80-90 0 266 266
Quantile 90-100 38 227 1810
The shadow price for labour in Table 2.8. indicates the extra gross margin a farm 
could achieve for having one more hour of  own labour available. If  the shadow 
price is equal to the hired labour wage, the farm will hire additional labour. Only 
if  the shadow price for own labour is equal to the wage for hired labour (17 euro) 
the farm will hire additional labour.  Table 2.8. shows that it is only attractive for 
the largest farm type to hire labour.
The shadow price for own labour costs shows that labour is not constraining 
for the farm types in the 0-90 quantile under PO1, for the farm types in the 0-30 
quantile under PO2, and for the farm types in the 0-70 quantile under PO3. The 
wage for hired labour would have to decrease substantially before the farm types 
in the 30-90 quantile under PO2 and 70-90 quantile under PO3 would hire ad-
ditional labour. Therefore, these farm types are quite stable in their choice not to 
hire labour. That said, under PO2 and PO3 a drop of  3 euros in the wage would 
result in a shift in farming decisions for the farms in the 80-90 percent quantile. 
Chapter 2
38
Table 2.8. Shadow prices for labour (euro per hour) per farm type for the three policy 
options
Farm type/shadow price labour PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order 
of Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 0 0
Quantile 20-30 0 0 0
Quantile 30-40 0 1 0
Quantile 40-50 0 3 0
Quantile 50-60 0 5 0
Quantile 60-70 0 7 0
Quantile 70-80 0 9 9
Quantile 80-90 0 14 14
Quantile 90-100 17 17 17
2.5. SENSiTiViTy ANAlySiS
The results we find depend strongly on the value of  the prices that are used 
within our model. In this paper we use data from 2013-2014, a period in which 
the milk price was very high. To show how our results would change with a lower 
milk price, we ran our model using the expected long term milk price instead. The 
results from this analysis can be found in appendix D. Lowering the milk price 
makes dairy farming less profitable for all farm types. For smaller farm types it 
is more profitable to rent out their land and sell their cows than to use the cows 
and land on their own farm. None of  the farm types will expand their number of  
cows to the maximum.  However, it is good to keep in mind that we only changed 
the milk price in this policy option, but kept all other costs and prices at the 
2013-2014 level. It can be expected that these will also change over the long term. 
2.6. DiSCuSSiON
Our results suggest that the milk quota abolishment will have the largest impact 
for the largest farm type in the 90-100 percent quantile. When milk quotas are 
abolished and only the Dairy law is in place this will be the only farm type that 
reaches the maximum amount of  cows that can be kept on a farm in our model. 
The other farm types are restricted by the investment costs of  stable capacity 
and the wage rate of  hired labour, or the costs of  processing manure and will 
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not become very intensive. The introduction of  the Order of  Council effectively 
limits the growth of  the largest farm type in the 90-100 percent quantile. 
The hypothesis that farms will grow when milk quotas are abolished seems to 
be supported by our results. Combined with a limitation on the land available 
for rent in the region this will also result in more intensive farms. The fear that 
intensive farms emerge if  no additional legislation is introduced after quota abol-
ishment seems to be realistic for the largest farm type. Whether a farm will change 
its farming practice to a larger scale with a more intensive farming style depends 
on the cost structure. Because larger farms can produce at lower costs, these are 
the farms that will grow and become more intensive. The expected shift towards 
larger farms is in line with the results found by Huettel and Jongeneel (2011) who 
found that a trend of  increasing herd size is likely after milk quotas are abolished. 
Research by Louhichi et al. (2010) also indicated that herd size is likely to increase 
as a result of  milk quota abolishment. Koeijer et al. (2014) considered several 
other options for land-based dairy farm growth, and concluded that land-based 
dairy farm growth is likely to increase the demand for land, and result in a higher 
land price. This is in line with the analysis performed by Rougoor and Schans 
(2013) and Rougoor and Schans (2014), who suggest that arable farms might 
choose to rent out their land to dairy farms due to the high value of  land for the 
dairy sector. These results found by others are in line with the results we find in 
our model. Having extra land available for rent would be especially beneficial to 
those farms which are heavily constrained by the availability of  land as indicated 
by the high shadow price for land.  
The results from our sensitivity analysis suggest that some of  the smaller farm 
types would achieve the highest gross margin by renting out most of  their land 
and selling most of  their cows when the milk price is equal to the long term 
expected milk price. The fact that they do not rent out all their land and sell all 
their cows is due to a restriction in our model that does not allow for having 
no land on the farm. In reality these farms might quit all together. Although 
our results do not demonstrate that small Dutch dairy farms will quit, research 
by Zimmermann and Heckelei (2012) showed that the probability of  farm exit 
decreases when farm size increases.  
In this paper, we explored the degree to which we could relate the non-linear 
response of  the optimal situation to the availability of  various resources (stable 
capacity, availability of  extra land for rent and labour) to the concepts of  shifts 
and stability. As pointed out in section 3, we are aware that a shift as described in 
this paper does not result from interactions between farmers, or from feedbacks 
between scale levels (which are considered to be typical complex system features 
(Mitchell, 2009)) and that the shift itself  is not characterized by an (uncontrol-
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lable) cascade of  positive feedbacks.  However, we do point out that some 
developments are latent, such as a resource gradually moving towards the point 
where it becomes a constraint, and that the system will only respond to changes in 
this resource once a certain threshold is reached. Such latent developments were 
captured by shadow prices and were used by us as an indicator for the stability (or 
no-response) of  the farming decisions to changes in resource availability. Shadow 
prices that approach investment prices indicate a non-linearity in the response 
curve as displayed in Figure 2.1. (bottom). Anticipating such non-linearities is 
useful for anticipating the effects of  a policy measure.  For instance, in the current 
situation an abolishment of  the milk quotas has no effect on the number of  cows 
kept by the smallest farm type, which may lead to the preliminary conclusion that 
the policy change has no detrimental effects for this farm type. However, if  the 
investment costs of  stable capacity would decrease continuously, at an investment 
cost of  276 this farm type might – in the absence of  restricting quota - decide to 
increase its stable capacity.  This is then a delayed effect of  quota abolishment. In 
the same way, abolishment of  the milk quota does not result in an increase to the 
maximum number of  cows that can be kept on the farm for the farm type in the 
80-90 percentile. However, the shadow price for labour indicates that a tipping 
point might be expected if  the wage decreases and reaches a value of  14 euro 
per hour. Prior to this point, wages are the constraining factor, and only when 
this constraint is no longer present, further effects of  quota abolishment on milk 
production could become visible. 
Our analysis also has some caveats. First, the model used is rather simple 
focusing mainly on feed, labour, and phosphate. However, other factors play a 
role in farm growth, e.g. farmers’ characteristics (e.g. age), preferences, financial 
variables, etc.  For example, our model assumes that all farms are gross margin 
maximizers, while in reality farms are only partly driven by economic motives and 
might at times act more like satificers than maximizers (Schnabel, 2001; Willock 
et al., 1999). If  farmers farm because they appreciate independence, because of  
family traditions, because they love their land, the countryside, their animals, etc., 
this may also explain why small farms are still in business while it would be more 
profitable to exit (Schnabel, 2001). Secondly, there are data limitations. We did 
not have economic and technical information for all farms producing milk in the 
Netherlands. The data at our disposal contained values for the average farm for 
some variables, or information for only three size categories. We then used this 
information to generate a distribution of  ten farm types. The milk price in the 
period that is reflected by our data was very high. Our sensitivity analysis shows 
that a lower milk price changes our conclusions. However, simply changing the 
milk price to an expected long term value creates inconsistencies in our data, and 
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so these results have to be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, our model 
allowed for an increase in the amount of  land rented and stable capacity on the 
farm. However, in reality increasing the amount of  land or stable capacity might 
not always be that simple, due to scarcity of  land or the requirement to obtain 
building permits. Despite these caveats our analysis using a mathematical pro-
gramming model contributes to understanding the effects of  milk quota abolition 
in the Netherlands.
2.7. CONCluSiONS
Our work shows that when milk quotas are abandoned the farm type in the 0-10 
percent quantile will keep the number of  cows and the number of  hectares on 
the farm constant. An increase in production is prevented by the fact that the 
costs associated with extending the production will outweigh the revenues.  The 
farms in the 10-90 percent quantiles will extend the number of  cows and grow. 
However, they will not grow to the maximum number of  cows that could be 
managed by a farm because they are constrained either by the costs of  removing 
and processing phosphate or by the availability of  own farm labour. Hiring ad-
ditional labour is only profitable for the largest farm type in the 90-100 percent 
quantile. This farm type does grow until the maximum number of  cows that 
could be managed on the farm is reached. The smaller farm types in the 0-20 
percent quantiles will not increase in intensity when milk quotas are abolished. 
However, farms in the 20-100 percent quantiles will become more intensive when 
milk quotas are abolished, especially the largest farm type in the 90-100 quantile. 
Introducing the Order of  Council effectively prevents farms from becoming 
very intensive. Especially the largest farm type is limited in its intensity when the 
Order of  Council is introduced. In that case this farm type is severely constrained 
by the availability of  land for rent.  
The response curve of  a system’s optimal configuration to the price or avail-
ability of  a resource is often non-linear. We used the shadow prices of  these re-
sources (i.e. stable capacity, labour, and extra land available for rent) as indicators 
for the distance to tipping points, and therewith of  stability or likelihood to shifts 
in farm structure. The shadow prices for stable capacity indicate that the yearly 
investment costs in stable capacity would have to go down from 355 euro to 
276 euro per extra stable place before the smallest farm type in the 0-10 percent 
quantile would start to invest in additional stable capacity. The shadow price for 
the other farms indicates that they are already willing to invest in additional stable 
capacity. When milk quotas are abolished the shadow prices for land indicate 
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that all but the smallest farm type would be willing to rent extra land if  it was 
available, thereby becoming less intensive. The shadow prices for extra land for 
farm types in the 40-70 and 90-100 quantile indicate that the availability of  land 
constrains them more when the Order of  Council is introduced. This shadow 
price is especially high for the farm type in the 90-100 quantile. The positive 
shadow prices when the Order of  Council is introduced for extra land for the 
farm types 20-100 indicate that these farm types would be willing to rent extra 
land if  it was available. 
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Objective: 
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4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  (A4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A18) 
 (A1)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A18) 
Subject to
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  (A4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A18) 
 (A2)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. M del description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   ( 1) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  ( 8) 
 (A3)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   ( 11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  ( 18) 
 (A4)
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Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  (A4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A18) 
 (A5)
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Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  (A4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A18) 
 (A6)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) ( 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  ( 8) 
 (A7)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  (A18) 
 (A8)
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  (A3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A 8) 
 (A9)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   (A 1) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  (A18) 
 (A10)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13; 
Subj ct to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) (A10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   ( 1) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  ( 8) 
 (A11)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) ( 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   ( 1) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22  ( 18) 
 (A12)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅  ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  8
 (A13)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 7
16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  8
16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) 10) 
9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   11) 
20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  12) 
20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 13) 
22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅  ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  5
24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6
4 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  7
1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  8
 (A14)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) ( 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   ( 11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  ( 8) 
 (A15)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  (A5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) ( 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   ( 11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  ( 8) 
 (A16)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥22𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  8
 (A17)
35 
 
Appendix 2A. Model description  
Objective:  
max𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅̅̅̅ − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
4
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖̅̅̅
13
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=5  (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,10;   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, . .13;  
Subject to 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥19𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12̅̅ ̅̅ ) −  
              (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16̅̅ ̅̅ ) 10) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅   11) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥21𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 0𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥20𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22̅̅ ̅̅   4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 2  8 (A18)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4̅̅ ̅̅   20
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   21
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  22
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  24  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A19)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4̅̅ ̅̅   20
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   21
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  22
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
(A20)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4̅̅ ̅̅   20
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   21
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  22
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A21)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4  20
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   21
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  22
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  24
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  25
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A22)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4  ( 20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅̅ ̅̅   ( 21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   ( 22) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  24  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 6) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.0 77 7 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  ( 28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  ( 29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
(A23)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4  20  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅   21  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   22  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  ( 23) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 6) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .594614 ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.0 77 7 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  ( 28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  ( 29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: ilk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 31) 
Policy option 3: ilk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 34) 
 (A24)
36 
 
5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
13 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4  20
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅̅ ̅̅   21
1   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  22
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  24  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 6) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 .594614 ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ +  2.0 77 7 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  ( 28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  ( 29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: ilk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 31) 
Policy option 3: ilk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 34) 
(A25)
36 
 
5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
13 ≤ 4  20
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅̅ ̅̅   21
4   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 5) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 6) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  ( 28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  ( 9) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
  2    abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅  1  
li  ti  3  il  t  li , Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  4  
 (A26)
36 
 
5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
13 ≤ 4  2
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅̅ ̅̅   2
1   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  23
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0. 9 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 5) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ( 27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  ( 28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  ( 9) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
li  ti  2: il  t  abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅  ( 1) 
li  ti  3: il  t  li , Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 4) 
 (A27)
36 
 
5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  9
3 ≤ 4  2
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅̅ ̅̅   2
4   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2?̅̅?𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 7̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  2
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0. 9 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   2
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  2
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  2  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A28)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 4̅̅ ̅̅   2
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2̅̅ ̅̅   2
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛   𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2?̅̅?𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0. 9 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  2
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  ( 9) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   30
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
3 abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 3
*If farm ch oses a phosph te surplus betwe n 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A29)
Chapter 2
44
extra constraints in policy options
Policy option 1: milk quotas 
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24̅̅ ̅̅   (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A22) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  (A23) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A30)
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy law introduced
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24̅̅ ̅̅   (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A22) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  (A23) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A31)
li  tion 3: ilk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced
*If  farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare:
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24̅̅ ̅̅   (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A22) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  (A23) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A32)
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24̅̅ ̅̅   20  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅   1  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅  2  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  (A23) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  4  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 . 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  5  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  6
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 594614 ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅ +  2.0 77 7 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  8  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  9  
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
Policy option 2: milk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm ch oses a phosph te surplus less than r eq al to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  3  
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34) 
 (A33)
*If  farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare:
36 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥ 0.8 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24̅̅ ̅̅   (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25̅̅ ̅̅   (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A22) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 45.5 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3̅ ∗ 10.2 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4̅ ∗ 23.5) −   
              (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  (A23) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A24) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0.19 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A25) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.057797 ∗  ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  +  1.520981 ∗  ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A26) 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 2.594614 ∗ ℎ𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ +  2.057797 ∗ ℎ𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥10𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥11𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛,≥ 0  (A28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 0  (A29) 
Extra constraints in policy options 
Policy option 1: milk quotas  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅  ≤  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅   (A30) 
 tion 2: ilk quotas abolished, Dairy Law introduced 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A31) 
Policy option 3: milk quotas abolished, Order of Council introduced 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus less than or equal to 20 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A33) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A34)  (A34)
37 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 36) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A37) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A38) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A39) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of appearance in the model.  
Where: 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A35)
37 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 36) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A37) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A38) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A39) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Where: 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A36)
37 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A35) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A36) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A37) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A38) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A39) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Where: 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A37)
37 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 35) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A36) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A37) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A38) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A39) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Where: 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A38)
37 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A35) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A37) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A38) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A39) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Where: 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A39)
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare:
37 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 35) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   7  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  8  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅   9  
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  1  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   3  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅   4  
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of appearance in the model.  
Wher : 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
2n  milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n   number of cows sold by farm n   
2n = nu ber of co s on farm n  
3n  r f y ung cattle < 1 year on farm n   
4n  r f  ttl  >  r  f r     
5n  ha grass on farm n   
6n   m ize on farm n 
7n  KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A40)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  5  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅   ( 9) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 1) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅   ( 4) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Wher : 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
2n  milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n   number of cows sold by farm n   
2n = nu ber of co s on farm n  
3n  r f y ung cattle < 1 year on farm n   
4n  r f  ttl  >  r  f r     
5n  ha grass n farm n   
6n   m ize on farm n 
7n  KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A41)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A35) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   A37  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  8  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅   9  
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  1  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 3𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  2  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅   3  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅   4  
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Wher : 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
2n  milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n   number of cows sold by farm n   
2n = nu ber of co s on farm n  
3n  r f y ung cattle < 1 year on farm n   
4n  r f  ttl  >  r  f r     
5n  ha grass on farm n   
6n   m ize on farm n 
7n  KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A42)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A35) 
4𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  6
2 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A38) 
8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   9
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Wher : 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A43)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.25)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 >  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A37) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 <  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   ( 38) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A39) 
*If farm chooses a phosphate surplus larger than or equal to 50 kg per hectare: 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥18𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛/𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A40) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥25𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ∗ 0.5)/(0.8 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17̅̅ ̅̅ ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18̅̅ ̅̅ )  (A41) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥24𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  (A42) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A43) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   (A44) 
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is given 
next in the order of app aran e in the odel.  
Where: 
πn = gross margin in euros on farm n  
p1n = price of cows sold in euros per cow for farm n 
p2n = milk price in euros per 100 kg for farm n 
x1n  = number of cows sold by farm n   
x2n = number of cows on farm n  
x3n = nu ber of young cattle < 1 year on farm n   
x4n = nu ber of young cattle > 1 year on farm n   
x5n = ha grass on farm n   
x6n = ha maize on farm n 
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n  
 (A44)
Exogenous variables are indicated by means of a bar. The meaning of the variables is 
given ext in the orde  of ppearance in the model  
Where:
 = gross margin in euros on farm n 
= price f cows sold in euros per cow for farm n
= milk pric  in euros per 100 kg for farm n
x   = number of cows sold by farm n  
x  = number of cow  n farm n 
x3  = number of you g cattle < 1 year on farm n  
45
The effect of milk quota abolishment on farm intensity: shifts and stability
C
ha
pt
er
 2
x4n = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm n  
x5n = ha grass on farm n  
x6n = ha maize on farm n
x7n = KVEM of feed bought on farm n 
x8n = kg P2O5 removed from farm n
x9n = kg P2O5 processed from farm n
x10n = positive hours of hired labour used on farm n
x11n = number of extra cows above stable capacity farm n 
x12n = number of extra cows bought or raised on farm n
x13n = ha of extra land rented on farm n 
x14n	 =	 number	of	extra	cows	that	fit	within	the	initial	stable	capacity	of	farm	n	
x15n = positive kg P2O5   surplus on farm n
x16n = kg P2O5 surplus on farm n 
x17n = negative kg P2O5 surplus on farm n
x18n = kg P2O5 produced on farm n
x19n = kg P2O5 that can be placed on land farm n
x20n = total hours of labour needed on farm n
x21n = own labour hours used on farm n
x22n = hours of hired labour used on farm n
x23n = negative amount of labour hired
x24n = total ha land on farm n
x25n = kg P2O5 produced per cow on farm n 
x26n =  ha land that has to be rented due to Order of Council if farm n increases the 
phosphate surplus  
e1n = milk production per cow in 100 kg on farm n 
e2n = initial number of cows on farm n 
e3 = percentage young cattle < 1 year per cow
e4 = percentage young cattle > 1 year per cow 
e5 = KVEM needed per cow 
e6 = KVEM needed per young cattle < 1 year 
e7 = KVEM needed per young cattle > 1 year 
e8 = KVEM produced on 1 ha of grass land
e9 = KVEM produced on 1 ha of maize land
e10 = kg P2O5 per KVEM from grass 
e11 = kg P2O5 per KVEM from maize
e12 = kg P2O5 KVEM from feed bought
e13 = kg P2O5 bound in 100 kg milk
e14 = kg P2O5 bound in carrying cows
e15 = kg P2O5 bound in growth young cattle <1 year
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e16 = kg P2O5 bound in growth cattle > 1 year 
e17 = kg P2O5 allowed per ha grass land
e18 = kg P2O5 allowed per ha maize land
e19 = labour hours needed per 100 kg milk produced
e20 = labour hours needed per ha grass land
e21 = labour hours needed per ha maize land  
e22 = hours of own labour available
e23n = initial ha land on farm n
e24 = total ha land available for rent to farm n
e25 = maximum number of cows on farm
e26n = maximum kg P2O5 that can be removed from farm n 
e27n =  number of cows for which phosphate surplus in initial situation is equal to 20 
kg P2O5 per ha
e28n =  number of cows on farm n for which phosphate surplus in initial situation is 
equal to 50 kg P2O5  per ha
w2n = yearly maintenance costs in euro per cow on farm n 
w3n = yearly maintenance costs in euro per young cattle < 1 year on farm n  
w4n = yearly maintenance costs in euro per young cattle > 1 year on farm n in euro 
w5 = yearly costs in euro of growing a ha grass
w6 = yearly costs in euro of growing a ha maize
w7 = costs of feed bought in euro per KVEM
w8 = costs of removing P2O5 in euro per kg
w9 = costs of processing P2O5 in euro per kg
w10 = costs of hired labour in euro per hour
w11 =  yearly investment costs additional stable capacity including young cattle 
capacity in euro per place for each extra cow
w12 = yearly costs of raising or buying extra cows in euro per cow
w13 = yearly costs of renting extra land in euro 
hgin = initial ha grassland farm n
hmin = initial ha maize land farm n
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The objective of  the farm (A1) is to maximize gross margin, which is the result of  
the revenue from milk production and selling cows no longer used in production 
minus the costs of   maintenance of  cows and young cattle, the costs of  growing 
grass and maize, the costs of  buying feed, the costs of  removing phosphate, the 
costs of  processing phosphate, the costs of  hiring additional labour, the invest-
ment cost in additional stable capacity, the costs of  raising or buying extra cows 
and the cost of  renting extra land.  The number of  cows on the farm can be 
found by adding up the number of  cows from the initial endowment and the 
extra number of  cows in the optimal solution and subtracting the number of  
cows that have been sold (A2). If  the farm decides to decrease the number of  
cows on the farm in the optimal solution the extra number of  cows compared to 
the initial situation can be negative. The number of  young cattle on the farm is 
determined by multiplying the number of  cows with the percentage young cattle 
needed for replacement (A3) and (A4).  Feed on the farm can be grown on the 
land in the form of  grass and maize or be bought. The amount of  feed bought 
is equal to the amount of  feed needed for the cows and young cattle minus the 
amount of  feed produced on the farm (A5).  We assume each animal needs a 
certain amount of  feed (expressed in KVEM) but we do not specify what that 
diet should consist of  in terms of  roughage and concentrate. The number of  
extra cows bought or raised on the farm can be divided in a part that fits within 
the initial stable capacity and a part that does not fit within the initial stable (A6). 
The positive phosphate surplus on the farm can be divided into a part that is 
removed from the farm and a part that has to be processed (A7).  It is possible 
that a farm does not produce a positive phosphate surplus, in which case the 
phosphate surplus is negative. In (A8) we state that the phosphate surplus is equal 
to the sum of  positive phosphate surplus and negative phosphate surplus.  This is 
done to make sure the farm does not get a negative cost for phosphate removal, 
which would be a revenue. It is not realistic to assume that a farm would make as 
much revenue from having some room left for extra phosphate on its land as it 
would need to pay for removing extra phosphate. In case the phosphate surplus 
is negative the positive phosphate surplus is set to zero. The phosphate surplus 
on the farm can be found by subtracting the phosphate place of  the farm from 
the phosphate produced on the farm (A9). The phosphate produced on the farm 
can be found by taking the amount of  phosphate consumed by the cows and 
young cattle and subtracting the amount of  phosphate that will be bound in the 
milk or growth of  cattle (A10). The phosphate that can be placed on land can be 
found by multiplying the hectares of  grass land by the amount of  phosphate that 
can be placed on a ha of  grass and adding the multiplication of  the hectares of  
maize and the amount of  phosphate that can be placed on a ha of  maize (A11). 
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The total hours of  labour needed on the farm can be found by adding the labour 
needed for milk production and the labour needed for cultivating grass and maize 
(A12). The labour hours needed on the farm can be divided into own labour 
hours and positive hired labour hours (A13). The amount of  labour hired is equal 
to the total amount of  labour hours needed minus the endowment of  own labour 
hours of  the farm (A14). It is possible that the farm has more own labour hours 
than needed, in which case the labour hours hired are negative. To prevent that 
the farm would get a revenue from these negative labour hours hired equation 
(A15) is added, that distinguishes between a negative and a positive amount of  
labour hired. In the case that the amount of  labour hired is negative the positive 
labour hours will be set to zero.  The total amount of  land used on the farm is 
equal to the initial land endowment plus the extra ha land rented (A16). We allow 
that the farm rents out some of  its own land, in which case the extra land rented 
will be negative.  The land on the farm can be divided into grassland and maize 
land (A17). 
There are some restrictions in the model. The amount of  own labour hours 
used has to be smaller than or equal to the amount of  own labour that is avail-
able on the farm (A18). The amount of  grassland has to be at least 80 percent, 
because only then the farm will receive derogation, which means the farm is 
allowed to place extra nitrogen on its land, which is often desired by Dutch dairy 
farms (A19). The amount of  extra land rented should be less than or equal to the 
amount of  land available for rent in the region which is 20ha (A20). The number 
of  cows on the farm should be less than the maximum number of  cows that 
could still be managed by a Dutch family farm (A21). This amount was based 
on the size of  some very large dairy farms in the Netherlands (Boerderij, 2010; 
Gelderlander, 2015; Trouw, 2015). The number of  cows that fit within the initial 
stable of  the farm should be equal to or less than the amount of  cows that have 
been sold (A22). The model also contains a number of  variables that cannot 
become negative (A28) or positive (A29). 
Finally, there are some constraints that are specific to each of  the policy options. 
If  the milk quotas are in place the milk production should not exceed the milk 
production in the initial situation (A30).  When the milk quotas are abolished and 
the Dairy Law is introduced the amount of  manure that can be removed should 
be less than a maximum amount that can be removed (melkveefosfaatreferentie) 
(A31, A33, A39, A44). 
Under the Order of  Council farms that have a phosphate surplus less than 20 
kg per hectare are excluded, provided they process the extra phosphate produced. 
Farms with a phosphate surplus between 20 and 50 kg per hectare are obliged 
to place 25 percent of  the extra phosphate production on newly acquired land. 
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Farms with a phosphate surplus exceeding 50 kg per hectare are required to place 
50 percent of  the extra phosphate produced on land (Rijksoverheid, 2015a)
In our model, if  the Order of  Council is introduced the farm can choose be-
tween three categories, namely producing a phosphate surplus less than 20 kg per 
ha, in which case the number of  cows cannot exceed beyond the number of  cows 
for which the phosphate surplus is 20 kg per ha (A32). In this case no additional 
land has to be purchased. If  the farm chooses a phosphate surplus between 20-50 
kg per ha the number of  cows on the farm is larger than the number which would 
result in a phosphate surplus of  20 kg per ha (A37) and less than the number of  
cows for which the phosphate surplus would be more than 50 kg per ha (A38). In 
this case the farm will have to purchase extra land on which to place 25 percent 
of  the phosphate produced by the extra cows (A35). The phosphate produced per 
cow is given by (A34). The total amount of  land on the farm should then be equal 
to or larger than the initial amount of  land plus the amount of  land that has to be 
bought for the phosphate surplus (A36). Finally, if  the farm chooses to have more 
than 50 kg phosphate surplus the farm will have to purchase extra land on which 
to place 50 percent of  the phosphate produced by the extra cows (A41). The total 
land on the farm must then be equal to or larger than the initial amount of  land 
plus the amount of  land needed to place the extra phosphate (A42). In this case 
the number of  cows on the farm will exceed the number of  cows for which the 
phosphate surplus is 50 kg per ha (A43).  To maximise gross margin the farm will 
compare the three possible categories for the Order of  Council and choose the 
one that will give him the highest gross margin. 
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APPenDIx 2b.   DATA uSeD
Table 2B.1. Values of exogenous parameters
Parameter Description Value Parameter Description Value
w5 Yearly costs in euro of 
growing a ha grass
1440 e10 Kg P2O5 per KVEM from 
grass
0.01
w6 Yearly costs in euro of 
growing a ha maize
1540 e11 Kg P2O5 per KVEM from 
maize
0.005
w7 Costs of feed bought in 
euro per KVEM
0.14 e12 Kg P2O5 KVEM from 
feed bought
0.012
w8 Costs of removing 
P2O5 in euro per kg
9.33 e13 Kg P2O5 bound in 100 
kg milk
0.222
w9 Costs of processing 
P2O5 in euro per kg
10.83 e14 Kg P2O5 bound in 
carrying cows
0.522
w10 Costs of hired labour in 
euro per hour
16.74 e15 Kg P2O5 bound in growth 
young cattle <1 year
4.619
w11 Yearly investment 
costs additional stable 
capacity including 
young cattle capacity in 
euro per place for each 
extra cow
354.8 e16 Kg P2O5 bound in growth 
cattle > 1 year
4.078
w12 Yearly costs of raising 
or buying extra cows in 
euro per cow
294 e17 Kg P2O5 allowed per ha 
grass land
95
w13 Yearly costs of renting 
extra land in euro
1200 e18 Kg P2O5 allowed per ha 
maize land
65
e3 Share young cattle < 1 
year per cow
0.64 e19 Labour hours needed per 
100 kg milk produced
0.5
e4 Share young cattle > 1 
year per cow
0.29 e20 Labour hours needed per 
ha grass land
7.2
e5 KVEM needed per cow 7197.8 e21 Labour hours needed per 
ha maize land
7.0
e6 KVEM needed per 
young cattle < 1 year
1277.5 e22 Hours of own labour 
available
7000
e7 KVEM needed per 
young cattle > 1 year
2555 e24 Total ha land available for 
rent to farm n
20
e8 KVEM produced on 1 
ha of grass land
11220 e25 Maximum number of 
cows on farm
500
e9 KVEM produced on 1 
ha of maize land
13720
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Table 2B.2. Values for the farm type specific exogenous variables in the reference year 
2013
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0-10 42.18 16 24 7 509 7291 774 15 1
10-20 42.73 27 45 12 488 7548 696 26 1
20-30 42.90 33 57 15 476 7692 671 32 1
30-40 43.02 38 68 18 465 7822 653 37 1
40-50 43.12 44 78 21 455 7945 639 43 1
50-60 43.21 49 88 23 445 8068 627 48 1
60-70 43.28 54 99 26 434 8199 616 53 1
70-80 43.36 60 112 29 421 8347 605 59 1
80-90 43.46 69 129 33 404 8554 592 68 1
90-100 43.79 112 215 55 317 9594 544 111 1
APPenDIx 2C.   ADDITIonAL MoDeL ReSuLTS
Table 2C.1. Model result farm gross margin in euros per farm type for the three policy 
options
Farm type/ gross margin PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 36306 36306 36306
Quantile 10-20 70999 73597 73459
Quantile 20-30 93229 97952 97952
Quantile 30-40 114926 124665 121631
Quantile 40-50 137106 152502 146225
Quantile 50-60 160498 179396 172451
Quantile 60-70 187064 207471 202533
Quantile 70-80 219254 238653 238653
Quantile 80-90 267371 280463 280463
Quantile 90-100 499098 585004 519508
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Table 2C.2. Model result number of extra cows that exceed initial stable per farm type for 
the three policy options
Farm type/ extra cows that exceed initial 
stable capacity
PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 26 25
Quantile 20-30 0 26 26
Quantile 30-40 0 101 31
Quantile 40-50 0 87 34
Quantile 50-60 0 73 37
Quantile 60-70 0 59 41
Quantile 70-80 0 42 42
Quantile 80-90 0 20 20
Quantile 90-100 0 285 61
Table 2C.3. Model result processing costs in euro per farm type for the three policy op-
tions
Farm type/ costs of processing phosphate PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 0 0
Quantile 20-30 0 0 0
Quantile 30-40 0 67632 5314
Quantile 40-50 0 55651 8697
Quantile 50-60 0 43902 11969
Quantile 60-70 0 31470 15379
Quantile 70-80 0 17473 17473
Quantile 80-90 0
Quantile 90-100 0 225621 34107
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Table 2C.4. Model result total hectare on farm per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/ ha land used PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 16 16 16
Quantile 10-20 30 47 46
Quantile 20-30 38 53 53
Quantile 30-40 45 58 58
Quantile 40-50 51 64 64
Quantile 50-60 58 69 69
Quantile 60-70 65 74 74
Quantile 70-80 72 80 80
Quantile 80-90 83 89 89
Quantile 90-100 132 132 132
Table 2C.5. Model result phosphate surplus in kg P2O5 per farm type for the three policy 
options
Farm type/phosphate surplus PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 0 0
Quantile 20-30 0 248 248
Quantile 30-40 0 6615 861
Quantile 40-50 0 5626 1290
Quantile 50-60 0 4657 1708
Quantile 60-70 0 3632 2146
Quantile 70-80 0 2480 2480
Quantile 80-90 0 905 905
Quantile 90-100 365 22879 5195
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APPenDIx 2D.   SenSITIvITy AnALySIS
Results when milk price equals long term milk price of  35 euro per kg (KWIN, 
2014-2015)
Table 2D.1. Extra hectares of land rented per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/ extra land rented PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 -15 -15 -15
Quantile 10-20 -26 -26 -26
Quantile 20-30 -32 -32 -32
Quantile 30-40 -37 -37 -37
Quantile 40-50 8 8 8
Quantile 50-60 9 9 9
Quantile 60-70 11 11 11
Quantile 70-80 12 12 12
Quantile 80-90 14 14 14
Quantile 90-100 -29 -29 -29
Table 2D.2. Number of cows per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/number of cows PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 1 1 1
Quantile 10-20 2 2 2
Quantile 20-30 2 2 2
Quantile 30-40 2 2 2
Quantile 40-50 78 78 78
Quantile 50-60 88 88 88
Quantile 60-70 99 99 99
Quantile 70-80 112 112 112
Quantile 80-90 129 129 129
Quantile 90-100 133 133 133
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Table 2D.3. Cows per hectare per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/ number of cows per ha PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order of 
Council
Quantile 0-10 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 10-20 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 20-30 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 30-40 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 40-50 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 50-60 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 60-70 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 70-80 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 80-90 1.5 1.5 1.5
Quantile 90-100 1.6 1.6 1.6
Table 2D.4. Shadow prices for stable capacity per farm type for the three policy options
Farm type/shadow price stable capacity PO1: Milk 
quota
PO2: No 
milk quota
PO3: Order 
of Council
Quantile 0-10 0 0 0
Quantile 10-20 0 0 0
Quantile 20-30 0 0 0
Quantile 30-40 0 0 0
Quantile 40-50 0 57 57
Quantile 50-60 0 114 114
Quantile 60-70 0 175 175
Quantile 70-80 0 244 244
Quantile 80-90 0 341 341
Quantile 90-100 0 0 0
The phosphate surplus is zero for all farm types in all three policy options, as is 
the shadow price for extra land for all farm types in all three policy options. The 
shadow price for labour is zero for all but the largest farm type in all three policy 
options. The largest farm type has a shadow price of  16 for labour, which is just 
below the costs of  hiring additional labour (which is 17 euro per hour). 

Chapter 3
Complex dynamics in the uptake of new farming practices: 
a case study for organic waste application2
2 Paper by Groeneveld, A.N., Bakker, M.M., Peerlings, J.H.M.,  and Heijman, W.J.M. has been accepted by 
Journal of  Environmental Planning and Management
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AbSTRACT
Adverse environmental effects of  intensive agriculture, together with scarcity 
in phosphates and water, urge farmers to find more sustainable practices. 
An example of  such a sustainable practice is on-farm processing of  organic 
waste. This paper explores three mechanisms that can lead to a widespread 
uptake of  this technique: (i) economies of  scale, (ii) information sharing, 
and (iii) adjustment of  social norms. Although each of  these mechanisms 
has been studied before, this paper provides new insights by considering the 
interactions that might exist between the different mechanisms when they 
are applied to real life situations. Based on a pilot study, we developed a 
multicriteria mathematical programming model at individual farm level. We 
used this model to simulate the uptake of  on-farm processing of  organic 
waste, as a result of  the three mechanisms and their interactions. Our results 
show that each mechanism results in an increased uptake, but is not likely to 
cause a widespread uptake. Interaction between the mechanisms, will lead to 
a much higher uptake. This result suggests that simultaneous consideration 
of  multiple mechanisms is essential to understand the behaviour of  social-
ecological systems.
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3.1. InTRoDuCTIon
After the Second World War agricultural practices became more intensive within 
Europe (Freemark, 2005; Kirschenmann, 2010). More intensive agriculture re-
sults in higher yields and economic development, but also in soil organic matter 
decline, soil erosion, biodiversity loss and ground water contamination (D’Hose 
et al., 2014; Guillem et al., 2015). Together with expected natural resource deple-
tion this leads to a need to make agriculture more sustainable (Kassam et al., 
2009). Sustainable practices are commonly stated to be environmentally sound, 
economically profitable, and socially just (Dale et al., 2013). 
To achieve a situation in which sustainable agricultural practices are the norm, 
a regime shift has to take place. In general, regime shifts are the result of  a com-
bination of  shocks, such as the introduction of  a new technology, and gradual 
changes that diminish the strength of  the prevailing processes. Once a threshold 
is passed another set of  processes prevail and the system restructures towards a 
new regime (Biggs, Schluter & Schoon, 2015; Peerlings, Polman & Dries, 2014). 
Uptake of  new agricultural techniques is a complex process, influenced by both 
monetary and non-monetary considerations (Clare et al., 2014). The adoption 
of  innovations is positively influenced by external economies of  scale (e.g. cost 
sharing, Agnolucci & McDowall, 2007), when the usefulness can be demonstrated 
(Brown et al., 2016), and when the innovation is part of  social capital (Perman 
et al., 2011). Besides these mechanisms other factors that may play a role are 
ease of  operation, image, riskiness, visibility, voluntariness, divisibility and com-
municability (Kapoor, Dwivedi & Williams, 2014). These mechanisms can lead to 
a gradually accelerating adoption of  innovations, which can ultimately lead to a 
regime shift from unsustainable to sustainable farming practices. 
On-farm processing of  organic waste is an example of  a sustainable farming 
practice. In this paper we analyse the potential of  a regime shifts for two techniques 
for on-farm processing of  compost from organic waste: the Controlled Microbial 
Compost (CMC) technique and the Bokashi technique (Janmaat, 2015). For both 
techniques municipalities deliver organic waste to a farm to be composted, and 
the end product can be used to fertilize the land of  the farm. In the case of  CMC 
organic waste material is put down in rows and micro-organisms are added. The 
material is then covered for six to eight weeks, during which the temperature and 
oxygen levels are regularly checked by the farmer. If  these values exceed a certain 
range the material is  turned in order to bring the temperature levels down and 
to add extra oxygen (Lanting, 2008). In the case of  Bokashi a fermented com-
post is created, by adding layers of  organic waste interspersed with calcium and 
micro-organisms (Jaramillo-López, Ramírez & Pérez-Salicrup, 2015). The organic 
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material is then covered and left for eight to ten weeks. Although the end product 
from both processes is slightly different, the most important distinctions between 
the processes are the labour intensity of  the process and the investment costs. 
The CMC process is labour intensive and requires a high initial investment in the 
form of  in a turning machine to control the oxygen and temperature levels during 
the composting process. This turning machine will generally last for 10 years. 
The variable costs for the CMC technique, on the other hand, are relatively low. 
The Bokashi technique is not as labour intensive, and does not require an initial 
investment. On the other hand, the variable costs of  this process are relatively 
high.  Both kinds of  compost potentially increase the soil organic matter content 
and could have a positive effect on yields. Other benefits for the farmer are pay-
ments from municipalities, who will save processing and transport cost by this 
alternative for organic waste removal.  CMC and Bokashi have not been applied 
on large scale in the Netherlands (Cupcompost, 2015; Diver, 2004; Melkvee.nl, 
2014) but in recent years pilot projects have been implemented (EM vereniging 
Nederland, 2015; Ommermarke, 2015). 
The goal of  this paper is show how on-farm processing of  organic waste might 
spread in the “Friese Meren” in the Dutch province of  Friesland as a result of  
economies of  scale, learning, and changing social norms. We investigate how 
these mechanisms individually lead to (partial) uptake of  on-farm processing 
of  organic waste, but also how interaction of  these mechanisms contributes to 
achieving a regime shift towards on-farm processing of  organic waste. These 
mechanisms reflect a combination of  economic, psychology and sociology per-
spectives. Although each of  these mechanisms has been studied before, this paper 
provides new insights by considering the interactions that might exist between the 
different mechanisms when they are applied to real life situations. We develop an 
Agent Based Model (ABM) -like methodology capturing feedbacks between the 
individual farmers and the overall system. However, we capture the individual 
decision making in a more sophisticated way by using a multi-criteria approach 
instead of  simple rule-based decision making. By looking at interactions between 
these mechanisms and the feedbacks between the farmers in sharing costs and 
information, and adjusting social norms we take a Complex Adaptive System 
(CAS) approach. A CAS approach has also been taken by (Alexander et al., 2013) 
who reconstructed the uptake of  perennial energy crops in the United Kingdom. 
Their model is well suited to explain and reconstruct the historical spread of  
energy crops, but is less suited for predictions due to a lack of  specific empirical 
data on the individual farm level. In this paper we obtained an empirical basis 
using interviews with local farmers. Given that we were not able to interview 
all farmers in the region we created an artificial farmer-agent population. This 
61
Complex dynamics in the uptake of new farming practices
C
ha
pt
er
 3
artificial farmer-agent population was based on the interviewed farmers and used 
to simulate the uptake of  on-farm processing of  organic waste in the region. We 
analyse eight scenarios to show how a regime shift towards on-farm processing 
of  organic waste might take place. 
The farmer-agent decision-making process is captured in a multi-criteria math-
ematical programming model. Mathematical programming models have been 
widely used within bio-economic research. They are appealing due to the fact that 
they are straightforward in optimizing an objective, given technological, resource 
and institutional constraints (Buysse, Huylenbroeck & Lauwers, 2007). Although 
mathematical programs are particularly suited to predict an individual farmer’s 
decisions and less for simulating interactions between farmers, we implement the 
mathematical program in a CAS context. CAS consists of  a network of  actors 
such as farmers, with interactions taking place between actors and between actors 
and their environment. Actors get information from their surroundings, which 
is used to determine their course of  action. The farmer decision depends on the 
decisions made by other farmers. In our model the CAS context is made explicit 
in the scenarios where farmer agents observe each other’s actions and adjust their 
own actions accordingly. By taking this into account we are able to analyse the 
likelihood of  an uptake of  the new technology better than if  we would ignore the 
linkages between the farmers. 
In the next section we introduce our model and the experimental design used in 
this paper, as well as the scenarios we analyse. We also describe our study area in 
more detail and elaborate on the data we use as an input to our model. In section 
3 we present our findings, and in sections 4 and 5 we provide a general discussion 
and conclusions. 
3.2. MeThoDS
In this section we start by describing the developed model (section 2.1), followed 
by a description of  the study area for which we calibrated the model (section 2.2). 
After that, we present the data collected for calibrating the model (section 2.3), 
and we end with a description of  the model-experimental set-up that was used 
to explore the uptake of  on-farm processing of  organic waste in the study area 
(section 2.4).
3.2.1. Model description
Our conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 3.1. A community of  farmers is 
shown, in which each individual can decide whether or not to adopt the practice 
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of  CMC or Bokashi (currently still a small minority). That decision is based on 
multiple criteria to which each individual attaches their own level of  importance. 
At system level, the sum of  individual decisions amount to emergent properties 
such as a certain social norm about the practices, a body of  knowledge about the 
practices, and also of  certain costs of  possibly shared equipment for the practices. 
These emergent system properties may in turn affect the criteria and weights that 
determine the individual decisions. The model is dynamic, since what happens in 
one time step is dependent on the state of  the system in the previous step. This 
approach is inspired by the work of  amongst others Murray-Rust et al. (2011), 
Karali, Rounsevell & Doherty (2011) and Valbuena et al. (2010).  In the remainder 
of  this chapter, we explain a) the individual decision module, b) the generation 
of  the virtual farmer population and their criteria and weights, and c) how the 
emergent system properties are determined and how they influence the criteria 
and weights of  the individuals.
 
Figure 3.1. A community of farmers is shown of which a small minority (the green ones) 
adopt one of the two practices. Each farmer makes this decision based on a decision 
module that is fed by their specific characteristics (e.g. number of cows, size of farm, 
value attached to sustainable farming). The individual decisions are also influenced by 
emergent system properties that in turn evolve from the behaviour of the collective: so-
cial norms, body of knowledge and costs of equipment
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3.2.1.1. Individual decision module 
The decision of  each individual farmer-agent is determined in a multi-criteria 
mathematical programming model capturing the farmer-agents utility function. 
The advantage of  this type of  model is that it allows one to take into account 
various conflicting objectives that farmer-agents might have. The assumption that 
farmers have multiple criteria is in line with the assumptions made by Bournaris 
& Manos (2012) and Tziolas, Manos & Bournaris (2016) which have successfully 
developed multi-criteria models to describe farmer behaviour before. 
To estimate the utility functions of  the farmers we set a priori three farmers’ 
objectives; profit maximization, environmental sustainability maximization, and 
the minimization of  hired labour. The assumption of  profit maximization in our 
model is in line with general assumptions in economic modelling (Pedersen et al., 
2012; Peerlings & Polman, 2009). The assumption of  labour minimization is in 
line with the findings of  Berbel & Rodriguez-Ocana (1998), Paassen, Ridder & 
Stroosnijder (2011), Rozakis, Sintori & Tsiboukas (2012), and Sumpsi, Amador 
& Romero (1997). Especially the CMC technique, which allows the farmer to 
process the largest amount of  organic waste, is labour intensive. The assump-
tion of  environmental sustainability maximization is in line with the findings by 
Willock et al. (1999), Bernués, Clemetsen & Eik (2016), Pereira et al. (2016), and 
Mandryk et al. (2014) that the use of  sustainable and environmentally friendly 
farming practices might influence farmer decisions (Karali et al., 2014; Willock 
et al., 1999). 
The levels of  profit, environmental sustainability, and hired labour are deter-
mined as indicated in equations 1-3. Profit is operationalized as Gross Margin, 
sustainability is measured by the quantity of  organic waste produced and hired 
labour as the amount of  labour required minus the own labour endowment. In the 
baseline the farmer’s decision is unrelated to the decisions made by other farmers. 
In the scenario analysis we introduce interaction between agents where the actions 
of  other agents effect the farmer’s decision. Profit is equal to the revenue from 
regular outputs (which may improve due to Bokashi/CMC application) and the 
revenue from processing organic waste (municipalities pay the farmers for taking 
the waste from them) minus the costs of  producing the regular outputs, costs of  
processing organic waste, and labour costs (1). Farmers are not allowed to sell the 
compost they produce but have to use this on their own land. This assumption 
is based on the (concept) contracts between farmers and municipalities in which 
farmers are not allowed to sell the compost to avoid unfair competition in the 
markets for compost. As an indicator for environmental sustainability we use the 
amount of  organic waste processed on the farm (2). The hired labour hours used 
on the farm are the labour hours needed which depends on the level of  regular 
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outputs and organic waste processed minus the initial labour endowment which 
is equal to the labour of  the farm household applied on-farm (3). 
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outputs and organic waste processed minus the initial labour endowment which is equal to the 
labour of the farm h sehold applied on-farm (3).  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = max(∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) (1)  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 = max𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  (2)  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = max( 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)  (3) 
Subject to:  
 (1)
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3.2.1.1. Individual decision module  
The decision of each individual farmer-agent is determined in a multi-criteria mathematical 
programming model capturing the farmer-agents utility function. The advantage of this type 
of model is that it allows one to take into account various conflicting objectives that farmer-
agents might have. The assumption that f rmers have multiple criteria is in line with the 
ssumptions m d  by Bournaris & Manos (2012) nd Tziolas, Manos & Bournaris (2016) 
which have successfully developed multi-criteria models to describe farmer behaviour before.  
To estimate the utility functions of the farmers we set a priori three farmers’ objectives; profit 
maximiz tion, environmental sustainability maximization, and th  minimization of hired 
labour. The assumption of profit maximization in our model is in line with general 
assumptions in economic modelling (Pederse  et al., 2012; Peerlings & Polman, 2009). The 
ss ti  of lab ur ini izatio  is in line with the findings of Berbel & Rodriguez-Ocana 
(1998), Paassen, Ridder & Stroos ijder (2011), Rozakis, Sintori & Tsiboukas (2012), and 
Sumpsi, Amador & Romero (1997). Especially the CMC technique, which llows the farmer 
to process the largest a ount of organic waste, is labour intensive. The assumption of 
environmental sustain bility maximization is in line with th  findings by Willock et al. 
(1999), B rnués, Clemetsen & Eik (2016), Pereira t al. (2016), and Mandryk et al. (2014) 
that the use of sustainable and environmentally friendly farming practices might influence 
farmer decisions (Kar li t al., 2014; Willock et al., 1999).  
The levels of profit, environmental sustainability, and hired labour are determined as 
indicated in equations 1-3. Profit is operationalized as Gross Margin, sustainability is 
measure  by the quantity of organic waste produced and hired labour as the mount of labour 
required minus the own labour endo ment. In the baseline the f rmer’s decision is unrelated 
to the decisions made by other farmers. I  the scenario a alysis we intro u e interaction 
betw en agents where the actions of other ag nts effect the farmer’s decision. Profit is equal 
to th  revenue from r gular outputs (w ich may improve due to Bokashi/CMC application) 
and the revenue from processing organic waste ( unicipalities pay the farmers for taking the 
waste from them) minus the costs of producing the regul r outputs, costs of processing 
organic waste, and labour costs (1). Farmers are not allowed to sell the compost they produce 
but have to use this on their own land. This assumption is based on t  (concept) contracts 
etween farm rs and municipalities in w ich far ers are not allowed to sell the compost to 
avoid u f ir competition in the markets for compost. As an indicator f r environmental 
sustainability we use the amount of organic waste processed on the farm (2). The hired labour 
hours used on the farm are the labour hours need d which depends on the level of regular 
outputs and organic waste processed minu  the initial labour endowment which is equal to the 
labo r of the farm household applied on-farm (3).  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = max(∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) (1)  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 = max𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  (2)  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = max( 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)  (3) 
Subject to:  
 (2)
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3.2.1.1. Individual decision module  
The decision of each individual far er-agent is determined in a multi-criteria mathematical 
programming model capturing the farmer-agents utility function. The advantage of this type 
of model is that it allows one to take into account various conflicting objectives that farmer-
agents ight have. The assumption that f rmers have multiple criteria is in line with the 
ssumptions m d  by Bournaris & Manos (2012) nd Tziolas, Manos & Bournaris (2016) 
which have successfully developed multi-criteria models to describe farmer behaviour before.  
To estimate the utility functions of the farmers we set a priori three farmers’ objectives; profit 
maximiz tion, environmental sustainability maximization, and th  minimization of hired 
labour. The assumption of profit maximization in our model is in line with general 
assumptions in economic modelling (Pederse  et al., 2012; Peerlings & Polman, 2009). The 
ti  of lab ur ini izatio  is in line with the findings of Berbel & Rodriguez-Ocana 
(1998), Paassen, Ridder & Stroosnijder (2011), Rozakis, Sintori & Tsiboukas (2012), and 
Sumpsi, Amador & Romero (1997). Especially the CMC technique, which llows the farmer 
to process the largest a ount of organic waste, is labour intensive. The assumption of 
environmental sustain bility maximization is in line with th  findings by Willock et al. 
(1999), B rnué , Clemetsen & Eik (2016), Pereira t al. (2016), and Mandryk et al. (2014) 
that the use of sustainable and environmentally friendly farming practices might influence 
farmer decisions (Kar li t al., 2014; Willock et al., 1999).  
The levels of profit, environmental sustainability, and hired labour are determined as 
indicated in equations 1-3. Profit is operationalized as Gross Margin, sustainability is 
measure  by the quantity of organic waste produced and hired labour as the mount of labour 
required minus the own labour endo ment. In the baseline the f rmer’s decision is unrelated 
to the decisions made by other farmers. I  the scenario a alysis we intro u e interaction 
betw en agent  where the actions of other ag nts effect the farmer’s decision. Profit is equal 
to the revenue from r gular outputs (w ich may improve due to Bokashi/CMC application) 
and the revenue from processing organic waste ( unicipalities pay the farmers for taking the 
waste from them) inus the costs of producing the regul r outputs, costs of processing 
organic waste, and labour costs (1). Farmers are not allowed to sell the co post they produce 
but have to use this on their own land. This assumption is based on t  (concept) contracts 
etween farm rs and municipalities in w ich far ers are not allowed to sell the compost to 
avoid u f ir competition in the markets for compost. As an indicator f r environmental 
sustainability we use the amount of organic waste processed on the farm (2). The hired labour 
hours used on the farm are the labour hours need d which depends on the level of regular 
outputs and organic waste processed minu  the initial labour endowment which is equal to the 
labo r of the farm household applied on-farm (3).  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 = max(∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜) (1)  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 = max𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  (2)  
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = max( 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)  (3) 
Subject to:  
 (3)
Subject to: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 profit, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price per unit of regular output j, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price per unit 
of input m, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 quantity of input m, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 revenue per unit of processed organic waste, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
processing cost per unit of organic waste, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 quantity of organic waste processed, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 price per 
unit of hired labour, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 quantity of hired labour, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 yearly investment cost of organic waste, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 
environmental sustainability, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 initial labour 
endowment, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set, 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector of outputs and variable inputs 
respectively, 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices respectively.   
Within the farmer’s utility function each of these objectives receives a weight. Following 
Manos et al. (2009) we distinguish four steps in the estimation of a farmer’s utility function. 
First, we have to define a set of q objectives 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) …𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) that capture the objectives 
that are most important in farmers’ decision making, here they are given in equation 1-3 (i.e. 
profit maximization, environmental sustainability maximization, and hired labour 
minimization). Here, 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 are the constraints determining the value of an objective. 
In the second step we have to obtain the pay-off matrix for the selected objectives. The pay-
off matrix is set up in the following way:  
Objectives/attributes  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                              𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 (4) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞1      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞2       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞∗ 
To obtain the elements of this matrix we optimize the objective in the top subject to the 
constraints 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 of each column. The elements in the rows are then the value of the objective at 
the beginning of the row achieved in this optimization. For example, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the 
value of objective i when we optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧). The diagonal elements give the optimal 
value of each objective. 
In the third step the weights that represent the farmers’ preferences are determined. In order to 
obtain the weights we have to solve the following system of equations:  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (5)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … , 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞       
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 profit, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price per unit of regular output j, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price per unit 
of input m, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 quantity of input m, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 revenue per unit of processed organic waste, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
processing cost per unit f organic wast , 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 quantity of organic waste processed, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 price per 
unit of hired labour, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 quantity of hired labour, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 yearly investment cost f organic waste, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 
e vironmental sustainability, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 initial l bour 
dowment, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set, 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector of outputs and variable inputs 
respectively, 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices respectively.   
Within the farmer’s utility function each of these objectives receives a weight. Following 
Manos et al. (2009) we distinguish four steps in the estimation of a farmer’s utility function. 
First, w  have to define a set of q objectiv s 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) …𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) that capture the objectives 
that are most important in farmers’ decision making, here they are given in equation 1-3 (i.e. 
profit maximizati n, environ ental sustainability maximization, and hired labour 
minimiz tion). Here, 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 are the constraints determining the value of an objective. 
In the second step we have to obtain the pay-off matrix for the selected objectives. The pay-
off matrix is set up in the following way:  
Objectives/attributes  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                              𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 (4) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞1      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞2       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞∗ 
To obtain the elements of this matrix we optimize the objective in the top subject to the 
constraints 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 of ach column. The elem nts in th  rows ar  then the value of the objective at 
the begi ning of the row achieved in this optimization. For example, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the 
value of objective i when we optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧). The diagonal elements give the optimal 
value of each objective. 
In the third step the weights that represent the farmers’ preferences are determined. In order to 
obtain the weights we have to solve the following system of equations:  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (5)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … , 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞       
here:
π r fit, pj price per unit of  regular output j, vj quantity of  re ular output j, wm 
rice per unit of  input m, xm quantity of  input m, po revenue per unit of  processed 
organic waste, wo processing cost per unit of  organic waste, yo quantity of  organic 
waste processed, pL price per unit of  hired labour, L quantity of  hired labour, lo 
y arly investment cost f  organic waste, μ nvi nmental sustain ility, LR labour 
required in the production process, LI initial labour endowment, T(y, x, yo, L) 
technology set, y, x vector of  outputs and variable inputs respectively, p, w vector 
of  output and input prices respectively. 
Within th farmer’s utility unction each of  these objectives re eives a weight. Fol-
low ng Manos et al. (2009) we distinguish four steps in the estimation of  a farmer’s 
utility function. First, we have to define a set of  q objectives f1(z), f2(z) ... fq(z) that 
capture the objectives that are most important in farmers’ decision making, here 
they are given in equation 1-3 (i.e. rofit aximization, environmental sustain-
ability maximization, and hired labour minimization). Here, z are the constraints 
det rmining the value of  an objective.
In the second step we have to obtain the pay-off  matrix for the selected objec-
tives. The pay-off  matrix is set up in the following way: 
Objectives/attributes  f1(z), f2(z) ... fq(z)
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 profit, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 pric  per unit of regular output j, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 qu ntity of regular output j, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price per unit 
of input m, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 quantity of input m, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 revenue per unit of processed org nic waste, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
proc ssing cost per unit of organic waste, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 quantity of organic waste processed, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 price per 
unit of hired labour, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 quantity of hired labour, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 yearly investment cost of organic waste, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 
environmental sustainability, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 initial labour 
end wment, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set, 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector of outputs and variable inputs 
respectively, 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 v ctor of output and input prices respectively.   
Within the farmer’s utility function each of these objectives receives a weight. Following 
Manos et al. (2009) we distinguish four steps in the estimation of a farmer’s utility function. 
First, we have to define a set of q objectives 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) …𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) that capture the objectives 
at are most important in farmers’ decision making, here they ar  given in equation 1-3 (i.e. 
profit maximization, environmental sustainability maximization, and hired labour 
minimization). Here, 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 are the constraints determining the value of an objective. 
In the second step we have to obtain the pay-off matrix for the selected objectives. The pay-
off matrix is set up in the following way:  
Objectives/attributes  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                              𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 (4) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞1      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞2       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞∗ 
To obtain the elements of this matrix we optimize the objective in the top subject to the 
constraints 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 of each column. The elements in the rows are then the value of the objective at 
the beginning of the row achieved in this optimization. For example, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the 
value of objective i when we optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧). The diagonal elements give the optimal 
value of each objective. 
In the third step the weights that represent the farmers’ preferences are determined. In order to 
obtain the weights we have to solve the following system of equations:  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (5)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … , 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞       
 (4)
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To obtain the elements of  this matrix we optimize the objective in the top subject 
to the constraints z of  each column. The elements in the rows are then the value 
of  the objective at the beginning of  the row achieved in this optimization. For 
example, the element fij is the value of  objective i when we optimize objective fj(z). 
The diagonal elements give the optimal value of  each objective.
In the third step the weights that represent the farmers’ preferences are deter-
mined. In order to obtain the weights we have to solve the following system of  
equations: 
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 profit, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price per unit of regular output j, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price per unit 
of input m, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 quantity of input m, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 revenue per unit of processed organic waste, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
processing cost per unit of organic waste, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 quantity of organic waste processed, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 price per 
unit of hired labour, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 quantity of hired labour, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 yearly investment cost of organic waste, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 
environmental sustainability, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 initial labour 
endowment, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set, 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector of outputs and variable inputs 
respectively, 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices respectively.   
Within the farmer’s utility function each of these objectives receives a weight. Following 
Manos et al. (2009) we distinguish four steps in the estimation of a farmer’s utility function. 
First, we have to define a set of q objectives 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) …𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) that capture the objectives 
that are most important in farmers’ decision making, here they are given in equation 1-3 (i.e. 
profit maximization, environmental sustainability maximization, and hired labour 
minimization). Here, 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 are the constraints determining the value of an objective. 
In the second step we have to obtain the pay-off matrix for the selected objectives. The pay-
off matrix is set up in the following way:  
Objectives/attributes  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                              𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 (4) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞1      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞2       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞∗ 
To obtain the elements of this matrix we optimiz  th  objective in the top subject to the 
constraints 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 of each column. The elements in the rows are then the value of the objective at 
the beginning of the row achieved in this optimization. For example, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the 
value of objective i when we optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧). The diagonal elements give the optimal 
value of each objective. 
In th  third step the weights that repr sent the farmers’ preferences are determined. In order to 
obtain the weights we have to solve the following system of equations:  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (5)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … , 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞       
 (5)
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𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 profit, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price per unit of regular output j, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price per unit 
of input m, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 quantity of input m, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 revenue per unit of processed organic waste, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
processing cost per unit f organic waste, 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 quantity of organic waste processed, 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 price per 
unit of hired labour, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 quantity of hired labour, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 yearly investment cost f organic waste, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 
e vir nmental sustainability, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 initial labour 
dowment, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set, 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector of outputs a d variable inputs 
respectively, 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices respectively.   
Within the farmer’s utility function each of these objectives receives a weight. Following 
Manos et al. (2009) we distinguish four steps in the estimation of a farmer’s utility function. 
First, we have to define a set of q objectives 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) …𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) that capture the objectives 
that are most important in farmers’ decision making, here they are given in equation 1-3 (i.e. 
profit maximizati n, environ ental sustainability maximization, and hired labour 
minimization). Here, 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 are the constraints determining the value of an objective. 
In the second step we have to obtain the pay-off matrix for the selected objectives. The pay-
off matrix is set up in t e following way:  
Objectives/attributes  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                              𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 (4) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧)                             𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞1      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞2       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞∗ 
To obtain the elements of this matrix we optimize the objective in the top subject to the 
c nstraints 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 of each c lumn. The ele ents in the rows are then the value of the obj ctive at 
the begi ning of the row achieved in this optimizati n. For example, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the 
value of objective i when we optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗(𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧). The diagonal elements give the optimal 
value of each objective. 
In the third step the weights that represent the farmers’ preferences are determined. In order to 
obtain t e weights we have to solve the follo ing system of equations:  
 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (5)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … , 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞       
Subject to
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ject to 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (6) 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1   (7) 
Where:  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the weight attached to the j-th objective (j=1,2,..,q) of the farmer, 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 are the elements of 
the pay-off matrix and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the i-th objective that is actually observed in the 
current production plan of the farmer, 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the negative deviation from the observed and 
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y ung cattle old r than a year per cow, initial number of  cows, initial number of  
hectares and the amount of  labour available on farm. General system properties 
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maintaining cattle, the amount of  feed measured in KVEM (measure for energy 
content of  feed) produced on a ha of  grassland and maize land, the amount of  
phosphate (P2O5) allowed on a ha of  grassland and maize land, and the percent-
age grassland needed to be able to apply for derogation (i.e. a measure that allows 
to apply more minerals on land (Rijksoverheid, 2009), the KVEM needed per 
cow, the KVEM needed for young cattle, the kg P2O5 per KVEM from grass, 
the kg P2O5 per KVEM from maize, the kg P2O5 per KVEM from feed bought, 
the kg P2O5 bound in milk, kg P2O5 bound in carrying cows, kg P2O5 bound in 
young cattle, the labour hours required for cultivating maize, the labour hours 
required for cultivating grass, the labour hours needed per cow, the labour hours 
needed per m3 organic and the costs of  cultivating a hectare of  grass and maize. 
See section 3.2 for more details on how we collected these data and how their 
corresponding variables have been included in the model.
Within this paper we model a limited number of  dairy farms. The empirical 
model can be found in Appendix A.
 3.2.1.2. Creating the farmer-agent population 
As we have not been able to interview all farmers in the region we then cre-
ated a virtual population of  a hundred farmer-agents to simulate the uptake of  
processing organic waste using the CMC or Bokashi technique. Hereby we use 
the information obtained from interviews with five dairy farmers in the study area 
(see section 2.3) to generate a population that exhibits variability in terms of  the 
above described criteria and weights. We assume that these five dairy farmers are 
representative for the whole region, except for the fact that they process organic 
waste. To generate the population, we take the properties of  the five farms and 
create per farm 19 additional virtual farm-agents. Each variable (representing the 
individual farm properties) is a random number drawn from a normal distribution, 
with the mean equal to the parameter value of  the original farm and a standard 
deviation of  ten percent of  the mean. This standard deviation is loosely based 
on standard deviations of  farm parameters used in Ondersteijn et al. (2003) and 
Fanguiero et al. (2008). The characteristics of  the initial farms can be found in 
appendix B. 
To create the weights attached to profit maximization, environmental sustain-
ability maximization and labour minimization we also start from the weights of  the 
initial farmers. However, because these five farmers already adopted the practice, 
they likely care more for environmental sustainability than the “average” farmer 
in this region. The assumption that the farmers that are among the early adopters 
and included in the pilot project on processing organic waste care more about 
sustainability than the other farmers in the region seems reasonable, given the 
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fact that they were willing to invest time in preparation of  the pilot when benefits 
were still uncertain. Furthermore, during the interviews farmers often mentioned 
the environmental benefits of  the project. Therefore, we draw the sustainability 
weight for the created farmer-agent population from a normal distribution with 
a mean that is equal to five percent of  the weight of  the original farmer and a 
standard deviation of  ten percent. Obviously, these are crude estimations from 
our side, which cannot be substantiated with empirical data. Although the estima-
tions affect the decision within the virtual farmer-agents population to adopt 
CMC/Bokashi in absolute terms, they do not affect the conclusions we ultimately 
draw about the mechanisms of  uptake (and their relative importance), and how 
these interact. Based on the number of  farmers involved in the CMC/Bokashi 
pilot projects and the total number of  farmers in the study area we estimate that 
five percent of  the farms in this area process organic waste. Although we focused 
on farmers that adopted the practice of  CMC/Bokashi, we assume that they are 
representative for the whole region, except for their sustainability weight (below 
we describe how we dealt with that).
We determine the weights for profit and labour by drawing a random term 
from a normal distribution with a mean equal to the weight of  the original farmer 
and a standard deviation of  ten percent. However, if  we decrease the weight 
attached to environmental sustainability we have to increase the weight for profit 
and labour, since the total weights have to add up to one. Therefore, we sum 
the three weights and determine the deviation from one. We add half  of  this 
deviation to the random term we found for profit and half  to the random term we 
found for labour to arrive at the final weights for profit and labour. If  we use the 
created farmer-agents population in the baseline model we find an initial uptake 
of  around five percent of  on-farm processing of  organic waste.
3.2.1.3. emergent system properties 
Mechanism 1: Economies of  scale 
Economies of  scale is often considered an important mechanism that enables the 
spread of  new technologies (Agnolucci & McDowall, 2007). Farmers can join in a 
network to reduce e.g. investment costs and therewith benefit from economies of  
scale (Perdomo et al., 2016). Other examples of  the importance of  economies of  
scale as a potential driver for innovation in the agricultural sector can be found in 
Vagneron, Faure & Loeillet (2009), Hermans, Roep & Klerkx (2016), Roest, Fer-
rari &Knickel (2017), and Berger (2001).For this mechanism the investment costs 
for the CMC machinery can be shared with other farmer-agents (the machine can 
be attached to a tractor and can therefore easily be transported). The costs for 
Bokashi cannot be shared, since this technique does not require an investment in 
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a specific machine. After each time step the number of  farmer-agents investing 
in a CMC machine is evaluated. We assume the farmer-agents are able to observe 
the investment decision of  all other farmer-agents in the system. In the next time 
step each of  the farmer-agents that did not invest in CMC in the previous time 
steps considers investing in CMC if  (s)he would be able to share the costs with 
the farmer-agents that invested in the previous time step. To determine the cost 
of  the CMC machine farmer-agents apply the following formula (see eq. A23 in 
appendix A): 
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Where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the average yearly investment cost of individual farmer-agent i in time step t, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  
is the average yearly total investment costs of CMC machinery and 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 is the number of 
farmer-agents that chose to invest in time step t‑1.  
The model takes into account that there is a maximum of 10 farmer-agents that could share a 
machine. If this number is exceeded a new machine would be needed, for which costs could 
again be shared. This mechanism is incorporated in the model. The assumption that farmers 
are able to share the machinery seems plausible given the fact that two farmers in one of the 
pilot projects already shared the machine. We assume that the maximum of 10 farmers is not 
dependent on farm size, as most material to be composted will be delivered by the 
municipality. Moreover, we assume that the amount of organic waste within the municipality 
is sufficiently large as not to limit the farmer’s decision whether or not to process organic 
waste on farm.  
Mechanism 2: Learning 
Adoption of new agricultural knowledge and practice is more likely after farmers are able to 
see them successfully demonstrated (Brown et al., 2016). Examples of the importance of 
learning as a potential driver for innovation in the agricultural sector can be found in Marra, 
Pannell & Ghadim (2003), Panell et al. (2006), Hogarth (2017),  Olde, Carsjens & Eilers 
(2017),  Dogliotti  et al. (2014), and Šūmane et al. (2017). When a new technique is 
introduced, the effects of this technique are uncertain. In general, application of compost can 
potentially enhance soil structure, increase water holding capacity, improve soil fertility 
(Cozzolino et al., 2015; Steel et al., 2010), improve soil biodiversity (Mbau, Karanja & 
Ayuke, 2015), reduce carbon emissions and nutrients leakage (Lanting, 2008), and reduce 
need for artificial pesticide (Saxena et al., 2015). Negative effects by pathogens and unwanted 
seed plants have also been reported (Insam, Franke-Whittle, & Goberna, 2010; Montemurro et 
al., 2015). For the farmers it is very difficult to estimate the effect of applying Bokashi or 
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estimate the effect of  applying Bokashi or CMC to their land, and whether or 
not this will have an effect on yield ex ante. Furthermore, the observation of  
the actual yield increase due to compost application tends to get obscured by 
the overall variability in yields caused by a range of  other factors, many of  them 
being stochastic (weather, mostly). The learning mechanism captures this yield 
uncertainty and the effect of  learning. Yields are subject to a small positive effect 
of  CMC and Bokashi, but with a considerable stochastic variability, so that an 
agent may not necessarily experience a positive response to compost application. 
To incorporate this in the scenarios reflecting this mechanism, a normal distribu-
tion with a mean of  four percent and a standard deviation of  two percent was 
used to generate the stochastic effect on yields when compost is applied.  In each 
of  the consecutive time steps the farmer-agents are able to observe the yields of  
the farmer-agents that invested in the previous time steps. They will adapt their 
yield expectation based on these observed yields and take this into account when 
making the decision to invest. Farmers do so by applying the following formula 
(see eq. A24 in appendix A): 
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compost,  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 is the yield increase for farmer-agent i when applying compost in time step t‑
1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the number of farmer-agents that applied compost in time step t‑1.  
We assume the farmers within the region can all observe each other, and thereby learn from 
each other. All farmer-agents in our model have similar learning capacity. This means that 
distance or personal relationships between the farmers do not explicitly influence learning in 
our model.  
Mechanism 3: Changing social norms 
The third mechanism shows the effect of changing social norms and values. Social norms and 
networks are thought to influence micro-scale values and beliefs of individuals and 
households (Atwell, Schulte & Westphal, 2009). Examples of the importance of changing 
social norms as a potential driver for innovation in the agricultural sector can be found in 
Cohen et al. (2016), Martínez-García, Dorward &Rehman (2013) and Fleury et al. (2015) . 
Initially a farmer might not care much about environmental sustainability. However, when 
more and more farmers start to process organic waste it might become the norm, influencing 
the weight a farmer attaches to environmental sustainability. For this mechanism we show the 
effect of an increase in the weight attached to environmental sustainability, as a response to 
decisions made by other farmer-agents in previous time steps. After each time step the 
number of farmer-agents that process organic waste is evaluated. For every five farmer-agents 
that apply organic waste the weight for environmental sustainability increases by 0.0025 
percent in the next time step for the entire population. This means that the farmer will increase 
the value he attaches to environmental sustainability by 1 percent for each 20 farmers that 
adopt on-farm processing of organic waste. The weights for profit and labour are decreased 
proportionally by the same amount, according to the following formulas (see eq. A25-A27 in 
appendix A):  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.0025 ×
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (11) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 −
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1+𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
× 0.0025 ×
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (12) 
 (10)
Where yei,t is the expected yield increase of  farmer-agent i in time step t when 
applying compost, yi,t‑1 is the yield increase for farmer-agent i when applying 
compost in time step t-1 mt‑1 is the number of  farmer-agents that applied compost 
in time st p t-1. 
We assume the farmers within the region can all observe each other, and thereby 
learn from each other. All farmer-agents in our model have similar learning capac-
ity. This means that distance or personal relationships between the farmers do not 
explicitly influence learning i  our model. 
Mechanism 3: Changing social norms
The third mechanism shows the effect of  changing social norms and values. Social 
norms and networks are thought to influence icro-scale values and beliefs of  
i d viduals and households (Atwell, Schulte & Westphal, 2009). Examples of  the 
importance of  changing social norms as a potential driver for innovation in the 
agricultural sector can be found in Cohen et al. (2016), Martínez-García, Dorward 
&Rehman (2013) and Fleury et al. (2015) . Initially a farmer might not care much 
about environmental sustainability. However, when more and more farmers start 
to process organic waste it might become the norm, influencing the weight a 
farmer attaches to environ ental sustainability. For this mechanism we show 
the effect of  an increase in the eight attached to environmental sustainability,
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as a response to decisions made by other farmer-agents in previous time steps. 
After each time step the number of  farmer-agents that process organic waste is 
evaluated. For every five farmer-agents that apply organic waste the weight for 
environmental sustainability increases by 0.0025 percent in the next time step 
for the entire population. This means that the farmer will increase the value he 
attaches to environmental sustainability by 1 percent for each 20 farmers that 
adopt on-farm processing of  organic waste. The weights for profit and labour 
are decreased proportionally by the same amount, according to the following 
formulas (see eq. A25-A27 in appendix A): 
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CMC to their land, and whether or not this will have an effect on yield ex ante. Furthermore, 
the observation of the actual yield increase due to compost application tends to get obscured 
by the overall variability in yields caused by a range of other factors, many of them being 
stochastic (weather, mostly). The learning mechanism captures this yield uncertainty and the 
effect of learning. Yields are subject to a small positive effect of CMC and Bokashi, but with 
a considerable stochastic variability, so that an agent may not necessarily experience a 
positive response to compost application. To incorporate this in the scenarios reflecting this 
mechanism, a normal distribution with a mean of four percent and a standard deviation of two 
percent was used to generate the stochastic effect on yields when compost is applied.  In each 
of the consecutive time steps the farmer-agents are able to observe the yields of the farmer-
agents that invested in the previous time steps. They will adapt their yield expectation based 
on these observed yields and take this into account when making the decision to invest. 
Farmers do so by applying the following formula (see eq. A24 in appendix A):  
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = ∑
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  (10) 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  is the expected yield increase of farmer-agent i in time step t when applying 
compost,  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 is the yield increase for farmer-agent i when applying compost in time step t‑
1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the number of farmer-agents that applied compost in time step t‑1.  
We assume the farmers within the region can all observe each other, and thereby learn from 
each other. All farmer-agents in our model have similar learning capacity. This means that 
distance or personal relationships between the farmers do not explicitly influence learning in 
our model.  
Mechanism 3: Changing social norms 
The third mechanism shows the effect of changing social norms and values. Social norms and 
networks are thought to influence micro-scale values and beliefs of individuals and 
households (Atwell, Schulte & Westphal, 2009). Examples of the importance of changing 
social norms as a potential driver for innovation in the agricultural sector can be found in 
Cohen et al. (2016), Martínez-García, Dorward &Rehman (2013) and Fleury et al. (2015) . 
Initially a farmer might not care much about environmental sustainability. However, when 
more and mor  farmers tart to proc ss organic w ste it mi ht become the norm, influencing 
the weight a farmer attaches to environmental sustainability. For this mechanism we show the 
effect of an increase in the weight attached to environmental sustainability, as a response to 
decisions made by other farmer-agents in previous time steps. After each time step the 
number of farmer-agents that process organic waste is evaluated. For every five farmer-agents 
that apply organic waste the weight for e vironmental sustainability increas s by 0.0025 
percent in the next time step for the entire population. This means that the farmer will increase 
the value he attaches to environmental sustainability by 1 percent for each 20 farmers that 
adopt on-farm processing of organic waste. The weights for profit and labour are decreased 
p oportion lly by the same amount, according to the following f mulas (see eq. A25-A27 in 
appendix A):  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 + 0.0025 ×
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (11) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 −
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1+𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
× 0.0025 ×
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (12) 
 (11)
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 to their land, and hether or not this ill have an effect on yield ex ante. Further ore, 
the observation of the actual yield increase due to co post application tends to get obscured 
by the overall variability in yields caused by a range of other factors, any of the  being 
stochastic ( eather, ostly). The learning echanis  captures this yield uncertainty and the 
effect of learning. ields are subject to a s all positive effect of  and okashi, but ith 
a considerable stochastic variability, so that an agent ay not necessarily experience a 
positive response to co post application. To incorporate this in the scenarios reflecting this 
echanis , a nor al distribution ith a ean of four percent and a standard deviation of t o 
percent as used to generate the stochastic effect on yields hen co post is applied.  In each 
of the consecutive ti e steps the far er-agents are able to observe the yields of the far er-
agents that invested in the previous ti e steps. They ill adapt their yield expectation based 
on these observed yields and take this into account hen aking the decision to invest. 
Far ers do so by applying the follo ing for ula (see eq. 24 in appendix ):  
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  (10) 
here 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  is the expected yield increase of far er-agent i in ti e step t hen applying 
co post,  𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 is the yield increase for far er-agent i hen applying co post in ti e step t‑
1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the nu ber of far er-agents that applied co post in ti e step t‑1.  
e assu e the far ers ithin the region can all observe each other, and thereby learn fro  
each other. ll far er-agents in our odel have si ilar learning capacity. This eans that 
distance or personal relationships bet een the far ers do not explicitly influence learning in 
our odel.  
echanis  3: hanging social nor s 
The third echanis  sho s the effect of changing social nor s and values. Social nor s and 
net orks are thought to influence icro-scale values and beliefs of individuals and 
households ( t ell, Schulte  estphal, 2009). Exa ples of the i portance of changing 
social nor s as a potential driver for innovation in the agricultural sector can be found in 
ohen et al. (2016), artínez- arcía, or ard eh an (2013) and Fleury et al. (2015) . 
Initially a far er ight not care uch about environ ental sustainability. o ever, hen 
ore and or  far ers start to proc ss organic ste it i ht beco e the nor , influencing 
the eight a far er attaches to environ ental sustainability. For this echanis  e sho  the 
effect of an increase in the eight attached to environ ental sustainability, as a response to 
decisions ade by other far er-agents in previous ti e steps. fter each ti e step the 
nu ber of far er-agents that process organic aste is evaluat d. For ev ry five far er-agents 
that apply organic aste the eight for environ ental sustainability increases by 0.0025 
percent in the next ti e step for the entire population. This eans that the far er ill increase 
the value he attaches to environ ental sustainability by 1 percent for each 20 far ers that 
adopt on-far  processing of organic aste. The eights for profit and labour are decreased 
proportion lly by the sa e a ount, according to the follo ing f r ulas (see eq. 25- 27 in 
appendix ):  
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 0.0025
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (11) 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1+𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
0.0025
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (12) 
 (12)
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𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1 −
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1+𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
× 0.0025 ×
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡−1
5
 (13) 
Where 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the weight farmer-agent i attaches to sustainability in time step t,  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the 
weight farmer-agent i attaches to profit in time step t, 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the weight farmer-agent i 
attaches to labour in time step t. 
The weights of the objective of all farmer-agents in the system change by the same amount, 
and is not dependent on their initial values. The value of 0.0025 reflects the degree of social 
cohesion within a farmers’ community. Our choice of 0.0025 is a fairly arbitrary one, which 
would require further calibration in future studies. We assume the farmers within the region 
can all observe each other, and each extra farmer processing organic waste will have the same 
impact on the weight for environmental sustainability.  
More detailed information about how the mechanisms were implemented in the model can be 
found in Appendix A. 
3.2.2. Study Area 
Our study area is called the “Friese Meren” and is situated in the Southwest of the province of 
Friesland. It encompasses an area of 55,000 ha of land and is inhabited by around 51,000 
persons (Overheid in Friesland, 2016). The land use is dominated by agriculture, with some 
big lakes and smaller villages and cities in between. The soil consists of peat, sand and light 
sandy clay (Bodematlas, 2016). Within the Friese Meren there are 362 dairy farms with on 
average 97 dairy cows. There are 132 farms with more than 100 cows (BoerenBusiness, 
2014b; Melkvee.nl, 2016). Figure 3.2. shows a map of the area. Currently organic municipal 
waste (often from the roadsides) is collected into a central point and processed, which is a 
costly activity for the municipality. The quality of the processed organic waste is often very 
low and rarely used in the agricultural sector. By setting up a system of on-farm processing of 
organic waste municipalities save processing and transport costs. Even though farmers receive 
a payment from the municipality for the organic waste they process the municipality will 
reduce their costs for processing organic waste. On top of that, since farmers are expected not 
to sell their compost but to use it on their own land, important nutrients from the organic 
waste will remain within the region (Lanting, 2008). 
 (13)
Where  wbi,t is the weight farmer-agent i attaches to sustainability in time step 
t, wpi,t is the weight farmer-agent i attaches to profit in time step t, wli,t is the 
weight farmer-agent i attaches to labour in time step t.
The weights of  the objective of  all farmer-agents in the system change by the 
same amount, and is not dependent on their initial values. The value of  0.0025 
reflects the degree of  social cohesion within a farmers’ community. Our choice of  
0.0025 is a fairly arbit ary one, which would require fu ther calibrat on in future 
studies. We assume the farmers within the region can all observe each other, and 
each extra farmer processing organic waste will have the same impact on the 
weight for environmental sustainability. 
More detailed information about how the mechanisms were implemented in the 
model can be found in Appendix A.
3.2.2. Study Area
Our study area is call d the “Friese Meren” and is situated in the Southwest of
the province of  Friesland. It encompasses an area of  55,000 ha of  land and is 
inhabited by around 51,000 persons (Overheid in Friesland, 2016). The land use 
is dominated by agriculture, with some big lakes and smaller villages d cities in 
between. The soil consists of  peat, sand and light sandy clay (Bodematlas, 2016). 
Within the Friese Meren there are 362 dairy farms with on average 97 dairy cows. 
There are 132 farms with more than 100 cows (BoerenBusiness, 2014b; Melkvee.
nl, 2016). Figure 3.2. shows a map of  the are . Currently organic municipal aste 
(often from the roadsides) is collected into a central point and processed, which 
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is a costly activity for the municipality. The quality of  the processed organic waste 
is often very low and rarely used in the agricultural sector. By setting up a system 
of  on-farm processing of  organic waste municipalities save processing and trans-
port costs. Even though farmers receive a payment from the municipality for the 
organic waste they process the municipality will reduce their costs for processing 
organic waste. On top of  that, since farmers are expected not to sell their com-
post but to use it on their own land, important nutrients from the organic waste 
will remain within the region (Lanting, 2008).
Figure 3.2. Soil types in the Friese Meren, Source: (Bodematlas, 2016)
3.2.3. Data 
In the “Friese Meren” ten farmers have been involved in two pilot projects for 
on-farm processing of  organic waste. One project has been finished in 2015, in 
this 2015 project two farmers were involved, and both are now applying the CMC 
compost technique. We interviewed one of  the farmers in this 2015 pilot project, 
since the other farmer had a mixed farm instead of  a dairy farm. 
The other pilot project is still running, in this current pilot eight farmers par-
ticipate and evaluate the decision to start CMC or Bokashi. Most of  these farmers 
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do not yet apply the technique, but revealed an intention to take up either CMC 
or Bokashi in the next year. We interviewed six of  the farmers in the current 
pilot project; two of  the farmers were not willing to participate. We performed all 
interviews in 2016, using semi-structured interviews to gather part of  the data for 
the model. Table 3.1. gives an overview of  the farmers in the pilot projects and 
the farmers we interviewed. 
Table 3.1. Overview of farmers in pilot projects and farmers interviewed
Total farmers Farmers interviewed
Current pilot project 8 6
2015 pilot project 2 1
Total 10 7
For each farm we asked about the number of  cows, the number of  young cattle 
< 1 year, the number of  young cattle > 1 year, the total amount of  milk produced, 
the total amount of  land on the farm, the amount of  grassland, the amount of  
maize land, whether they (are going to) produce CMC or Bokashi including the 
amount of  organic waste (that will be) processed on the farm, the number of  
persons working on the farm and the hours of  agricultural contractors hired. Two 
of  the seven farmers had an organic farm. Since our model is based on regular 
dairy farms to capture the majority of  the farmers in the Friese Meren we used 
the interviews with the organic farmers to gain background information on the 
CMC and Bokashi techniques. The interviews with the remaining five farmers 
were used to collect input data for our model. 
Appendix B shows the values of  the parameters used in the model. Table 3B.1. 
in appendix B gives an overview of  the individual farmer data used in our model. 
For the farmers that did not yet process organic waste we use the expected level 
of  investments and costs indicated by the farmers, unless they were unable to 
estimate these costs. In that case we base ourselves on the values indicated in 
the report on the 2015 pilot project (Holster, 2015). In the interviews we asked 
each of  the farmers to indicate the price (s)he expected to receive from the 
municipality for each m3 of  organic waste that was processed on farm. Differ-
ent farmers expected different prices per m3 of  organic waste processed.  Since 
negotiations were still going on we do not report the individual expectations here. 
We determine farmer’s utility functions given the investment costs and processing 
benefits as expected by the farmers, regardless whether these investment costs 
and benefits were realistic. However, when we analyse the possible uptake of  this 
practice we will need to take the “real” investment costs and prices into account. 
Based on the conversations we had on this topic with different people involved 
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in the pilot projects we assume that the real price for most farmers will eventually 
be somewhere around 7€/m3.
The investments indicated also differed for each farmer. The two farmers in the 
current pilot project managed to buy a second-hand machine together, lowering 
their investment costs considerably. They already invested in this machine, even 
though the contract with the municipality specifying the amount of  organic waste 
to be processed and the price for organic waste was not yet concluded. For the 
other farmers we use the investment costs as indicated in the report from the 
2015 pilot project. The variable costs of  processing organic waste were hard to 
estimate for the farmers at the time of  the interviews. Based on the answers 
of  the farmers we found that they expected a variable cost of  around 5.7€/m3 
organic waste in the CMC process and around 6. /€ m3 for the Bokashi process. 
These are the prices that farmers expected and that we used in determining utility 
functions. In the time since we did the interviews with the farmers the organizers 
of  the current pilot project had research done that indicated that the real variable 
costs of  the farmers were 5 €/ m3 for CMC and 11.78€/m3 for Bokashi (Bosma, 
2016); these are the prices that we use to analyse the uptake. The total costs of  
hiring labour of  about 33€/hr we base on the report of  the 2015 pilot project 
(Holster, 2015) and the interviews with the farmers. This number is in accordance 
with the labour costs mentioned for agricultural contractors in the Quantitative 
Information Livestock Industry report (KWIN) 2014-2015 (Buisonje et al., 2014). 
Our model also contains general farm data. From the KWIN 2014-2015 
(Buisonje et al., 2014) we extracted information on the costs of  feed bought, 
the costs of  removing phosphate, the costs of  maintaining cattle, the amount 
of  feed measured in KVEM (measure for energy content of  feed) produced on 
a ha of  grassland and maize land, the amount of  phosphate (P2O5) allowed on a 
ha of  grassland and maize land, and the percentage grassland needed to be able 
to apply for derogation (i.e. a measure that allows to apply more minerals on 
land (Rijksoverheid, 2009). The handbook on the dairy farm sector 2014 (Rem-
melink et al., 2014) states the KVEM needed per cow and the KVEM needed 
for young cattle. The kg P2O5 per KVEM from grass, the kg P2O5 per KVEM 
from maize, the kg P2O5 per KVEM from feed bought, the kg P2O5 bound in 
milk, kg P2O5 bound in carrying cows and kg P2O5 bound in young cattle can 
be found in a report for calculating phosphate production on dairy farms by the 
Dutch government (RVO, 2010). The labour hours required for cultivating maize 
and for cultivating grass are extracted from (Meetjesland, 2016), while the labour 
hours needed per cow and per m3 organic waste are based on the interviews. 
Finally, the costs of  cultivating a hectare of  grass land and maize are calculated 
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from information from the “Kostenwijzer voedermiddelen” (Cost indicator for 
feedstuff) (WageningenUR, 2015). 
3.2.4. Model-experimental set-up
In order to explore if  and how a regime shift towards wide-scale uptake of  
on-farm organic waste processing could take place, as a result of  the proposed 
mechanism, the following experimental design was chosen. First, we explore a 
baseline in which none of  the mechanisms occur, and only the individual decision 
module is in effect. Secondly, we explore three scenarios in which each individual 
mechanism is taking place. Third, we explore four scenarios in which all possible 
combinations of  the three mechanisms are simulated.
For each scenario we run the model a 100 times. For each of  these 100 model 
runs we create a random farmer-agent population as described in the section 
“creating the farmer-agent population”. Each of  the 100 model runs contains 
ten time steps. In each time step the farmer-agent observes the actions of  its 
neighbours in the previous time step and makes its own decision accordingly. This 
allows us to determine the average number of  farmer-agents who process organic 
waste over 100 model runs in each of  the ten time steps. 
Table 3.2. shows which mechanisms are implemented in each of  the scenarios 
and the baseline. 
Table 3.2. Mechanisms implemented in each of the scenarios and the baseline
Scenario/mechanism Economies of 
scale
Learning Changing social 
norm
Baseline x x x
Economies of scale ✓ x x
Learning x ✓ x
Changing social norm x x ✓
Interaction all ✓ ✓ ✓
Interaction no economies of scale x ✓ ✓
Interaction no learning ✓ x ✓
Interaction no social norm ✓ ✓ x
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3.3. ReSuLTS 
Initial utility functions
The actual value of  gross margin, total amount of  organic waste processed and 
the total labour hours hired on the farm when optimizing each of  the farmers 
objectives are depicted in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3. Simulated and actual gross margin in euros, m3 organic waste processed and 
hours of hired labour by farmer
Farmer Max profit Max 
environmental 
sustainability
Min hired labour Actual
Farm 1
Gross margin 160,106 155,950 119,173 147,610
Total org. waste 3,960 4,950 0 2,917
Hired labour hours 1,634 1,935 0 2,301
Farm 2
Gross margin 198,998 197,268 168,074 198,960
Total org. waste 2,680 3,350 0 1,916
Hired labour hours 855 1,059 0 793
Farm 3
Gross margin 201,707 184,072 168,074 189,165
Total org. waste 0 4,060 0 2,000
Hired labour hours 751 1,122 0 1,119
Farm 4
Gross margin 126,024 115,412 126,024 88,807
Total org. waste 0 2,500 0 600
Hired labour hours 0 0 0 1,183
Farm 5
Gross margin 310,950 299,206 171,494 274,733
Total org. waste 0 6,250 0 2,500
Hired labour hours 3,754 4,254 0 4,849
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By applying the technique as described by Manos et al. (2009) which minimizes 
the deviations between the scenarios and reality we find the utility functions (9) 
to (14) for each of  the five farmers (we determined these using equations 4 to 8).
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𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈1 = 0.119 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋1
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋1
∗ +  0.588 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1
∗  −  0.293 ×  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
∗  (14) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈2 =  0.715 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋2
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋2
∗  −  0.285 ×  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
∗  (15) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈3 = 0.507 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋3
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋3
∗ +  0.493 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3
∗    (16) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈4 =  0.760 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋4
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋4
∗ +  0.240 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇4
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇4
∗   (17) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈5 =  0.693 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋5
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋5
∗ +  0.307 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇5
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇5
∗   (18) 
Where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is utility of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is profit of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential profit of 
farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is environmental sustainability of farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential 
environmental sustainability farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is hired labour hours by farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ minimum hired 
labour hours used by farmer i.  
Farmer 1 is the only farmer that attaches weight to all three objectives. Farmer 2 does not 
attach value to environmental sustainability, whereas farmer 3, 4 and 5 do not value hired 
labour minimization.  
The utility functions for the artificially created farmer population resulted from the weights 
we created as described in the section “creating the farmer-agent population”. These weights 
can be found in appendix D.  
Baseline 
In the baseline each farmer determines his/her optimal choice without taking the choices made 
by other farmers into account. In the baseline on average five farmers (5.15) choose to process 
organic waste (i.e. 5%).  
Three important parameters that influence the decisions in our model are the wage, the milk 
price and the price received for processing organic waste. In the sensitivity analysis in 
appendix C we show how the optimal decisions of the initial five farmers change with these 
prices. The sensitivity analysis shows that the farmer choices are robust with respect to price 
changes.  
Results Scenarios  
Figure 3.3. shows the average number of farmers who process organic waste over a 100 
model runs in each of the ten time steps for the economies of scale, learning and social norm 
scenarios.  
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Where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is utility of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is profit of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential profit of 
farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is environmental sustainability of farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential 
environmental sustainability farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is hired labour hours by farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ minimum hired 
labour hours used by farmer i.  
Farmer 1 is the only farmer that attaches weight to all three objectives. Farmer 2 does not 
attach value to environmental sustainability, whereas farmer 3, 4 and 5 do not value hired 
labour minimization.  
The utility functions for the artificially created farmer population resulted from the weights 
we created as described in the section “creating the farmer-agent population”. These weights 
can be found in appendix D.  
Baseline 
In the baseline each farmer determines his/her optimal choice without taking the choices made 
by other farmers into account. In the baseline on average five farmers (5.15) choose to process 
organic waste (i.e. 5%).  
Three important parameters that influence the decisions in our model are the wage, the milk 
price and the price received for processing organic waste. In the sensitivity analysis in 
appendix C we show how the optimal decisions of the initial five farmers change with these 
prices. The sensitivity analysis shows that the farmer choices are robust with respect to price 
changes.  
Results Scenarios  
Figure 3.3. shows the average number of farmers who process organic waste over a 100 
model runs in each of the ten time steps for the economies of scale, learning and social norm 
scenarios.  
 (15)
68 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈1 = 0.119 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋1
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋1
∗ +  0.588 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1
∗  −  0.293 ×  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
∗  (14) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈2 =  0.715 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋2
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋2
∗  −  0.285 ×  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
∗  (15) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈3 = 0.507 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋3
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋3
∗ +  0.493 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3
∗    (16) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈4 =  0.760 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋4
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋4
∗ +  0.240 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇4
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇4
∗   (17) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈5 =  0.693 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋5
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋5
∗ +  0.307 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇5
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇5
∗   (18) 
Where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is utility of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is profit of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential profit of 
farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is environmental sustainability o  farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential 
environmental sustai ability farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is hired labour hours by farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ minimum hired 
labour hours used by f rmer i.  
Farmer 1 is the only farmer that attaches weight to all three objectives. Farmer 2 does not 
attach value to environmental sustainability, whereas farmer 3, 4 and 5 do not value hired 
labour minimization.  
The utility functions for the artificially created farmer population resulted from the weights 
we created as described in the section “ r ting the farmer-agent pop lation”. These weights 
can b  found in appen ix D.  
Baseline 
In the baseline each farmer determines his/her optimal choice without taking the choices made 
by other farm rs into account. In the baselin  on average fiv  farmers (5.15) c oose to process 
organic w ste (i.e. 5%).  
Three important parameters that influence the decisions in our model are the wage, the milk 
pric  and the price received for processing organic waste. In the sensitivity analysis in 
app ndix C we show how the optimal decisions of the initial five farmers change with these 
pric s. The sensitivity analysis shows that the farmer choices ar  robust wit  respect to price 
changes.  
Results Scenarios  
Figure 3.3. shows the average number of farmers who process organic waste over a 100 
model runs in each of th  ten time st ps for th  economies of scale, learning and social norm 
scenarios.  
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farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is environmental sustainabil y o  farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential 
environmental sustai bility farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is hired labour hours by far er i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ minimum hired 
labour hours used by f rmer i.  
Farmer 1 is the only farmer that attaches weight to all three objectives. Farmer 2 does not 
attach value to environmental sus ainability, where s farm r 3, 4 and 5 do not value hired 
labour minimization.  
The tility functions for the artificially created farmer population resulted from the weights 
we created as described in the sect on “ ing the farmer-agent pop lation”. These weights 
can b  found in appen ix D.  
Baseline 
In the baseline each farmer determines his/her optimal choice without taking the choices made 
by other farm rs into account. In the baselin  on average fiv  farmers (5.15) c oose to process 
organ c w ste (i.e. 5%).  
Three important parameters that influence the decisions in our model are the wage, the milk 
pric  and the price eceived for processing organic waste. In the sensitivity analysis in 
appendix C we show how the optimal decisions of the initial five farmers change with these 
prices. The sensitivity analysis shows that the farmer choices ar  robust wit  respect to price 
changes.  
Results Scenarios  
Figure 3.3. shows the average number of farmers who process organic waste over a 100 
model runs in each of th  ten time st ps for th  economies of scale, learning and social norm 
scenarios.  
(17)
68 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈1 = 0.119 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋1
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋1
∗ +  0.588 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1
∗  −  0.293 ×  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙1
∗  (14) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈2 =  0.715 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋2
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋2
∗  −  0.285 ×  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙2
∗  (15) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈3 = 0.507 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋3
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋3
∗ +  0.493 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3
∗    (16) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈4 =  0.760 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋4
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋4
∗ +  0.240 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇4
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇4
∗   (17) 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈5 =  0.693 ×  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋5
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋5
∗ +  0.307 ×
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇5
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇5
∗   (18) 
Where 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖is utility of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is profit of farmer i, 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential profit of 
farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is environmental sustainabil y o  farmer i, 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ is maximum potential 
environmental sustai bility farmer i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is hired labour hours by far er i, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ minimum hired 
labour hours used by far er i.  
Farmer 1 is the only farmer that attaches weight to all three objectives. Farmer 2 does not 
attach value to environmental sustainability, where s farm r 3, 4 and 5 do not value hired 
labour minimization.  
The tility functions for the artificially created farmer population resulted from the weights 
we created as described in the section “ r ting the farmer-agent pop lation”. These weights 
can b  found in appen ix D.  
Baseline 
In the baseline a h farmer d termines his/her optim l choice with ut t king the choic s made 
by other farm rs into account. In the baselin  on average fiv  farmers (5.15) c oose to process 
organic w ste (i.e. 5%).  
Three important parameters that influence the decisions in our model are the wage, the milk 
pric  and the price received for processing organic waste. In the sensitivity analysis in 
appendix C we show how the optimal decisions of the initial five farmers change with these 
pric s. The sensitivity analysis shows that the farmer choices ar  robust wit  respect to price 
changes.  
Results Scenarios  
Figure 3.3. hows the average number of farmers who pro s organic waste over a 100 
model runs in each of th  ten time st ps for th  economies of scale, learning and social norm 
scenarios.  
(18)
h re Ui is utility of  farmer i, πi is profit of  farm r i, πi* is maximum potential 
profit of  farmer i, μi is environmental sustainability of  farmer i, μi* is maximum 
pot tial e iron ental sustainability farmer i, li is hired lab ur hours by farmer 
i, li* minimum hired labour hours used by farmer i. 
Farmer 1 is the only farmer that attaches weight to all three objectives. Farmer 
2 does ot attach value to environmental sustainability, w er as farmer 3, 4 and 5 
do not value hired l bour minimization. 
The tility fu ction  for the artificially created farmer population resulted from 
t  weights we cr ated s d scribed in the section “creatin  the farmer-agent 
population”. These weights can be found in appendix D. 
baseline
In he baseli e each farmer d termines his/h r optimal choice without taking 
the choic  made by ther f rmers into account. In h  baseline on average five 
fa mers (5.15) choose to process orga ic waste (i.e. 5%). 
Thre  import t parameters th t influence the decisions in our model are the 
wag , the milk price and the price received for processing organic waste. In the 
s nsitivity analysis in appendix C we show how the optimal decisions of  the ini-
t al five farmers ch ge with these prices. The sensitivity nalysis shows that the 
farmer choices are robust with respect to price changes. 
Results Scenarios 
Figure 3.3. shows the average number of  farmers who process organic waste 
over a 100 model runs in each of  the ten time steps for the economies of  scale, 
learning and social norm scenarios. 
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Figure 3.3. Average number of farmers processing organic waste in each time step in the economies of 
scale, learning, social norm and interaction all scenarios 
Figure 3.3. shows that the average number of farmers that process organic waste in the 10th 
time step is no higher than in the baseline in the scenario changing social norms (4), but this 
may be ascribed to our – fairly arbitrarily chosen – parameter indicating how the behaviour of 
individual farmers affect the overall social norm. The economies of scale scenario (13) and 
the learning scenario take an intermediate position (9). The average number of farmers 
increases initially, but after a certain time the average number of farmers stays constant in 
each of these scenarios However, the final uptake is substantially higher if the mechanisms 
from the first three scenarios are combined in the scenario interaction (92).  
Figure 3.4. shows the average number of farmers processing organic waste in the different 
interaction scenarios.  
Figure 3.3. Average number of farmers processing organic waste in each time step in the 
economies of scale, learning, social norm and interaction all scenarios
Figure 3.3. shows that the average number of  farmers that process organic waste 
in the 10t  time step is no higher than in the baseline in the scenario changing 
social norms (4), but this may be ascribed to our – fairly arbitrarily chosen – 
parameter indic ting ow the beh viour of  individual farmers affect the overall 
social norm. The economies of  scale scenario (13) and the learning scenario take 
an intermediate position (9). The average number of  farmers increases initially, 
but after a certain time the average number of  farmers stays constant in each of  
these scenarios However, the final uptake is substantially higher if  the mecha-
nisms from the first three scenarios are combined in the scenario interaction (92). 
Figure 3.4. shows the average number of  farmers processing organic waste in 
the different interaction scenarios. 
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Figure 3.4. Average number of farmers processing organic waste in each time step in the interaction 
scenarios 
Figure 3.4. shows the effect of dropping one of the mechanisms from the interaction scenario. 
If we consider the combined effect of a changing social norm and learning (16) and combined 
effect of a changing social norm and economies of scale (20) the average number of farmers 
processing organic waste after ten time steps is considerably lower than if we consider the 
effect of the three mechanisms combined (92). The average number of farmers after ten time 
steps if we combine the effect of economies of scale and learning (74) takes an intermediate 
value. Furthermore, the average number of farmers processing organic waste stays constant 
after the fifth time step in the scenarios combining only two mechanisms, but keeps increasing 
in the scenario combining all three mechanisms.  
For each of the 100 model runs we determined the number of farmers processing organic 
waste. This information is presented in the histograms in Figure 3.5. The frequency in these 
histograms indicates how many times the number of farmers indicated on the horizontal axis 
were processing organic waste at the end of the model run. For example, in the histogram 
economies of scale the frequency of 11 farmers processing organic waste is 23. This means 
that out of a 100 model runs we found 23 times that the final number of farmers processing 
organic waste was 11.  
 
Figure 3.4. Average number of farmers processing organic waste in each time step in the 
interaction scenarios
Figure 3.4. shows the effect of  dropping one of  the mechanisms from the 
interaction scenario. If  we c nsider the c mbi ed effect of  a changing social 
norm and learning (16) and combined effect of  a changing social norm and 
economies of  scale (20) the average number of  farmers processing organic waste 
after ten time steps is considerably lower than if  we consider the effect of  the 
three mechanisms combined (92). The average number of  farmers after ten time 
steps if  we combine the effect of  economies of  scale and learning (74) takes 
an intermediate value. Furthermore, the average number of  farmers processing 
organic waste stays constant after the fifth time step in the scenarios combining 
only two mech nisms, but keeps increasing in the sc nario combini g all thr e 
mechanisms. 
For each of  the 100 model runs we determined the number of  farmers pro-
cessing organic waste. This information is presented in the histograms in Figure 
3.5. The frequency in these histograms indicates how many times the number 
of  farmers indicated on the horizontal axis were processing organic waste at the 
end of  the model run. For example, in the histogram economies of  scale the 
frequency of  11 farmers processing organic waste is 23. This means that out of  
a 100 model runs we found 23 times that the final number of  farmers processing 
organic waste was 11. 
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Figure 3.5. Histograms for each scenario 
In the economies of scale scenario the number of farmers processing organic waste in the final 
time step ranges from 10 to 20. Initially there are possible gains from sharing costs, but at a 
certain point the gains and the spread of the new technology is halted due to the fact that there 
is a maximum number of farmers that can share the costs of one machine. In the learning 
scenario the number of farmers processing organic waste in the final time step ranges from 4 
to 22. Learning about yields changes the expected benefits and will cause some farmers to 
take up the practice, but the increase in yields is not so large that it will make processing 
organic waste attractive for everyone. In the changing social norms scenario the number of 
farmers processing organic waste in the final time step ranges is always 4. The initial number 
of farmers is too small to change the weight for sustainability significantly.  
 
Figure 3.5. histograms for each scenario
In the economies of  scale scenario the number of  farmers processing organic 
waste in the fi nal time step ranges from 10 to 20. Initially there are possible gains 
from sharing costs, but at a cert i  point the gains and the spread of  the new 
technology is halted due to the fact that there is a maximum number of  farmers 
that can share the costs of  one machine. In the learning scenario the number 
of  farmers processing organic waste in the fi nal time step ranges from 4 to 22. 
Lea ning about yields ch nges  expected benefi ts and ill cause some far ers
to take up the practice, but the increase in yields is not so large that it will make 
processing organic waste attractive for everyone. In the changing social norms 
scenario the number of  farmers processing organic waste in the fi nal time step 
Chapter 3
80
ranges is always 4. The initial number of  farmers is too small to change the weight 
for sustainability significantly. 
In the interaction scenarios the interaction between the mechanisms creates a kind 
of  momentum. If  the uptake due to the first mechanism is coming to a standstill, 
the increasing number of  farmers participating due to the second mechanism 
can activate the first mechanism again. If  we combine only two mechanisms, the 
number of  farmers processing organic waste at the end of  the model run ranges 
from 4 to 44 for the interaction without economies of  scale, from 11 to 44 for the 
scenario without learning and from 42 to 100 for the scenario without a changing 
social norm. In the interaction between all mechanisms scenario the number of  
farmers processing organic waste at the end of  the model run ranges from 63 to 
100. The histograms show that the number of  farmers processing organic waste is 
in general much larger if  all three mechanisms interact. Although a feedback loop 
starts in the interaction scenarios with only two mechanisms, this feedback loop 
does not always lead to a regime shift towards processing organic waste, when the 
effect of  both mechanisms is exhausted and no new impulse is provided. When a 
third mechanism is added, this can provide the new impulse necessary to set the 
feedback loop in motion again, leading to a full shift towards processing organic 
waste. Due to random variations in the population processing organic waste is 
taken up by almost the entire farmer-agent population in some cases, while not 
in others. The results also show that uptake of  on-farm processing organic waste 
can even occur when the weight for sustainability is zero, as long as on-farm 
processing of  organic waste is profitable. This implies that a policy maker could 
stimulate the use of  this sustainable farming practice even in areas where farmers 
do not attach a large weight on sustainability. Furthermore, the results suggest that 
in order to promote the uptake of  a sustainable farming practice, such as the use 
of  organic waste, a policymaker should take into account all three mechanisms of  
innovation. Ideally, all three mechanisms could be stimulated, in which case the 
effect on the uptake of  organic waste would be biggest. 
3.4. DISCuSSIon 
We analysed how economies of  scale, learning, and changing social norms 
can influence the decision to invest in CMC and Bokashi. We showed how the 
techniques can spread in some situations, and remain a niche in other situations. 
Random variations in yield and farmer-agent population can explain why in some 
instances a threshold is reached resulting in a shift towards processing organic 
waste and not in others. This helps to explain to policy makers the puzzling result 
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of  why policies can have a large effect in one area and no effect in another area. 
When we consider the effects of  the three mechanisms separately it might seem 
that although processing organic waste on farm becomes somewhat more popular, 
it is unlikely to become a standard practice in the region. However, the interaction 
between the mechanisms leads to a higher uptake. When the effect of  the first 
mechanism is exhausted, the increasing number of  farmers participating due to 
the second mechanism can set the first mechanism in motion again. For instance, 
if  more than ten farmers invest in CMC the machine cannot be shared by more 
farmers. Therefore, the eleventh farmer will not be able to share the costs, even if  
(s)he would want to. However, if  more farmers want to take up the processing of  
organic waste due to learning about yields, the eleventh farmer is able to share the 
costs with these farmers, again starting a feedback loop of  decreasing investment 
costs. Although other studies have already shown the individual effects of  each of  
these three mechanisms, we show that only by combining the three mechanisms 
in one scenario a shift towards processing organic waste can be achieved. 
We are aware of  limitations in our research. First, even though the farmers in 
our model prefer CMC, in the interviews two farmers indicated their preference 
for Bokashi. This can be explained by the fact that our model considers yearly 
investment costs and does not consider the possible difficulty that farmers might 
experience when they need to finance the whole investment at the beginning of  
the period. Second, the exact effect on yields of  using CMC and Bokashi are still 
largely unknown (Álvarez-Solís et al., 2010; D’Hose et al., 2016; ILVO, 2016; 
Kahn, Payton & Graetz, 2012; Lee, 2012; Ndona et al., 2011). Our assumption 
that yields instantly react to CMC or Bokashi application (albeit modestly and ob-
scured by general yield volatility) is a simplification of  reality, in which it may take 
many years before any improvement can be observed, if  at all. Other limitations 
pertain to the fact that our empirical observations were obtained from farmers 
that participated in a pilot project.  Lastly, the empirical grounding of  the model 
was based on only a limited set of  interviews, which were also conducted for a 
subset of  farmers who were interested in the practice. The lack of  awareness of  
these technologies in the wider farming populations made it difficult to extend 
the number of  interviews. 
The results from our paper show a high uptake of  on-farm processing of  or-
ganic waste, which might at first glance seem unrealistic. However, if  one realises 
the favourable circumstances for on-farm processing of  organic waste created in 
the pilot project, the results are much more understandable. In the pilot project a 
contract with the municipality was arranged, in which a fixed price was guaranteed 
to the farmers for processing organic waste during a couple of  years. Therefore, 
in our model this price is offered by the municipality to any farmer willing to 
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process organic waste. Outside the pilot project arranging such a contract might 
be more difficult. If  municipalities would not be willing to pay the uptake would 
be much lower. Furthermore, in our model we assume that the farmers believe 
the municipalities will keep offering these contracts, while in reality farmers might 
be afraid that the contracts will not be renewed. So, to facilitate a shift towards 
on-farm processing of  organic waste policy makers should create a transparent 
and constant policy, offering farmers a secure contract for processing organic 
waste. 
To overtake the limitations of  our research, one would first need to decide 
which direction to take: towards a more applied-sciences model, which can be 
used by policymakers to predict uptake of  the practice in response to certain 
policy options; or towards a more academic model that allows the development 
of  theory around the scientific questions of  how regime shifts in land use systems 
can be brought about. For the former purpose, the model would have to be better 
calibrated in terms of  decision-making processes in farmers, of  yield responses to 
CMC/Bokashi applications, and one may want to include more real-world mecha-
nisms such as regulations preventing the uptake (due to e.g. heavy metal pollution 
risk). On the other hand, to move towards more elaborated theory development 
one would need to filter out the “empirical noise” and increase the number of  
agents in the model to arrive at a more stylized output and conduct more experi-
ments to explore e.g. hysteresis, bifurcations, and other phenomena related to the 
notion of  regime shifts. Nevertheless, our research shows how the mechanisms 
of  economies of  scale, learning about yields, and changing social norms can each 
lead to (partial) uptake of  on-farm processing of  organic waste. We also show the 
importance of  interaction between these mechanisms. It demonstrates how a re-
gime shift towards on-farm processing of  organic waste as a standard practice can 
only explained by the interaction of  these mechanisms. This realisation provides 
us with more insights on the mechanisms that underlie the uptake of  sustainable 
farming practices and might aid policymakers in the design of  more effective 
policies to promote these farming practices. 
We find that taking a farmer perspective that is broader than profit maximiza-
tion allows us to explain farmer decisions on the uptake of  on-farm processing of  
organic waste. Our work is related to the work of  Sengupta et al. (2005) who uses 
an agent-based model to describe farmer enrolment in the Conservation Reserve 
Program in the USA, and emphasize the need to focus on more than just profit 
maximizing to capture agent decisions accurately. We took a CAS perspective in 
studying the uptake of  on-farm waste processing of  the farmers in our model, 
which allows us to explain the mechanisms that can lead to uptake of  sustainable 
farming techniques. This is in line with results found by Bale et al. (2014) who 
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developed a method to model the diffusion of  energy-efficiency innovations 
in a social network of  heterogeneous households. Their results suggest that a 
complexity based approach is required to understand the decision making of  the 
households.
In their paper Zeweld et al. (2017) used insights from the theory of  planned 
behaviour to reveal that attitudes and normative issues can explain the possible 
adoption of  sustainable farming practices. Furthermore, they found that per-
ceived usefulness, social capital and perceived ease of  operation have an effect on 
adoption decisions (Zeweld et al., 2017). Our paper shows a practical application 
of  the effect of  perceived usefulness and ease of  operation through the learning 
mechanism, as well as a practical application of  the effect of  social capital in the 
form of  the social pressure mechanism.  Gebrezgagher et al. (2015) studied the 
likelihood of  adoption of  manure separation of  Dutch dairy farmers, and found 
that farmer attitudes towards technology play a role in explaining adaptation. 
The attitudes of  the farmers in our model are reflected in the weights assigned to 
different farmer objectives. 
In traditional Agent Based Modelling approaches the individual decision mak-
ing is rule-based. In this paper we show a more sophisticated way of  capturing in-
dividual decision making, while still maintaining the advantages of  ABM in terms 
of  capturing interactions and feedbacks, in a system of  heterogonous agents. This 
paper also contributes to the understanding of  feedbacks in land use systems, an 
area which is relatively unexplored as pointed out by Chen et al. (2016a).
3.5. CONCluSiONS
Although achieving a shift towards more sustainable farming practices is desirable, 
in reality the uptake of  these practices is often limited and unsatisfactory. As we 
have shown in this paper, the uptake of  sustainable practices is often dependent on 
a combination of  multiple mechanisms. If  one of  these mechanisms is not in place, 
the momentum might be lost and the sustainable practice might remain a niche 
practice. This brings interesting policy implications, for when planning to imple-
ment a sustainable practice, all these mechanisms have to be taken into account.
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Appendix 3A. Farm model 
Basic model:  
Objective  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ +  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
r = 1,…, 100 
t = 1,…, 10 
Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (A3) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  (A4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  (A7) 
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             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
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             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
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∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
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Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (A3) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  (A4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  (A8) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (A10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A11) 
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𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  5
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
        +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  ( 7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  8
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  9
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  11) 
  (A6)
75 
 
Appendix 3A. Farm model 
Basic model:  
Objective  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ +  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
r = 1, , 100 
t = 1,…, 10 
Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (A3) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  (A4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  ( 7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  (A8) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  ( 10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 11) 
(A7)
75 
 
Appendix 3A. Farm model 
Basic model:  
Objective  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ +  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
r = 1, , 100 
t = 1,…, 10 
Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (A3) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  (A4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  (A8) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (A10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A11) 
 (A8)
75 
 
Appendix 3A. Farm model 
Basic model:  
Objective  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ +  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
r = 1,…, 100 
t = 1,…, 10 
Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (A3) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  (A4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  (A5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  (A8) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  (A10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A11) 
 (A9)
75 
 
Appendix 3A. Farm model 
Basic model:  
Objective 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ +  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
r = 1,…, 100 
t  1, , 10 
Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ( 3) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  ( 4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
             −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  ( 5) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
                 +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  ( 8) 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  ( 10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 11) 
 (A10)
75 
 
Appendix 3A. Farm model 
Basic model:  
Objective  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ +  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗   (A1) 
i = 1,…, 10  
r = 1, , 100 
t
Subject to:  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
8
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1    
            −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A2) 
m = 1 or 2   
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  max ((𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖),0);  ( 4) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒3 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒4 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27          
            −𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗            𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7  5
10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒6 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9  
       +𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11  
                − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1 12 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = max ((𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), 0)  8
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  9
5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  0.8 ∗ (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  10) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  11)  (A11)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  2
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  ( 7) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A22) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i 
 (A12)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  (A17) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A22) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i 
 (A13)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  2
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  (A17) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A22) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i 
 (A14)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  (A17) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A22) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i 
 (A15)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒25𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  7  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A22) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i 
 (A16)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  (A 7) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 2) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt  nu ber of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt  KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt  ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt  ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt  kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt  labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt  kg phosphate that can be placed on land far  i 
 (A17)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  ( 7) 
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  ( 8) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 2) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt  nu ber of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt  KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt  ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt  ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt  kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt  labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt  kg phosphate that can be placed on land far  i 
 (A18)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  7  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  8  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  9  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  20  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  21  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  2  
Where:  
x irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
3irt  r f y ung cattle > 1 year on farm i  
4irt  KVEM feed purch sed  
5irt  ha grassland o  farm i  
6irt  ha aize land on f rm i  
7irt  kg phosphate surplus farm i  
8irt  labour hours hired on farm i 
9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
11irt  kg phosphate that can be placed on land f r  i 
 (A19)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  7  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  8  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 9) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 2) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = nu ber of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha aize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land far  i 
 (A20)
76 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  7  
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  18  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 2) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt  nu ber of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt  KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt  ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt  ha maize land on farm i  
x7irt  kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt  labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt  kg phosphate that can be placed on land far  i 
 (A21)
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒22𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 12) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒23𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  13) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒24𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ≥ 0  7
𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒26  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥14𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 19) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥15𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥16𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 20) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 21) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥17𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A 2) 
Where:  
x1irt = number of cows on farm i  
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i  
x3irt = nu ber of young cattle > 1 year on farm i  
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased  
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i  
x6irt = ha aize land on farm i  
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i  
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i 
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m 
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i 
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land far  i 
 (A22)
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Where: 
x1irt = number of cows on farm i 
x2irt = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i 
x3irt = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i 
x4irt = KVEM feed purchased 
x5irt = ha grassland on farm i 
x6irt = ha maize land on farm i 
x7irt = kg phosphate surplus farm i 
x8irt = labour hours hired on farm i
x9imrt = m3 organic waste material processed on farm i with technique m
x10irt = kg phosphate produced on farm i
x11irt = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i
x12irt = total ha land on farm i
x13irt = ha grass with compost
x14irt = ha grass without compost
x15irt = ha maize with compost
x16irt = ha maize without compost
x17irt = total ha with compost
p1 = price milk in euro per 100 kg 
p2i = price organic waste in euro per m3
w1 = maintenance costs in euro per cow
w2 = maintenance costs in euro per young cattle < 1 year
w3 = maintenance costs in euro per young cattle > 1 year
w4 = costs per KVEM feed in euro
w5 = costs of maintaining a ha of grass in euro
w6 = costs of maintaining a ha of maize in euro
w7 = costs of removing a kg of excess phosphate 
w8 = costs of hiring one hour of labour in euro
w9m = costs of processing one m3 organic waste with technique m
w10im = yearly investment costs of technique m in euro
e1ir = 100 kg milk produced per cow on farm i
e2ir = own labour hours available on farm i
e3 = KVEM needed per cow
e4 = KVEM needed per young cattle < 1 year
e5 = KVEM needed per young cattle > 1 year
e6 = KVEM produced on a ha of grassland
e7 = KVEM produced on a ha of maize land
e8 = kg phosphate in a KVEM from grassland
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e9 = kg phosphate in a KVEM from maize land 
e10 = kg phosphate in a KVEM purchased
e11 = kg phosphate in 100 kg milk 
e12 = kg phosphate in a carrying cow
e13 = kg phosphate in a young cattle < 1 year
e14 = kg phosphate in a young cattle > 1 year
e15 = kg phosphate allowed on a ha of grassland 
e16 = kg phosphate allowed on a ha of maize land 
e17 = labour hours needed per cow
e18 = labour hours needed per ha grassland
e19 = labour hours needed per ha maize land
e20m = labour hours needed per m3 organic waste with technique m
e21m =  maximum m3 organic waste processed with technique m that can be placed 
on a ha of land
e22ir = number of young cattle < 1 year per cow on farm i
e23ir = number of young cattle > 1 year per cow on farm i
e24ir = initial number of cows on farm i 
e25ir = initial ha of land on farm i
e26 = subsistence income farmers
e27 = expected increase in yields when applying compost
g1ir =	 weight	attached	to	profit	maximization	by	farmer	i
g2ir = weight attached to environmental sustainability maximization by farmer i
g3ir = weight attached to labour minimisation by farmer i
lirt = labour hours needed on farm i 
μirt = environmental sustainability on farm i
πirt	 =	 profit	on	farm	i
πir
*	 =	 maximum	value	for	profit	for	farm	i
μir
* = maximum value for environmental sustainability for farm i
lir* = minimum value for labour hours on farm i.
The farmer aims to maximize his utility (A1), which depends on the level of  profit 
(A2), environmental sustainability (A3) and hired labour (A4). Profit equals the 
revenue from milk and municipal waste processed minus the maintenance costs 
of  cattle, the costs of  feed, the costs of  growing grass and maize, the costs of  
removing excess manure, the costs of  processing organic waste, the costs of  hired 
labour, and the investment costs in CMC or Bokashi (A2). The environmental 
sustainability equals the amount of  organic waste processed on the farm (A3). 
The hired labour used on the farm is the result of  the labour hours needed minus 
own labour hours, there cannot be a negative amount of  labour hours hired (A4).
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The amount of  feed purchased by the farmer is equal to the number of  cows 
times the feed needed per cow plus the number of  young cattle times the feed 
needed per young cattle minus the amount of  feed produced on the farm (A5). The 
phosphate produced on farm equals the KVEM from grass consumed times the 
phosphate in a KVEM of  grass plus the KVEM from maize consumed times the 
phosphate in a KVEM of  maize plus the KVEM bought consumed times the phos-
phate in a KVEM bought minus the phosphate in milk , the phosphate in carrying 
cows and the phosphate in young cattle (A6).The phosphate that can be placed on 
land is equal to the ha of  grass times the phosphate allowed per ha of  grass plus the 
phosphate allowed per ha of  maize times the phosphate allowed per ha of  maize 
(A7).The phosphate surplus is then the result of  the total phosphate production 
minus the amount of  phosphate that can be placed on land, there cannot be a 
negative phosphate surplus (A8). The total hours of  labour needed can be found by 
multiplying the number of  cows with the time needed per cow, the ha of  grass with 
the time needed per ha of  grass, the ha of  maize with the time needed per ha of  
maize and the m3 organic waste times the amount of  time needed to process a m3 
organic waste (A9). In order to be viable for derogation (permission to place more 
manure on land) the farm has to maintain at least 80 percent grass land (A10). The 
total area of  farm land exists of  grassland and maize land (A11). The number of  
young cattle younger than one year is found by multiplying the number of  cows by 
the number of  young cattle younger than one year kept per cow (A12). The number 
of  young cattle older than one year is found by multiplying the number of  cows by 
the number of  young cattle older than one year kept per cow (A13). The number 
of  cows kept in the model cannot exceed the number of  cows kept in the initial 
situation (A14). The amount of  grass plus the amount of  maize is equal to or less 
than the total amount of  land in the initial situation (A15). The amount of  organic 
waste processed on the farm cannot be more than the maximum amount of  organic 
waste per ha times the number of  ha on the farm (A16). Export of  processed 
organic waste is not possible in the model, since that would mean the farmer has to 
take additional legislation into account. All the farmers in the pilot studies indicated 
that they would not produce more compost than could be used on their own farm. 
The number of  cows, the feed purchased, the ha of  grass, the ha of  maize, the 
phosphate surplus, the organic waste processed, and the hired labour hours and 
the total amount of  land cannot be negative (A17). The profit of  the farm has to 
reach a certain level to guarantee the farmer a subsistence income (A18). Grassland 
can be divided in grassland on which compost is applied and grassland on which 
no compost is applied (A19). Similarly, maize land can be divided in maize land on 
which compost is applied on maize land on which no compost is applied (A20). The 
hectares of  grassland with compost and the hectares of  maize land with compost 
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together form the total amount of  land on which compost is used (A21). The total 
amount of  land on which compost is used is equal to the amount of  compost 
produced divided by the amount of  compost that can be put on a ha of  land (A22). 
Scenario 1: Costs sharing 
To determine the shared costs we add the following equation to the base model:
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processed on the farm cannot be more than the maximum amount of organic waste per ha 
times the number of ha on the farm (A16). Export of processed organic waste is not possible 
in the model, since that would mean the farmer has to take additional legislation into account. 
All the farmers in the pilot studies indicated that they would not produce more compost than 
could be used on their own farm. The number of cows, the feed purchased, the ha of grass, the 
ha of maize, the phosphate surplus, the organic waste processed, and the hired labour hours 
and the total amount of land cannot be negative (A17). The profit of the farm has to reach a 
certain level to guarantee the farmer a subsistence income (A18). Grassland can be divided in 
grassland on which compost is applied and grassland on which no compost is applied (A19). 
Similarly, maize land can be divided in maize land on which compost is applied on maize 
land on which no compost is applied (A20). The hectares of grassland with compost and the 
hectares of maize land with compost together form the total amount of land on which compost 
is used (A21). The total amount of land on which compost is used is equal to the amount of 
compost produced divided by the amount of compost that can be put on a ha of land (A22).  
Scenario 1: Costs sharing  
To determine the shared costs we add the following equation to the base model: 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (A23) 
Where:  
e28 = yearly investment costs of CMC machine in euro 
e29r = number of farmers that chose to invest in CMC in the previous step 
Equation (A23) specifies that the yearly investment costs are equal to the yearly investment 
costs of a CMC machine divided by the number of farmers that chose to invest.  
Scenario 2: Learning 
Step 2: Add the following equation to the base model:  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 =  ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒30𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1   (A24) 
Where:  
e30kr = increase in yields for the farmer k using compost 
e31r = the number of farmers that used compost in the previous step. 
The average increase in yields when using compost is equal to the sum of increased compost 
for each farmer k that applies compost, divided by the k farmers that apply compost (A24).  
Scenario 3: Social norms 
 (A23)
Where: 
e28 = yearly investment costs of CMC machine in euro
e29r = number of farmers that chose to invest in CMC in the previous step
Equation (A23) specifies that the yearly investment costs are equal to the yearly 
investment costs of  a CMC machine divided by the number of  farmers that chose 
to i vest. 
Scenario 2: Learning
Step 2: Add the following equation to the base model: 
80 
 
processed on the farm cannot be more than the maximum amount of organic waste per ha 
times the number of ha on the farm (A16). Export of processed organic waste is not possible 
in the model, since that would mean the farmer has to take additional legislation into account. 
All the farmers in the pilot studies indicated that they would not produce more compost than 
could be used on their own farm. The number of cows, the feed purchased, the ha of grass, the 
ha of maize, the phosphate surplus, the organic waste processed, and the hired labour hours 
and the total amount of land cannot be negative (A17). The profit of the farm has to reach a 
certain level to guarantee the farmer a subsistence income (A18). Grassland can be divided in 
grassland on which compost is applied and grassland on which no compost is applied (A19). 
Similarly, maize land can be divided in maize land on which compost is applied on maize 
land on which no compost is applied (A20). The hectares of grassland with compost and the 
hectares of maize land with compost together form the total amount of land on which compost 
is used (A21). The total amount of land on which compost is used is equal to the amount of 
compost produce  divided by the amount of compost that can be put on a ha of land (A22).  
Scenario 1: Costs sharing  
To determine the shared costs we add the following equation to the base model: 
𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1,𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒28/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (A23) 
here:  
e28 = yearly investment costs of CMC machine in euro 
e29r = number of farmers that chose to invest in CMC in the previous step 
quation (A23) specifies that the yearl  investment costs are equal to the yearly investment 
costs of a CMC machine divided by the number of farmers that chose to invest.  
Scenario 2: Learning 
tep 2: Add the following equation to the base model:  
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒27 =  ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒30𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟/𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1   (A24) 
Where:  
e30kr = increase in yields for the farmer k using compost 
e31r = the number of farmers that used compost in the previous step. 
The average increase in yields when using compost is equal to the sum of increased compost 
for each farmer k that applies compost, divided by the k farmers that apply compost (A24).  
Scenario 3: Social norms 
 (A24)
Where: 
e30kr = increase in yields for the farmer k using compost
e31r = the number of farmers that used compost in the previous step.
Th  average increase in yields when using compost is equal to the sum of  in-
creased compost for each farmer k that applies compost, divided by the k farmers 
that apply c mpost (A24). 
Scenario 3: Social norms
The weight g2ir in the model is replaced by xg2irt, the weight g1ir in the model is 
replaced by xg1irt and the weight g3ir is replaced by xg3irt. The following equations 
need to be added to the base model. 
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The weight g2ir in the model is replaced by xg2irt, the weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the model is replaced by 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is replaced by 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  The following equations need to be added 
to the base model.  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) ∗ 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) ∗ 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A27) 
 
  
 (A25)
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Th  weight g2ir in the model is replaced by xg2irt, the weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the model is replaced by 
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to the base model.  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) ∗ 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) ∗ 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A27) 
 
  
 (A26)
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The weight g2ir in the model is replaced by xg2irt, the weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in the model is replaced by 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is replaced by 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  The following equations need to be added 
to the base model.  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) ∗ 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − (
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) ∗ 0.0025 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/5  (A27) 
 
  
 (A27)
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APPenDIx 3b.   exogenouS vALueS foR DeTeRMInIng uTILITy 
funCTIonS
Table 3B.1. Exogenous farmer specific parameter values
Parameter Farmer 1 Farmer 2 Farmer 3 Farmer 4 Farmer 5
e1i =  100 kg milk produced per 
cow on farm i
81 95 96 86.7 96.15
e2i =  Own labour hours available 
on farm
2,237 2,237 2,237 2,237 2,237
e22i =  Number of young cattle < 1 
year per cow on farm i
0.32 0.31 0.36 0.35 0.29
e23i =  Number of young cattle > 1 
year per cow on farm i
0.32 0.27 0.28 0.35 0.29
e24i =  Initial number of cows on 
farm i
190 130 125 100 260
e25i =  Initial ha of land on farm i 102.5 67 81.2 50 125
e26i =  Max m3 organic waste that 
can be placed on farm
4,950 3,350 4,060 2,500 6,250
li =  Actual labour hours hired on 
farm i
2,301 793 1,119 1,183 4,849
μi =  Actual m3 organic waste 
processed on farm i
2,917 1,916 2,000 600 2,500
w10im=1 =  Yearly investment costs 
CMC in euro
2,600 1,000 7,650 7,650 3,306
w10im=2 =  Yearly investment costs 
Bokashi in euro
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
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Table 3B.2. Exogenous parameters 
Variable Values in baseline 
scenario
p1 = Output price per 100 kg milk in euro 35
w1 = Maintenance costs per cow in euro 432
w2 = Maintenance cost per young cattle < 1 year in euro 432 x0.19
w3 = Maintenance costs per young cattle > 1 year 432* 0.19
w4 = Costs in euro per KVEM bought 0.14
w5 = Costs of maintaining a ha of grass in euro 1,440
w6 = Costs of growing a ha maize in euro 1,540
w7 = costs of removing P2O5 in euro per kg 11.78
w81 = Costs of processing m3 organic waste CMC in euro/m3 5 
w82 = Costs of processing m3 organic waste Bokashi in euro/m3 6.5 
w9 = Costs of hired labour in euro per hour 33
e3 = KVEM needed per cow 7197.8
e4 = KVEM needed per young cattle < 1 year 1277,5
e5 = KVEM needed per young cattle > 1 year 2555
e6 = KVEM produced on a ha of grassland 11220
e7 = KVEM produced on a ha of maize land 13720
e8 = Kg P2O5 per KVEM from grass 0.01
e9 = Kg P2O5 per KVEM from grass 0.01
e10 = Kg P2O5 per KVEM from feed bought 0.012
e11 = Kg P2O5 bound in 100 kg milk 0.222
e12 = Kg P2O5 bound in carrying cows 0.522
e13 = Kg P2O5 bound in growth cattle <1 year 4.619
e14 = Kg P2O5 bound in growth cattle >1 year 4.078
e15 = Kg P2O5 allowed per ha grass land 95
e16 = Kg P2O5 allowed per ha maize 65
e17 = Labour hours needed per cow 19.6
e18 = Labour hours needed per ha grassland 7.2
e19 = Labour hours needed per ha of maize land 7.0
e201 = Labour hours needed per m3 organic waste CMC 0.08
e202 = Labour hours needed per m3 organic waste Bokashi 0.024
e211 = Maximum m3 organic waste for CMC per ha 50
e212 = Maximum m3 organic waste for Bokashi per ha 40
91
Complex dynamics in the uptake of new farming practices
C
ha
pt
er
 3
APPenDIx 3C.   SenSITIvITy AnALySIS
Three important parameters that influence the decisions of  the farmers in our 
model are the wage, the milk price and the price received for processing organic 
waste. In this sensitivity analysis we show how the optimal decisions of  the farm-
ers change with these prices. 
Changing wage
We change the hired labour costs from minus 50 % to plus 50 percent and observe 
the effect on the farmers decision with respect to the selection of  processing 
organic waste or not. Changing the wage within this range does not change the 
farmer decisions. 
If  the price for hired labour becomes too high to hire labour, less milk will be 
produced and more of  the own labour will be used for producing CMC. 
Changing milk price
We change the milk price from minus 50 percent to plus 50 percent and observe 
the farmers’ decisions whether or not to produce organic waste. 
The optimal decision to use CMC or not does not change for the farms when 
the milk price changes within this range, but if  the price more than -40% farm 2 
will exit farming and if  the price drops more than 50% farm 3 will exit because 
the farms are no longer able to earn the subsistence income in those cases. 
Changing organic waste price
We do not observe a change in the optimal decision to process organic waste 
or not when organic waste prices are changed from minus 50% to plus 50%. 
Even though processing organic waste is costly to the farmers, they appreciate the 
environmental sustainability aspect and take this into account when maximizing 
their utility. Farmer 2 does not care about environmental sustainability and does 
not chose to process organic waste not even when the organic waste price is 50 
percent higher. 
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APPENDix 3D.   WEighTS FOr PrOFiT, SuSTAiNABiliTy AND lABOur
Table 3D.1. Weights for profit sustainability and labour in the first model run
Farm Weight profit Weight sustainability Weight labour 
Farm1 0.12 0.59 0.29
Farm2 0.39 0.03 0.58
Farm3 0.38 0.03 0.59
Farm4 0.40 0.03 0.57
Farm5 0.42 0.03 0.56
Farm6 0.39 0.03 0.59
Farm7 0.41 0.03 0.56
Farm8 0.40 0.02 0.57
Farm9 0.41 0.03 0.56
Farm10 0.41 0.03 0.56
Farm11 0.42 0.03 0.55
Farm12 0.41 0.04 0.55
Farm13 0.40 0.03 0.57
Farm14 0.42 0.03 0.55
Farm15 0.43 0.03 0.54
Farm16 0.42 0.03 0.55
Farm17 0.40 0.03 0.57
Farm18 0.38 0.03 0.59
Farm19 0.42 0.03 0.56
Farm20 0.41 0.03 0.56
Farm21 0.72 0.00 0.29
Farm22 0.77 0.00 0.23
Farm23 0.77 0.00 0.23
Farm24 0.67 0.00 0.33
Farm25 0.68 0.00 0.32
Farm26 0.74 0.00 0.26
Farm27 0.73 0.00 0.27
Farm28 0.72 0.00 0.28
Farm29 0.65 0.00 0.35
Farm30 0.72 0.00 0.28
Farm31 0.65 0.00 0.35
Farm32 0.66 0.00 0.34
Farm33 0.72 0.00 0.28
Farm34 0.78 0.00 0.22
Farm35 0.79 0.00 0.21
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Table 3D.1. Weights for profit sustainability and labour in the first model run (continued)
Farm Weight profit Weight sustainability Weight labour 
Farm36 0.71 0.00 0.29
Farm37 0.74 0.00 0.26
Farm38 0.70 0.00 0.30
Farm39 0.68 0.00 0.32
Farm40 0.77 0.00 0.23
Farm41 0.51 0.49 0.00
Farm42 0.77 0.02 0.21
Farm43 0.73 0.03 0.25
Farm44 0.74 0.03 0.23
Farm45 0.74 0.03 0.23
Farm46 0.78 0.03 0.19
Farm47 0.78 0.02 0.20
Farm48 0.74 0.02 0.23
Farm49 0.71 0.03 0.26
Farm50 0.77 0.02 0.21
Farm51 0.71 0.02 0.26
Farm52 0.72 0.02 0.25
Farm53 0.77 0.02 0.20
Farm54 0.72 0.02 0.25
Farm55 0.75 0.02 0.23
Farm56 0.75 0.03 0.22
Farm57 0.74 0.02 0.24
Farm58 0.70 0.03 0.28
Farm59 0.73 0.02 0.25
Farm60 0.71 0.02 0.27
Farm61 0.76 0.24 0.00
Farm62 0.85 0.01 0.14
Farm63 0.91 0.01 0.07
Farm64 0.91 0.01 0.08
Farm65 0.83 0.01 0.16
Farm66 0.84 0.01 0.15
Farm67 0.91 0.01 0.08
Farm68 0.88 0.01 0.11
Farm69 0.87 0.01 0.12
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Table 3D.1. Weights for profit sustainability and labour in the first model run (continued)
Farm Weight profit Weight sustainability Weight labour 
Farm70 0.89 0.01 0.10
Farm71 0.88 0.01 0.11
Farm72 0.89 0.01 0.10
Farm73 0.94 0.01 0.05
Farm74 0.86 0.01 0.13
Farm75 0.91 0.01 0.07
Farm76 0.87 0.01 0.12
Farm77 0.85 0.01 0.14
Farm78 0.79 0.01 0.20
Farm79 0.90 0.01 0.09
Farm80 0.89 0.01 0.10
Farm81 0.69 0.31 0.00
Farm82 0.85 0.02 0.13
Farm83 0.88 0.01 0.11
Farm84 0.82 0.01 0.16
Farm85 0.85 0.02 0.13
Farm86 0.83 0.01 0.15
Farm87 0.85 0.02 0.13
Farm88 0.80 0.01 0.19
Farm89 0.87 0.02 0.11
Farm90 0.79 0.02 0.20
Farm91 0.81 0.02 0.17
Farm92 0.83 0.02 0.15
Farm93 0.83 0.01 0.15
Farm94 0.85 0.01 0.14
Farm95 0.85 0.01 0.14
Farm96 0.90 0.02 0.09
Farm97 0.84 0.01 0.14
Farm98 0.79 0.02 0.20
Farm99 0.87 0.02 0.12
Farm100 0.86 0.02 0.13
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AbSTRACT
To prevent further biodiversity loss as a result of  intensive agricultural 
practices, Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES) have been implemented on 
European farmland. Unfortunately, these AES have not always been effective 
in terms of  biodiversity and farmer participation. In an effort to improve 
the AES programme the Dutch government switched from an individual ap-
plication system to a collective application system for AES payments in 2016. 
The goal of  this paper is to analyse how the resilience of  the land use system 
in terms of  farmer participation in the AES and biodiversity is affected 
by the value farmers attach to biodiversity, and whether the shift from an 
individual to collective AES will affect the resilience of  the land use system. 
We constructed a multi-objective mathematical programming model in which 
farmers maximise utility. Farmers are linked through their common effect on 
biodiversity. In the collective application system payments are only available 
when the biodiversity in the region is above a certain threshold. Simulation 
results show no difference in farmer participation and biodiversity between 
the individual application system and the collective application system when 
biodiversity weights are high. The land use system loses its resilience in terms 
farmer participation in the AES and biodiversity if  we lower the biodiversity 
weights, this effect is stronger in the collective AES programme. 
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Effects on participation and biodiversity of reforming the implementation of AES
4.1. InTRoDuCTIon
Agricultural intensification has resulted in a loss of  biodiversity within Europe 
(Stoate et al., 2001). To prevent further biodiversity loss, Agri-Environmental 
Schemes (AES) have been implemented on European farmland (van Dijk et al., 
2015). AES offer payments to farmers that modify their farming practice to obtain 
environmental benefits (Kleijn & Sutherland, 2003). Sufficient farmer participa-
tion is vital for achieving the aims of  the AES programmes (Lastra-Bravo et al., 
2015). Unfortunately, participation of  farmers in AES is often low, resulting in 
inadequate conservation areas and poor biodiversity results (Kuhfuss et al., 2016; 
Mckenzie et al., 2013; Whittingham, 2007). These disappointing results combined 
with the high costs of  AES schemes (Kleijn & Sutherland, 2003) have motivated 
policymakers to try to improve the AES programme. 
To this effect the 2014 EU Rural Development Regulation (Regulation (EU) 
No 1305/2013, Article 28) was introduced, which made it possible to apply for 
AES as a group, but left the option for individual farm applications as well. The 
Dutch government took this a step further and changed the implementation of  
the Dutch AES programme to allow only joint applications by farmer collec-
tives from 2016 onwards. Only if  the farmer collective can offer sufficient nature 
conservation its application will be approved and payment will become available. 
If  the promised nature conservation is not realized, the payment to the collective 
will be penalized or withdrawn (Ministry of  Economic Affairs, 2016). The collec-
tive programme is believed to result in a more effective and efficient realisation 
of  nature conservation goals, with lower execution costs, and a higher and more 
sustainable participation of  farmers (Portaal Natuur en Landschap, 2016). How-
ever, it is possible that farmers who in first instance receive AES payments, will 
no longer be able to obtain these payments due to insufficient participation of  
their neighbours in the collective AES programme. If  no payments are available 
in the AES programme we might encounter a shift towards low farmer participa-
tion and a loss of  resilience leading to lower biodiversity in the ecological system. 
Land use systems can be viewed as a social ecological system, characterised 
by interactions and feedbacks between socio-economic elements such as farm-
ing methods and biophysical components such as biodiversity (Mitchell et al., 
2015; Müller et al., 2014; Schouten et al., 2013). Developing policies for land 
use systems can be challenging because they exhibit many characteristics of  a 
complex system, with nonlinear responses (Chen et al., 2016a). The result is that 
sometimes the resilience of  a system is influenced by a policy measure, while at 
other times the system shows no response to a policy change at all. Therefore, 
this complex nature should be taken into account when analysing policy measures 
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such as the change in the AES programme. Central elements of  complex systems 
are feedbacks, which should be incorporated in land use models to accomplish 
integration of  the social and biophysical system (Verburg, 2006). In both the 
individual and collective AES application programme there is a feedback from 
biodiversity. Biodiversity in the region depends on conservation measures taken 
by farmers, but the amount of  conservation measures taken also depends on 
the level of  biodiversity in the region. This is because farmers attach value to 
biodiversity and a single farmer will not be able to reach a high biodiversity level 
on his/her own. In the collective AES programme an additional feedback is 
introduced via the availability of  maintenance payments, whereby the AES pay-
ment depends on a sufficient biodiversity level, in contrast to the individual AES 
programme.  A feedback between land use and prices has also been described by 
Drechsler (2017) who shows how cost feedbacks affect the ecological effective-
ness of  conservation instruments. 
Some farmers are more biodiversity-minded than other farmers. The value 
farmers attach to biodiversity might have an effect on the resilience of  biodiversity 
in the land use system. The goal of  this paper is to analyse how the resilience of  
the land use system in terms of  farmer participation in the AES and biodiversity 
is affected by the value farmers attach to biodiversity, and whether the shift from 
an individual to collective application for agri-environmental contracts will affect 
the resilience of  the land use system. We test this for a case study area containing 
high nature value farmland due to the presence of  hedgerows. Biodiversity de-
pends on the farmers’ efforts to maintain hedgerows (Boer, 2003), for which AES 
payments are offered. To measure biodiversity we calculate a biodiversity score, 
based on three indicator species with different key areas needed to maintain a 
sustainable population. We incorporate feedback mechanisms in a multi-objective 
mathematical programming model in which farmers maximise utility and where 
famers’ utility is influenced by the choices made by other farmers. Farmers are 
linked through their mutual effect on biodiversity and agri-environmental pay-
ments. 
Section 2 discusses the methods, including our theoretical framework, the case 
study area, the conceptual model and the mathematical model. Section 3 presents 
the data and section 4 presents the experimental design. The results are presented 
in section 5.  Section 6 concludes and discusses. 
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4.2. MeThoDS
Theoretical framework
Farmers work with scarce resources (land, labour, inputs), which justifies taking 
an economic perspective to their decision making. However, although financial 
incentives play a role in farmer decisions on nature conservation, they do not only 
apply for AES on the basis of  economic profit (van Dijk et al., 2015; Lokhorst et 
al., 2011). Farmer willingness to support biodiversity and farmer interactions also 
influence conservation choices and behaviour (Runhaar et al., 2017). Therefore, 
we apply a mathematical programming model containing a multi-criteria decision 
making (MCDM) principle, in which multiple conflicting objectives can be com-
bined (Calker et al., 2006). Farmer decisions depend on several weighted farmer 
objectives in a utility maximization framework. This allows us to step outside the 
traditional reductionist economic approaches in which farmer choices are purely 
based on the profit maximization paradigm, but still model a rational-decision-
making process (Jongeneel, Polman & Slangen, 2008). Since the change from the 
individual to collective AES programme is a new policy measure, data on this 
change are not yet available. This makes an econometric analysis problematic. By 
using a mathematical programming model we can simulate the change without 
the need for time-series data. 
Case study area
The study area Noordelijke Friese Wouden (NFW) is situated in the province of  
Friesland, in the northern part of  the Netherlands. The NFW is a 25,000 ha rural 
area specialized in dairy farming with some villages in between, where farming 
parcels are separated by hedgerows of  alder belts and wooded banks (Oosterveld, 
2013; van der Ploeg, Strijker & Hoofwijk, 2010). Alder belts are rows of  trees 
next to ditches, mostly alder trees, while wooded banks exist of  a sand ridge that 
is overgrown by trees, bushes and herbs (Oosterveld, 2013). Hedgerows offer 
home and refuge to many species that are threatened by intensive agricultural 
practices (Besnard & Secondi, 2014). The hedgerows stem from the time before 
barbed wire was introduced, and served to prevent livestock from roaming. Given 
its historical value the NFW is a national park (Oosterveld, 2013). Because of  the 
cultural and biodiversity value of  this landscape the farmers in this area are of-
fered AES payments of  0.3 euro per m2 to maintain their hedgerows. If  a farmer 
does not join the AES (s)he is free not to maintain his hedgerows, but (s)he is not 
allowed to remove the trees. Within this area the farmer collective of  the NFW 
plays an important role in nature and landscape conservation.  The NFW submits 
a proposal for nature conservation to the Dutch government and is responsible 
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for the implementation of  these plans. This collective has around 800 members 
in several municipalities spread over an area of  53,551 hectares. The area covered 
by the collective contains 971 km alder belts and 103 hectares of  wooded banks 
(Noordelijke Friese Wouden, 2017). An average parcel in our sample will have 
four neighbours and 285 m2 hedgerows. An average farm in our sample contains 
0.91 ha of  hedgerows and has 144 neighbouring parcels. The total amount of  
hedgerows in our sample is 8.19 ha.
Conceptual model
Our model describes a landscape made up of  nine individual farmers and 288 
parcels. Farmers decide on the maintenance of  hedgerows on their own farming 
parcels. It is possible for the farmers in our model to maintain only part of  the 
hedgerows on the farm. Although each farmer maximizes his/her own utility, 
farmers are connected through their mutual effect on biodiversity and the avail-
ability of  AES payments. 
The farmer-decision module describes a typical farm in the area: a dairy farm 
with hedgerows, eligible for financial support from the AES program. These 
hedgerows are located on the farms parcels, and contribute to the biodiversity 
level in the region provided they are maintained. Properly maintaining hedgerows 
entails some yearly work like checking and some bigger work like pruning or 
cutting down trees every few years. In practice, farmers tend to alternate the 
large maintenance work for different hedgerows, ensuring that only a part of  the 
hedgerows needs major maintenance every year. Therefore, the model considers 
just the average amount of  work needed every year for maintaining hedgerows. 
Well-maintained hedgerows take up space and create shade resulting in a lower 
grass or maize production. Although most farmers that are not in the AES scheme 
do some maintenance work, we assumed that farmers who will not properly 
maintain their hedgerows have negligible maintenance costs, area reduction, and 
shade effects.
Farmers strive for maximizing their utility. Utility depends on several weighted 
farmer objectives which are captured by an additive utility function. Farmer 
objectives and weights have been determined during interviews. We grouped the 
objectives into the following categories: profit maximization, labour minimiza-
tion, risk minimization and biodiversity maximization. Profit equals the sum of  
revenues from milk, revenue from selling cows, and AES payments minus costs 
of  farming and costs of  hedgerow maintenance. Labour equals the sum of  the 
labour needed for each of  the farm tasks. We measured price risk as the variance 
in milk prices (see e.g. Berentsen, Kovacs & van Asseldonk., 2012; Kaiser and 
Messer, 2011; Schmit, Boisvert & Tauer, 2001). If  a farmer attaches a value to 
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the risk minimization objective, (s)he will be risk averse. We assume there is no 
price risk to the AES programme, once the contract is agreed, as contracts are 
concluded for a period of  6 years. Biodiversity is measured by a biodiversity score, 
depending on three indicator species (see also the next section on measuring 
resilience).
There are two feedbacks in our model, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The feedback 
through biodiversity takes place in both the individual and the collective AES 
programme: The overall biodiversity level in the region has an effect on the in-
dividual farmer’s decision (arrow 1); the individual farmer’s decision determines 
the amount of  hedgerows maintained on the farm (arrow 2); which infl uences 
the overall biodiversity level (arrow 3).  The payment feedback takes place only 
in the collective AES programme: The availability of  AES payments depends 
on suffi cient overall biodiversity in the region (arrow 4); the individual farmer’s 
decision depends on the availability of  payment (arrow 5); the individual farmer’s 
decision determines the amount of  hedgerows maintained on the farm (arrow 2); 
which has an effect on the overall biodiversity (arrow 3). 
Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of the biodiversity feedback (arrow 1, 2, 3) and pay-
ment feedback (arrow 4, 5, 2, 3) in the model
Measuring resilience 
To determine the resilience of  the hedgerow landscape we analyse how the farmer 
participation in the AES scheme and the biodiversity score in the region depend 
on the level of  the biodiversity weights and the AES programme. 
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farmer participation in the AeS
Farmer participation is measured as the number of  farmers that maintain hedge-
rows. We hereby assumed that each farmer maintaining hedgerows does so within 
the AES scheme. 
biodiversity
Biodiversity is a broad concept, and can include numerous animal and plant 
species. For the purpose of  this paper we selected a number of  key species 
characterised by their key area and dispersion capacity, which together represent 
the biodiversity in the NFW. The minimum or key area of  a species is the total 
amount of  habitat area that is needed to maintain a sustainable population of  that 
species (Reijnen et al, 2007). The dispersion capacity of  an organism refers to the 
extent to which it is able to move from one habitat patch to another (Reijnen et 
al., 2001). All maintained hedgerows that are within a distance equal to the disper-
sion capacity are added to calculate the key area. Key areas and dispersion capacity 
have also been used to analyse and measure biodiversity by e.g. Grashof-Bokdam 
et al. (2009), Reijnen et al., (2001), Reijnen et al., (2007), Elands et al. (2005) and 
Kwakernaak, de Lange & Hartgers (2015). 
False oat-grass (Arrhenatherum elatius) is a plant species that occurs in the 
hedgerow landscape in the NFW (expert judgement and Floron, 2017). It has a key 
area of  1000 m2 and a dispersion capacity of  100m, and is therewith an example 
of  a species for which the biodiversity is dependent on a small scale key area. The 
key area indicates that a sustainable population could not survive on the hedge-
rows of  a single parcel. However, the dispersion capacity suggests that the species 
could reach the hedgerows on the neighbouring parcels. On average the amount 
of  hedgerows on a parcel plus its neighbouring parcels is sufficient to support a 
sustainable population of  this species when these hedgerows are maintained. 
The purple hairstreak (Favonius quercus) is a butterfly that occurs in wooded 
banks (Vlindernet, 2017). The key area of  this species is 5 ha and the dispersion 
capacity is 100m, and is therewith an example of  a species with a medium scale 
key area. The key area needed for this species cannot be provided on one farm; 
however the amount of  hedgerows on the farm plus its neighbouring parcels is 
sufficient to support a sustainable population of  this species when these hedge-
rows are maintained. 
The Large-flowered Hemp-nettle (Galeopsis speciosa) is a plant species that 
occurs in the hedgerow landscape (expert judgement and Dijkstra, 2017). The key 
area of  this species is 10 ha, and is therewith an example of  a species with a large 
scale key area. All the hedgerows in the region need to be maintained to support 
a sustainable population of  this species. 
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In our case study the key area of  a small scale species matches the average 
size of  a parcel plus it’s neighbouring parcels, the key area for a medium scale 
species matches the average size of  a farm plus its neighbouring parcels, and the 
key area of  a large scale species matches the size of  the whole region.  However, 
it is possible that only part of  the hedgerows in the key area is maintained. To 
calculate the effect on biodiversity of  maintaining only part of  the hedgerows in 
the key area we use a logistic function. This function is specified in such a way that 
it implies that when the maintained amount of  hedgerows is low, the score is close 
to zero and when a certain threshold is passed the score is close to one. A logistic 
function was also used by (Natuhara & Imai, 1999) to predict species richness by 
environmental variables such as habitat area.  
Mathematical model
In this section we present the general structure of  our mathematical model. The 
exact equations and restrictions are presented in appendix A. 
Each farmer maximizes utility as defined in equation 1, subject to the constraints 
presented in equations 1a-1c. 
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that it implies that when the maintained amount of hedgerows is low, the score is close to zero 
and when a certain threshold is passed the score is close to one. A logistic function was also 
used by (Natuhara & Imai, 1999) to predict species richness by environmental variables such 
as habitat area.   
athematical model 
In this section we present the general structure of our mathematical model. The exact 
equations and restrictions are presented in appendix A.  
Each farmer maximizes utility as defined in equation 1, subject to the constraints presented in 
equations 1a-1c.  
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍) (1)  (1)
Subject to:
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Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1        ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0                       ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
The way we define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (5)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
taken by the farmer; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices 
respectively.  
 (1a)
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Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1        ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0                       ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity l vel z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is th  level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
f a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
The way we define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (5)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
tit  f hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the producti n process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
t ken by the farm r; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
bi iversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology s t; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 v ctor of output and i put pric s 
respectively.  
 (1b)
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Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1        ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0                       ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity l vel z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is th  level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
f a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
The way we define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (5)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
tit  f hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the producti n process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
t ken by the farm r; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
bi iversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology s t; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 v ctor of output and i put prices 
respectively.  
 (1c)
Where:
U is utility; gn is the weight attached to objective n; on(rz) is the normalized value 
f  objectiv  n depending on activity l vel z; rz is the lev l f  activity z, bk is the 
total availability of  a resource k; azk is the quantity of  resource k demanded by 
activity z; πk is the shadow price of  resource k; dl is the total available quantity of  
r urce l; czl is the quantity of  resource l demanded by activity z.
The way we define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5. 
 
 
 
ject t : 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 1     𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] ( a) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 1        𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ( ) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧                        𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ( c) 
ere: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is tilit ; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is t e ei t attac e  t  jecti e ; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is t e r alize  al e f 
jecti e  e e i  acti it  le el z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is t e le el f acti it  z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is t e t tal a aila ilit  
of a res rce ; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is t e a tit  f res rce  e a e   acti it  z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is t e s a  
rice f res rce ; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is t e t tal a aila le a tit  f res rce l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is t e a tit  f 
res rce l e a e   acti it  z. 
e a  e efi e t e jecti es is rese te  i  e ati s - .  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) ( )  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  ( ) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 ( )  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 , ,  ( )  
ject t :  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  
ere:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 r fit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 rice f re lar t t j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 a tit  f re lar t t j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 rice f i t ; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
a i t ; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  a e t e er s; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 c st f ai t i i  e er s; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of e er s ai ai e ; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 c sts f ire  la r; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 a tit  la r se  t e 
far ; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 la r re ire  i  t e r ctio  r cess; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 i itial la  e e t; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 ris  
ta e   t e far er; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ris  a ersi  c fficie t; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 aria ce il  rice; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 a t f il  
r ce ; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 erall i i ersit  sc re; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 s all scale i i ersit  sc re; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 e i  scale 
iodi ersit  sc re; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 lar e scale i i ersit  sc re; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) tec l  s t; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 ect r 
f t ts a  aria le i ts res ecti el ; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 ect r f t t a  in t rices 
res ecti el .  
 (2)
96 
 
Subject to: 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1        𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 0                       𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1c) 
here: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the eight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the nor alized value of 
objective n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k de anded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shado  
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l de anded by activity z. 
The ay e define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 1,2,3 (5)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 0 
here:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input ; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input ; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ES pay ent hedgero s; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of aintaining hedgero s; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedgero s aintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
far ; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endo ent; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
taken by the far er; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance ilk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 a ount of ilk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 s all scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 ediu  scale 
biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices 
respectively.  
 (3)
96 
 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1        ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0                       ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1c) 
here: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity l vel z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
f a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quan ity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the to al available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
The way we define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
4  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
              𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 5
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
  hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs f hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 qu nt ty labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required i  the producti n process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
t ken by the fa m r; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk p ice; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity scor ; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
bi iversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology s t; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respecti ely; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 v ctor of output and i put pric s 
respectively.  
 (4) 
96 
 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧        𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 b  
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0                       ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ( c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
obj ctive n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of r source k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the tot l available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity f 
resource l demanded by activi y z. 
The way we define the objec ives is p ented i  equ tions 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  3  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (5)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour r qui d in the production process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowm nt; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
take  b  the farmer; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficie t; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 ov rall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale iodivers ty score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scal  
biodiversity scor ; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scal  biodiversity s o ; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) techno ogy set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs nd variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices 
respectively.  
 (5) 
Chapter 4
104
Subject to: 
96 
 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧      [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (1a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1        ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (1b) 
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objective n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
The way we define the objectives is presented in equations 2-5.  
 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (2)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (4)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
               𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (5)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
taken by the farmer; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices 
respectively.  
ere: 
O1 profit; pj price of  regular output j; yj quantity of  regular output j;  wm price of  
input m; xm quantity of  input m; po AES payment hedgerows; wo cost of  maintain-
ing hedgerows; yo quantity of  hedgerows maintained; wL costs of  hired labour; O2 
qua tity labour used on th  farm; LR labour required in the production process; LI 
initial labour endowment; O3 risk taken by the farmer; e risk aversion coefficient; 
v1 variance milk price; y1 amount of  milk produced; O4 overall biodiversity score; 
μ1 small scale biodiversity score; μ2 medium scale biodiversity score; μ3 large scale 
biodiversity score; T(y, x, yo, L) technology set; y, x vector of  outputs and variable 
inputs respectively; p, w vector of  output and input prices respectively. 
We calculate a biodiversity score using a logistic function. The advantage of  
a logistic function is that despite the abrupt switch we still have a continuous 
function which makes solving the model feasible. Equations 6 and 7 show how 
we calculated the biodiversity scores: 
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Where: 
μb is the biodiversity score of  biodiversity type b; yob is the amount of  maintained 
hedgerows hat contributes o biodiversity type b; yob* is the maximum amount of  
hedgerows that contributes t  biod versity type b and can be maintained, α is the 
speed parameter and β the biodiversity parameter. 
By manipulating α we determine the speed at which the biodiversity score 
switches from cl se o 0 to close to 1, the high r α the faste . We select here r-
bitrarily 30 i plying a fast transition. By manipulating β we can determine where 
the switch takes place. For example, with a biodiversity parameter β equal to 0.7 
the biodiversity score will drop rapidly to a value close to zero for a ratio 
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smaller than 0.8. With a higher ratio 
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We calculate a biodiversity score using a logistic function. The advantage of a logistic 
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We calculate a biodiversity score using a logistic function. The advantage of a logistic 
function is that despite the abrupt switch we still have a continuous function which makes 
solving the model feasible. Equations 6 and 7 show how we calculated the biodiversity scores:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =
1
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
         𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6) 
and  
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ∗
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
− 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽  (7) 
Where:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity score of biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the amount of maintained hedgerows 
that cont ibut s to biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ is the maximum amount of hedgerows that 
contributes to biodiversity type b and can be maintain d, α is the speed parameter and β the 
b odiversity param ter.  
By manipulating 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 we determine the speed at which the biodiversity score switches from 
close to 0 to close to 1, the higher 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 the faster. We select here arbitrarily 30 implying a fast 
transition. By manipulating 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 we can determine where the switch takes place. For example, 
with a biodiversity para eter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 equal to 0.7 the biodive sity score will drop rapidly to a value 
close to zero for a ratio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 small  than 0.8. With a higher ratio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 the biodiversity score 
lies between 0.8 and 1. So, a higher biodiversity parameter implies that the switch occurs at 
higher ratios and with a l wer parameter the switch takes place at lower ratios. Figure 4.2. 
shows how the biodiversity score differs depending on α and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio. Figure 4.3. shows 
how the biodiversity score differs depending on β and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio.  
 
Figure 4.2. Biodiversity score depending on α and 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
∗ ratio 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
bi
od
iv
er
sit
y 
sc
or
e
yob/yob* ratio
β 0.7 α=20
β 0.7 α=40
β=0.7 α=30
rat o. 
105
C
ha
pt
er
 4
Effects on participation and biodiversity of reforming the implementation of AES
97 
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function is that despite the abrupt switch we still have a continuous function which makes 
solving the model feasible. Equations 6 and 7 show how we calculated the biodiversity scores:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =
1
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
         𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6) 
and  
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ∗
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
− 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽  (7) 
Where:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity score of biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the amount of maintained hedgerows 
that contributes to biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ is the maximum amount of hedgerows that 
contributes to biodiversity type b and can be maintained, α is the speed parameter and β the 
biodiversity parameter.  
By manipulating 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 we determine the speed at which the biodiversity score switches from 
close to 0 to close to 1, the higher 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 the faster. We select here arbitrarily 30 implying a fast 
transition. By manipulating 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 we can determine where the switch takes place. For example, 
with a biodiversity parameter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 equal to 0.7 the biodiversity score will drop rapidly to a value 
close to zero for a ratio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 smaller than 0.8. With a higher ratio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 the biodiversity score 
lies between 0.8 and 1. So, a higher biodiversity parameter implies that the switch occurs at 
higher ratios and with a lower parameter the switch takes place at lower ratios. Figure 4.2. 
shows how the biodiversity score differs depending on α and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio. Figure 4.3. shows 
how the biodivers ty score differs d pending on β and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio.  
 
Figure 4.2. Biodiversity score depending on α and 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
∗ ratio 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
bi
od
iv
er
sit
y 
sc
or
e
yob/yob* ratio
β=0.7 α=20
β=0.7 α=40
β=0.7 α=30
figure 4.2. biodiversity score depending on α and 
97 
 
We calculate a biodiversity score using a logistic function. The advantage of a logistic 
function is that despite the abrupt switch we still have a continuous function which makes 
solving the model feasible. Equations 6 and 7 show how we calculated the biodiversity scores:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =
1
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
         𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6) 
and  
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ∗
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
− 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽  (7) 
Where:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity score of biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the amount of maintained hedgerows 
that contributes to biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ is the maximum amount of hedgerows that 
contributes to biodiversity type b and can be maintained, α is the speed parameter and β the 
biodiversity parameter.  
By manipulating 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 we determine the speed at which the biodiversity score switches from 
close to 0 to close to 1, the higher 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 the faster. We select here arbitrarily 30 implying a fast 
transition. By manipulating 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 we can determine where the switch takes place. For example, 
with a biodiversity parameter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 equal to 0.7 the biodiversity score will drop rapidly to a value 
close to zero or a ratio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 smaller than 0.8. With a higher r tio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 the biodiversity score 
lies between 0.8 and 1. So, a higher biodiversity parameter implies that the switch occurs at 
higher ratios and with a lower parameter the switch takes place at lower ratios. Figure 4.2. 
shows how the biodiversity score differs depending on α and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio. Figure 4.3. shows 
how the biodiversity score differs depending on β and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio.  
 
Figure 4.2. Biodiversity score depending on α and 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
∗ ratio 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
bi
od
iv
er
sit
y 
sc
or
e
yob/yob* ratio
β=0.7 α=20
β=0.7 α=40
β=0.7 α=30
ratio
98 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Biodiversity score depending on β and 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
∗ ratio 
The biodiversity scores were determined for the species with small scale, medium scale and 
large scale key areas. An average of these scores was taken to calculate the overall 
biodiversity score as shown in equation 8. Equation 9 shows how the availability of payments 
in the collective AES depends on the achieved biodiversity level:   
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Where 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity threshold.  
As long as the biodiversity score remains close to one if there is a change in biodiversity 
weights or AES application system we say that the system is resilient to the change. However, 
if the biodiversity score drops below the threshold the biodiversity score will be close to zero 
and the system is no longer resilient in terms of biodiversity.   
4.3. Data 
Available data 
The model requires general farm data which is largely unavailable. Therefore we used data for 
the average Dutch farm that were available from different sources (Blanken et al., 2016; 
Meetjesland, 2016; Remmelink et al., 2016; RVO, 2010; Wageningen UR, 2015) for the 
following variables: costs of feed bought; costs of removing phosphate surpluses; costs of 
maintaining cattle; amount of feed produced on grassland; amount of feed produced on arable 
land (fodder maize); limits for phosphate application on grassland and maize land; milk price; 
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We calculate a biodiversity score using a logistic function. The advantage of a logistic 
function is that despite the abrupt switch we still have a continuous function which makes 
solving the model feasible. Equations 6 and 7 show how we calculated the biodiversity scores:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 =
1
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
         𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6) 
and  
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 ∗
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
− 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽  (7) 
Where:  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity score of biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the amount of maintained hedgerows 
that contributes to biodiversity type b; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ is the maximum amount of hedgerows that 
contributes to biodiversity type b and can be maintained, α is the speed parameter and β the 
biodiversity parameter.  
By manipulating 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 we determine the speed at which the biodiversity score switches from 
close to 0 to close to 1, the higher 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 the faster. We select here arbitrarily 30 implying a fast 
transition. By manipulating 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 we can determine where the switch takes place. For example, 
with a biodiversity parameter 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 equal to 0.7 the biodiversity score will drop rapidly to a value 
close to zero or a ratio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 smaller than 0.8. With a higher r tio 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 the biodiversity score 
lies between 0.8 and 1. So, a higher biodiversity parameter implies that the switch occurs at 
higher ratios and with a lower parameter the switch takes place at lower ratios. Figure 4.2. 
shows how the biodiversity score differs depending on α and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio. Figure 4.3. shows 
how the biodiversity score differs depending on β and the 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜∗
 ratio.  
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The biodiversity scores were determined for the species with small scale, medium 
scale and large scale key areas. An average of  these scores was taken to calculate 
the overall biodiversity score as shown in equation 8. Equation 9 shows how the 
availability of  payments in the collective AES depends on the achieved biodiver-
sity level:  
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The biodive sity scores were determined for the species with small scale, medium scale and 
large scale key areas. An average of these scores was taken to calculate the overall 
biodiversity score as shown in equation 8. Equation 9 shows how the availability of payments 
in the collective AES depends on the achieved biodiversity level:   
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
  (8) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
 > 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏        𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂  (9) 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏       𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂   
Where 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity threshold.  
As long as the biodiversity score remains close to one if there is a change in biodiversity 
weights or AES application system we say that the system is resilient to the change. However, 
if the biodiversity score drops below the threshold the biodiversity score will be close to zero 
and the system is no longer resilient in terms of biodiversity.   
4.3. Data 
Available data 
The model requires general farm data which is largely unavailable. Therefore we used data for 
the average Dutch farm that were available from different sources (Blanken et al., 2016; 
Meetjesland, 2016; Remmelink et al., 2016; RVO, 2010; Wageningen UR, 2015) for the 
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land (fodder m ize); limits for phosphate application on grassland and maize land; milk price; 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
bi
od
iv
er
sit
y 
sc
or
e
yob/yob* ratio
β=0.7 α=30
β=0.5 α=30
β=0.9 α=30
 (8)
Chapter 4
106
98 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Biodiversity score depending on β and 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐
∗ ratio 
The biodiversity scores were determined for the species with small scale, medium scale and 
large scale key areas. An average of these scores was taken to calculate the overall 
biodiversity score as shown in equation 8. Equation 9 shows how the availability of payments 
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Where 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the biodiversity threshold.  
As long as the biodiversity score remains close to one if there is a change in biodiversity 
weights or AES application system we say that the system is resilient to the change. However, 
if the biodiversity score drops below the threshold the biodiversity score will be close to zero 
and the system is no longer resilient in terms of biodiversity.   
4.3. Data 
Available data 
The model requires general farm data which is largely unavailable. Therefore we used data for 
the average Dutch farm that were available from different sources (Blanken et al., 2016; 
Meetjesland, 2016; Remmelink et al., 2016; RVO, 2010; Wageningen UR, 2015) for the 
following variables: costs of feed bought; costs of removing phosphate surpluses; costs of 
maintaining cattle; amount of feed produced on grassland; amount of feed produced on arable 
land (fodder maize); limits for phosphate application on grassland and maize land; milk price; 
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Where bt is the biodiversity threshold. 
As long as the biodiversity score r mains close to one if  there is a change in 
biodiversity weights or AES application system we say that the system is resilient 
to the change. However, if  the biodiversity score drops below the threshold the 
biodiversity score will be close to zero and the system is no longer resilient in 
terms of  biodiversity.  
4.3. DATA
Available data
The model requires general farm data which is largely unavailable. Therefore we 
used data for the average Dutch farm that were available from different sources 
(Blanken et al., 2016; Meetjesland, 2016; Remmelink et al., 2016; RVO, 2010; 
Wageningen UR, 2015) for the following variables: costs of  feed bought; costs 
of  removing phosphate surpluses; costs of  maintaining cattle; amount of  feed 
produced on grassland; amount of  feed produced on arable land (fodder maize); 
limits for phosphate application on grassland and maize land; milk price; labour 
costs; percentage cows to be replaced; price of  new cows; price of  slaughter cows; 
variance of  the milk price; feed requirements per cow, cattle younger than one 
year and cattle between one and two years; phosphate content of  grass, maize, 
feed bought, bound in milk, bound in carrying cows and bound in young cattle; 
labour hours needed for cultivating maize or grass; costs of  cultivating silage 
maize and grass.
Data collection
Farm-specific information was collected from in-depth interviews with nine 
farmers in the NFW. The sample was selected by the farmer collective in the 
NFW, who ensured that both farmers with positive, negative, and neutral attitudes 
concerning AES were included. All of  the farmers in the sample had hedgerows 
on their land, but not all participated in the AES scheme and maintained their 
hedgerows accordingly. An overview of  the income, maintenance, and payments 
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Effects on participation and biodiversity of reforming the implementation of AES
received for each farmer is presented in Table 4.1. The farmer income has to be 
shared by all family members that work on the farm. 
Table 4.1. income, maintenance and payments per farmer 
Farmer Number of 
parcels
Total m2 
hedgerows
M2 
hedgerows 
maintained
Income 
farmer in 
euro
AES 
payments 
received (€)
Share of 
payments 
in income
1 15 2335 0 82676 0 0.00
2 92 33152 33152 228710 9946 0.04
3 7 1988 784 96289 235 0.00
4 22 7517 7517 98022 2255 0.02
5 25 12920 12920 156870 3876 0.02
6 21 10273 0 60060 0 0.00
7 14 5086 0 89732 0 0.00
8 38 800 0 205687 0 0.00
9 54 7917 7273 66800 2182 0.03
Total 288 81988 61646 1084846 18494
We asked each farmer about his/her farming objectives and their relative impor-
tance. In addition, facts concerning the type of  farm, whether or not the farm 
was certified as organic, the number of  cows and young cattle, the amount of  
milk produced on the farm, the amount of  land, the different crops, the labour 
hours worked on farm, the amount of  hedgerows, the location hedgerows, and 
the maintenance of  hedgerows were collected. Moreover, for all farms we had 
a map showing the exact size and location of  all their parcels. Out of  the nine 
farmers one farmer no longer had dairy cows, but still owned and maintained 
his/her land. For this farmer we took the average milk production per cow and 
the average number of  dairy cows in the region, since we assumed every farmer 
needed to be able to earn a subsistence income. We realise our small sample 
may not be representative of  the whole region. However, it allows us to show 
how a small sample such as this can be used to create an artificial region which 
is suitable for running model simulations. In this way we are able to capture the 
mechanisms that are important in the collective AES programme. In theory more 
farmers could be included in our model, but this would make solving the model 
more complex. To see how the farmers that we included compare to the general 
farming population in the Netherlands and in the province of  Friesland we offer 
a comparison on the number of  cows, the milk production and the amount of  
land in Table 4.2. The averages are reported for 2016. 
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Table 4.2. Number of cows, milk production and land in sample and on average (CBS, 
2017b; CrV, 2016)
  Number of cows Milk production per 
cow
Ha of land on farm
 Sample NFW 129 8243 77
 The Netherlands 97 8500 52
 Friesland 114 8500 66
Data reconstruction
The farmers we interviewed were all located within the NFW. Their parcels are 
distributed over the NFW, mixed with parcels of  other farmers. For simulating 
biodiversity, however, we needed a contiguous area, so we created an artificial 
region containing only these nine farms and their 288 parcels. For each individual 
farm we have a map showing its parcels of  land, and how these parcels are located 
relative to each other. We used this information to create an artificial region, 
with the 288 parcels that belong to the nine individual farmers. Since there is no 
reason to assume a specific spatial configuration, we calculated for each parcel 
k the probability that it neighboured parcel j of  farm i in the sample. For the 
parcels k that belong to the same farm as parcel j this probability is either 1 or 0 
as we know their exact location relative to parcel j. For the parcels k that belong 
to the other farms we calculated the probability by determining the number of  
potential neighbours. For example, imagine parcel 1 of  farm a has 3 unknown 
neighbours and parcel 4 of  farm b has two unknown neighbours. Parcel 4 could 
then be located at any of  the 3 unknown sides of  parcel 1 with either of  its two 
unknown sides. Furthermore, assume that in this example in total all the parcels 
not belonging to farm a have 100 unknown neighbours. Then parcel 4 of  farm b 
has a probability of  
100 
 
it allows us to show how a small sample such as this can be used to create an artificial region 
which is suitable for running model simulations. In this way we are able to capture the 
mechanisms that are important in the collective AES programme. In theory more farmers 
could be included in our model, but this would make solving the model more complex. To see 
how the farmers that we included compare to the general farming population in the 
Netherlands and in the province of Friesland we offer a comparison on the number of cows, 
the milk production and the amount of land in Table 4.2. The averages are reported for 2016.  
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artificial region, with the 288 parcels that belong to the nine individual farmers. Since there is 
no reason to assume a specific spatial configur tion, we calculated for each parcel k the 
probability that it neighboured parcel j of farm i in the sample. For the parcels k that belong to 
the same farm as parcel j this probability is either 1 or 0 as we know their exact location 
relative to parcel j. For the parcels k that belong to the other farms we calculated the 
probability by determining the number of potential neighbours. For example, imagine parcel 1 
of farm a has 3 unknown neighbours and parcel 4 of farm b has two unknown neighbours. 
Parcel 4 could then be located at any of the 3 unknown sides of parcel 1 with either of its two 
unknown sides. Furthermore, assume that in this example in total all the parcels not belonging 
to farm a have 100 unknown neighbours. Then parcel 4 of farm b has a probability of 
1
100
×3×2= 6100 to neighbour parcel 1 of farm 1. We used the probabilities to calculate an expected 
amount of maintained hedgerows by multiplying the probability with the amount of 
hedgerows on each potentially neighbouring parcel and the parcel itself. One should note here 
that the effect of maintaining hedgerows on a single parcel on biodiversity is less extreme 
when one considers expected amounts. By multiplying the probability that each parcel is a 
neighbour times the amount of maintained hedgerows we take some kind of average over all 
the parcels that could potentially be a neighbour, thereby smoothening the effect of 
maintaining the hedgerows on a single parcel.    
 eighbour parcel 1 of  farm 1. W  us d the prob-
abilities to calculate n expected amount of  maintained hedgerows by multiplying 
the probability with the amount of  hedgerows on each potentially neighbouring 
parcel and the parcel itself. One should note here that the effect of  maintaining 
hedgerows on a singl  parcel on biodiversity is less extrem  when on con iders 
expected amounts. By multiplying the probability that each parcel is a neighbour 
times the amount of  maintained hedgerows we take some kind of  average over all 
the parcels that could potentially be a neighbour, thereby smoothening the effect 
of  maintaining the hedgerows on a single parcel.   
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4.4. exPeRIMenTAL DeSIgn
We ran the model for 10 time steps in order to reach a stable outcome, for two 
policy scenario and various settings of  biodiversity weights. It is important to no-
tice here that time steps do not refer to specific time units, but to the time needed 
for the famers to respond to each other’s actions in the previous time step. The 
response time is dependent on how long it takes for the farmer to determine the 
actions of  other farmers, either by observing the effects (this could be months) or 
by gathering information during the interaction with other farmers or the farmer 
collective (this could be days). When making a decision, the farmer takes the 
actions of  the other farmers in the previous time step as given. In the first time 
step the actions of  the other farmers are as indicated during the interviews. A 
sensitivity analysis of  our results can be found in appendix B.
4.4.1. Policy scenarios
Baseline: individual AES Programme
In this scenario AES payments are available if  the farmer properly maintains the 
hedgerows. The biodiversity feedback (arrow 1, 2, 3 in Figure 4.1.) is in effect, 
but the payment feedback (arrow 4,5 in Figure 4.1.) is not included. This scenario 
allows us to determine what the biodiversity and participation in the AES are in 
the individual AES programme. 
Collective AeS programme
In this scenario the first time step is equal to the baseline scenario. In each time 
step farmers choose whether or not to maintain their hedgerows. The AES pay-
ment is only available if  the overall biodiversity score in the previous time step 
exceeds 0.8 (the range for this biodiversity score is 0-1).  Both the biodiversity 
feedback and payment feedback are included. This scenario allows us to deter-
mine what happens to biodiversity and participation in AES when the collective 
AES programme is introduced. 
4.4.2. biodiversity weights
During the interviews we asked farmers to indicate the weight they attached to 
each of  the farmer objectives. The farmers in our case study were situated in a 
landscape that was designated as a national park.  Farmers seemed to be very 
aware of  the special quality of  the landscape in the NFW. However, it is likely 
that farmers in other parts of  the Netherlands are less biodiversity-minded and 
have lower biodiversity weights. Therefore, in this model-experiment we consider 
the effect of  the switch from the individual to collective AES programme in a 
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situation where farmers attach less value to biodiversity. We consider biodiversity 
weights that are in the range 0-100% of  the original weight and for each of  these 
weights we run the baseline scenario and the collective AES programme scenario. 
When we lower the biodiversity weight, we increase the other weights proportion-
ally to assure the weights will add up to one. 
4.5. rESulTS 
4.5.1. results policy scenarios 
Baseline Scenario: individual AES Programme 
Figure 4.4 shows the biodiversity scores in each time step of  the model for the 
baseline scenario. 
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Figure 4.4. Overall, small scale, medium scale and large scale biodiversity scores in the baseline scenario 
In the model farmers consider a trade-off. On the one hand, by maintaining hedgerows they 
obtain AES payments, achieve higher biodiversity, and have a lower price risk.  On the other 
hand, maintaining hedgerows also results in production loss due to the shade of hedgerows 
and extra labour hours spend on maintenance. Farmers will choose to maintain the amount of 
hedgerows that will give them the highest utility. In the baseline scenario six farmers 
participate in the AES maintaining 68,531 m2 of hedgerows. The overall biodiversity score 
stabilizes at 0.867.  The highest biodiversity score is for large scale biodiversity, the lowest 
biodiversity score is for small scale biodiversity.  
Collective AES programme 
The results at the end of the model run for the collective programme are the same as the 
results in the baseline scenario. Biodiversity does not drop below the threshold and the system 
remains resilient in terms of biodiversity and farmer participation. A difference between 
farmers’ decisions in the baseline scenario and the collective programme can be expected 
when there is a change in maintenance payment, which will occur if the biodiversity score 
drops below the threshold. This is apparently not the case here.  
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Figure 4.4. Overall, small scale, medium scale and large scale biodiversity scores in the 
baseline scenario
In the model farmers consider a trade-off. On the one h nd, by maintaining 
hedgerows they obtain AES payments, achieve higher biodiversity, and have 
a lower price risk.  On the other hand, maintaining hedgerows also results in 
production loss due to the shade of  hedgerows and extra labour hours sp nd 
on maintenance. Farmers will choose to maintain the amount of  hedgerows that 
will give them the highest utility. In the baseline scenario six farmers participate 
in the AES maintaining 68,531 m2 of  hedgerows. The overall biodiversity score 
stabilizes at 0.867.  The highest biodiversity score is for large scale biodiversity, 
the lowest biodiversity score is for small scale biodiversity. 
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Collective AeS programme
The results at the end of  the model run for the collective programme are the 
same as the results in the baseline scenario. Biodiversity does not drop below the 
threshold and the system remains resilient in terms of  biodiversity and farmer 
participation. A difference between farmers’ decisions in the baseline scenario and 
the collective programme can be expected when there is a change in maintenance 
payment, which will occur if  the biodiversity score drops below the threshold. 
This is apparently not the case here. 
4.5.2. results model experiments
biodiversity weights 
Figure 4.5. shows the number of  farmers enrolled in the individual and the col-
lective AES programme for different biodiversity weights. In Figure 4.5. we show 
the farmer participation in the AES programme for biodiversity weights in the 
range 0-30% of  the original weight.  
If  the biodiversity weight is zero, the system is not resilient and only two farm-
ers are maintaining their hedgerows at the onset of  the model run. They are not 
motivated by the biodiversity effects of  maintaining these hedgerows but by the 
profit or low risk that is associated with the AES payments. In the individual AES 
programme this payment is available in each time step, and thus these two farmers 
do not change their maintenance during the model run.  In the collective AES 
programme the biodiversity score in the first time step is below the threshold, and 
the AES payment is not be available in the following time steps of  the collective 
AES programme. Therefore, in the collective programme the number of  farmers 
in the AES will drop to zero. If  the biodiversity weight is equal to 10 percent of  
the original weight, six farmers participate in the AES at the onset of  the model 
run. In the individual programme this does not change over time. However, since 
the biodiversity score is below the threshold, payments are not available in the 
collective AES programme and the system loses its resilience. In the second time 
step two farmers still choose to maintain their hedgerows, because they are not 
primarily driven by the AES payment but by the perception of  biodiversity around 
them. However, when they notice the low overall biodiversity score due to the low 
maintenance by the other farmers in the second round they no longer maintain 
their own hedgerows in the third round, since they will receive a higher utility 
by not maintaining hedgerows if  the overall biodiversity score is very low. If  the 
biodiversity weight is equal to 20% of  the original weight, six farmers participate 
in the AES at the onset of  the model run. The number of  farmers in the AES 
is stable in the individual programme. Since the biodiversity score is below the 
threshold, no payment is available in the collective AES programme. Therefore, 
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the system shows no resilience, and the number of  farmers participating in the 
AES in the collective programme drops, and alternates between three and four 
farmers that keep responding to each other by maintaining small amounts of  
hedgerows. When the biodiversity weight is equal to 30-100% of  the original 
biodiversity weight there are six farmers participating in the AES and we do not 
see a drop in farmer participation for either the individual or collective AES 
programme, as both systems are resilient in terms of  farmer participation. 
Figure 4.5. Farmer participation in the individual and collective programme depending 
on biodiversity weights
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Figure 4.6. shows how the overall biodiversity score changes due to the change 
from the individual AES programme to the collective AES programme. 
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Figure 4.6. Change in overall biodiversity score due to switching from an individual AES 
programme to a collective AeS programme
If  the biodiversity weights are zero (thus equal to 0% of  the original biodiversity 
weights) there is a low biodiversity score in both the individual and collective 
AES programme. The individual AES programme is slightly more resilient to 
the change in the biodiversity weight, as the overall biodiversity score is slightly 
higher. If  the biodiversity weights are 10% or 20% of  the original weight the bio-
diversity score in the collective AES programme is much lower than the individual 
AES programme. In this case the change in overall biodiversity score due to the 
new policy is substantial, and the collective AES programme shows less resilience 
to changing the biodiversity weights than the individual AES programme. If  
the biodiversity weights are 30-60% of  the original biodiversity weight farmer 
participation does not differ between the two AES programmes, but the bio-
diversity score is slightly lower in the collective AES programme. Thus, in the 
range 30-60% of  the original biodiversity weight the collective AES programme 
is slightly less resilient to a change in biodiversity weights than the individual AES 
programme. In the range 70-100% of  the original biodiversity weight there is no 
difference in the overall biodiversity score in the individual AES programme and 
the collective AES programme. 
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4.6. CONCluSiONS AND DiSCuSSiON
The goal of  this paper is to analyse how the resilience of  the land use system 
in terms of  farmer participation in the AES and biodiversity is affected by the 
value farmers attach to biodiversity, and whether the shift from an individual to 
collective application for agri-environmental contracts will affect the resilience 
of  the land use system. Our results show that the individual AES programme 
is quite resilient to changes in the biodiversity weight, only if  the biodiversity 
weight drops to zero the farmer participation and biodiversity score are low. The 
collective AES programme is less resilient to changes in the biodiversity weight, 
especially for situations in which farmers do not value biodiversity very highly. If  
the biodiversity weight is 20 percent of  the original weight or less the biodiversity 
scores and farmer participation are low.
Thus, although the Dutch policy makers assume that the introduction of  the 
collective AES programme will result in a higher biodiversity level and more 
farmer participation due to social interaction, in this paper we show that the 
introduction of  the collective AES programme also brings a risk of  a collapse of  
the biodiversity and farmer participation. 
Whether or not the system will be resilient to the policy change depends on the 
level of  the biodiversity weights. If  farmers have high biodiversity weights, some 
farmers will maintain their hedgerows even when no payment is available, and 
no loss of  resilience occurs when the collective AES programme is introduced. 
This finding is in line with research by van Dijk et al. (2016), who found that 
on-farm nature conservation is only to some extent determined by payments. If  
biodiversity weights are low, the introduction of  the collective AES programme 
might result in a loss of  resilience and a shift towards low farmer participation 
and biodiversity level. 
This shift in the land use system due to a loss of  resilience can be explained from 
the feedbacks in the system. The shift starts due to the payment feedback, where 
payment is no longer available if  the biodiversity score in the region is below a 
certain threshold. The lack of  payments influences farmer decisions which result 
in a low level of  biodiversity in the region. Due to the biodiversity feedback this 
lower level of  biodiversity causes other farmers to stop their maintenance efforts 
as well. Melman et al. (2016) find that a moderately positive ecological effect for 
meadow birds is expected due to the collective AES programme. In the light of  
our results this suggests that no shift towards low farmer participation is to be 
expected. Melman et al. (2016) did not take the economic efficiency and farmers’ 
support for the collective programme into account. 
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The reported results are determined in a model simulation based on a small 
sample, and caution should be applied when generalizing these results. To place 
our model in context we provided a comparison against the average number of  
cows, milk production per cow and amount of  land in the Netherlands and in 
Friesland. On average the farmers in our model have more cows and land, and 
a lower milk production. The differences are not very large. To provide some 
validation to our results we showed the results of  this research to representatives 
of  the farmer collective, who thought the results were reasonable. The possibility 
that the collective programme will lead to a lower resilience seems to be supported 
by findings from the theory on threshold public goods. For example, Dannenberg 
et al. (2015) found that a negative effect (such as a loss of  biodiversity) can occur 
when a certain contribution threshold needs to be passed to obtain a common 
benefit and the individual agent cannot pass this threshold on its own. McBride 
(2006) shows that low farmer participation can prevent the provision of  a public 
good. Luo and Miller (2017) analysed the possibility of  starting a biofuel factory, 
which would only be economically viable once enough farmers participate. They 
also show that farmer participation can be high in some circumstances but low 
in others. 
Our research shows how a model with information on a small sample of  farm-
ers can offer insights in the mechanisms that drive the decision whether or not 
to participate in the AES programme. We believe this is a valuable contribution, 
since collecting information on a large sample is often costly and time consuming. 
It is not just the time and costs sacrificed by the researcher, sample subjects must 
also be found willing to invest their time in being interviewed. Since our goal is 
not to show a significant effect, but to explore the impact of  the introduction of  
the collective AES programmes and the associated feedback effects in the case 
study, this small sample approach seems appropriate. 
We realise our model has limitations, we mention four. First, we do not al-
low the total amount of  hedgerows to increase beyond the current amount of  
maintained plus unmaintained hedgerows in the NFW. This assumption is based 
on the fact that none of  the farmers indicated a willingness to plant more trees, 
due to the restrictions on removing trees. Second, we use stated farmer objectives, 
which might differ from the actual weights farmers might apply in their day to 
day decisions. When a question is asked in a hypothetical way, farmers do not 
need to take market and personal constraints into account or can be sensitive to 
the elicitation format used (Azevedo, Herriges & Kling, 2003; Woldu et al., 2016). 
Third, biodiversity is measured in quite a crude way. We capture only the effect 
of  maintaining three specific species in small, medium and large key areas and 
their dispersion capacities. Therefore, our biodiversity scores should be inter-
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preted only as an indication of  the effect on biodiversity. Finally, we considered 
the success of  the collective AES programme from the perspective of  farmer 
participation and biodiversity scores. We did not score the collective programme 
on its performance in other areas, such as the possible cost savings or reduction 
in monitoring efforts for the Dutch government. Neither did we look at the social 
influence that might result in the collective programme, which might increase 
farmer participation. 
However, despite the caveats we think this paper contributes to the discussion 
on the implementation and effects of  AES payments for maintaining wildlife 
and landscapes. We show how the value farmers attach to biodiversity affects 
the resilience of  the land use system and how the switch from an individual to 
a collective AES programme can have a negative effect on the resilience of  the 
land use system. 
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APPenDIx 4A.   gAMS MoDeL 
The model describes the behaviour of  the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke 
Friese Wouden”. It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals 
the sum of  the weights the farmer attaches to each of  the farmer objectives 
times the normalized value of  each objective. The farmer objectives are profit 
maximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk minimization (A4) and biodi-
versity maximization (A5). In the model utility is maximized subject to constraints 
(A2-A35). 
Objective: 
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Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the far er objectives times the normalized value of each objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit maximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
minimization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the model utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (A4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (A5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (A8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     (A12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
 (A1)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
Th  model describes the behaviour of the dairy f rm r  in th  “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assume  that the farm m ximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of ach objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
minimization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the model utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (A4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (A5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (A8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     (A12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
 
jec  to: 
108 
 
e ix 4 .  o el  
he odel describes the behaviour of the dairy far ers in the “ oordelijke riese ouden”. 
It is assu e  that the far  xi izes utility ( 1). tility equals the su  of the eights the 
far er attaches to each of the far er objec ives ti es the nor alized value of ach objective. 
he far er objectives are profit axi ization ( 2), labour ini izat on ( 3), risk 
ini ization ( 4) and biodiversity axi zation ( 5). In the odel utility is axi ized 
subject to constraints ( 2- 35).  
bjective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗   𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   ( 1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 , . . , ; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , . . ,     
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    ( 2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , ,   
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  ( 4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  ( 7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  ax ( , 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  ( 10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     ( 12) 
, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  ( 13) 
(A2)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assu e  that the farm m x mizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attach  to each of the far er obj ctives times the normalized value of each objec ive
The f mer objec ives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
inimization (A4) and biodiversity maximization ( 5). In the od l utility is m ximiz  
subject to c straints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (A4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (A5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (A8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     (A12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of each objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit maximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
minimization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the model utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (A4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  5  
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (A8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     (A12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
 (A3)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
he model describes the behaviour of the dairy arm rs in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of each objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
minimization (A4) nd biodiversity maximization (A5). In t e model utility is maximized
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (A4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
 5
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (A8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     (A12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
 (A4)
108 
 
ppendix 4A. GA S m del  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to eac  of t e farmer objectives ti es the normalize  valu  of ach objective. 
far r objectiv s are profit maximiza ion (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
mini ization (A4) nd biodiversity max m zation (A5). I  t e mod l t lity is maximized 
subject to c nstra nts (A2-A35).  
O ject ve:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  ( 4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (A5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (A6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  ( 7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  ( 10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     ( 12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
(A5)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to eac  of t e farmer objectives times the normalized value of each objective. 
he farmer objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
mini ization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the model utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 0  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  5
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6)  8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  (A9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     2
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
 (A6)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of ach objective. 
farm r objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
m nimization (A4) and biodiversity max mization (A5). In the mod l tility is max mized 
subject to c nstraints (A2-A35).  
O j tive:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to: 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  5
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6)  8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     2
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (A13) 
 (A7)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of each objective. 
farm r objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
m ni ization (A4) and biodiversity max mization (A5). In the m d l tility is max mized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Obj ctive:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
 5
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  ( 7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3
 (A8)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to ac  of t e farmer obj ctives times the normalized valu of ach objective. 
e farmer objectiv s e profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
mini ization (A4) nd biodiv rsity maximization (A5). In the model ti ity is maximized 
subject to c n t aints (A2-A35).  
Objective: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    ( 2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 0  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  A4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (A5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  9  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  ( 10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 8 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3
 (A9)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of each objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit maximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
minimization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the model utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Object ve:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to   
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  ( 4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (A5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚= − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  9
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  ( 10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 8 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     ( 2) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  ( 3) 
 (A10)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of ach objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
mini ization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the m del ut lity is maximized 
subject to constraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to   
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    A2  
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  ( 4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚= − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (A8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  9
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     ( 12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  ( 13) 
 (A11)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farmer attaches to each of the farmer objectives times the normalized value of ach objective. 
The farmer objectives are profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
mini ization (A4) and biodiversity maximization (A5). In the m del utility is maximized 
subject to con t aints (A2-A35).  
Objective: 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    ( 2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (A3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (A4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
 ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  (A7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒19  9  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒2 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     (A12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  ( 13) 
 (A12)
108 
 
Appendix 4A. GAMS model  
The model describes the behaviour of the dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
It is assumed that the farm maximizes utility (A1). Utility equals the sum of the weights the 
farm r attaches to ac  of t e farm r obj ctives times the normalized valu  of ach objective. 
The farmer objectiv s e profit aximization (A2), labour minimization (A3), risk 
minimization (A4) nd biodiversity maxim zation (A5). In the model utility is maximized 
subj ct to c nstraints (A2-A35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗   (A1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9    
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24    (A2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 0  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  5
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  ( 6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚= − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32  ( 7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒11𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒12𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒31𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒32𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒17 −
2𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9  9
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒21  (A10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (A 1) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23     ( 2  
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3   (A13)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A14)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A15)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  ( 17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A16)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  A 5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  ( 16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  ( 17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  ( 18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A20)
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𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A21)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
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)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
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109 
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𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  ( 18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 ( 19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 ( 20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  ( 2) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  ( 28) 
 (A23)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   8  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 ( 9) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 ( 20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  8  
 (A24)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9  
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  8
 (A25)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (A20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗ (
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  5
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A26)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (A17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (A18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (A19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 ( 20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  ( 2) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  5
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (A26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (A27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A28) 
 (A27)
109 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (A14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (A15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (A16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  ( 17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  ( 18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
   (A21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (A22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (A23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (A24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (A25) 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  ( 26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  ( 27) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  8 (A28)
110 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 (A33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (A34) 
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0    
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
 (A29)
110 
 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 (A33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (A34) 
Add for the collective AES system setting:   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    (A35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0    
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
 (A30)
110 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A31) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 (A33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (A34) 
Add for the collective AES system setting:   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    (A35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0    
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
(A31)
110 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 7  30  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  1  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  2  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 3  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  4  
Add for the collective AES system setting:   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    (A35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 0    
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
i2 labour hours used on farm i 
i3 risk taken by farmer i 
i4 overall biodiversity score  
i1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
i2 ini  labour hours that could be used on farm i 
i3 risk that could be taken y farmer i 
i4 ax overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to prof  maximization by farmer i 
i2 labour mini izati   far er i 
i3 risk minim zation by farmer i 
i4 biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
 (A32)
110 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 (A33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (A34) 
Add for the collective AES system setting:   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    (A35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 0  
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = ini u  labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = ini u  risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = ax overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour mini ization by far er i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
 (A33)
110 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (A31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  (A32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 (A33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (A34) 
Add for the collective AES system setting:   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    5
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 0  
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
 (A34)
Add for the collective AES system setting:  
110 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (A29) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  ( 30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  ( 31) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  ( 2) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  ( 4) 
Add for the collective AES system setting:   
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜    (A35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0    
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
i2 = labour hours used on farm i 
i3  risk taken by farmer i 
i4  overall biodiversity score  
i1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
i2* = ini u  labour hours that could be used on farm i 
i3*  ini  risk that could be taken by farmer i 
i4*  ax overall iodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = eight attached to labour mini ization by far er i 
i3  ei t attac e  t  risk minimization by farmer i 
i4  ei t attac e  t  biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
 (A35)
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Where: 
Ui = utility of farmer i
Oi1	 =	 profit	farmer	i	in	euros
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score 
Oi1*	 =	 maximum	profit	in	euros	farmer	i	could	obtain
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain
gi1	 =	 weight	attached	to	profit	maximization	by	farmer	i
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i
LRi = labour hours required on farm i
LIi = initial labour hours available on farm i
α = speed parameter
β = biodiversity parameter
v1 = variance milk price
μi1 = biodiversity score small scale biodiversity type for farmer i
μi2 = biodiversity score medium scale biodiversity type for farmer i
μi3 = biodiversity score large scale biodiversity type
yi1 = milk produced on farm i (in 100 kgs)
p1 = price milk in euro per 100 kg  
p2 = price old cows in euro per cow 
po = price maintained hedgerows in euro per m2
pot=2 = price maintained hedgerows in euro per m2 in second time step
w1 = maintenance costs in euro per cow
w2 = maintenance costs in euro per young cattle < 1 year
w3 = maintenance costs in euro per young cattle > 1 year
w4 = costs per KVEM feed in euro
w5 = costs of removing a kg of excess phosphate in euro
w6 = costs of maintaining a m2 of maize in euro
w7 = costs of maintaining a m2 hedgerows in euro
w8 = costs of maintaining a m2 of grass in euro
w9 = costs of hiring an hour of labour in euro
w10 = costs of buying one more cow in euro per cow
xi1 = number of cows on farm i 
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xi2 = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i 
xi3 = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i 
xi4 = KVEM feed purchased by farm i
xi5 = kg phosphate surplus on farm i
xi6 = m2 maize land on farm i
xi7 = m2 maintained hedgerows on farm i 
xi8 = m2 grassland on farm i 
xi9 = m2 hedgerows not maintained on farm i
xhi10 =  expected m2 maintained hedgerows on parcel h of farm i and its neigh-
bouring parcels
xi11 = m2 grassland without damage from hedgerows on farm i
xi12 = m2 grassland with damage from hedgerows on farm i 
xi13 = m2 maize land without damage from hedgerows on farm i
xi14 = m2 maize land with damage from hedgerows on farm i
xi15 = kg phosphate produced on farm i
xi16 = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i
xi17 = number of new cows bought by farm i
xi18 = total m2 land used in production on farm i
xha19 = m2 hedgerows maintained on neighbour a of parcel h on farm i
xhc20 = m2 hedgerows maintained on neighbour c of farm i
xi21 = m2 hedgerows maintained on farm i and its neighbouring parcels
xi22 = number of (old) cows sold by farm i
xi23 = number of new cows on farm i
xi24 = number of new bought by farm i
xhi25 = m2 hedgerows maintained on parcel h of farm i
e1 = KVEM needed per cow
e2 = KVEM needed per young cattle < 1 year
e3 = KVEM needed per young cattle > 1 year
ei4 = 100 kg milk produced per cow on farm i
e5 = labour hours needed per cow
e6 = labour hours needed per m2 maize land
e7 = labour hours needed per m2 maintained hedgerows 
e8 = labour hours needed per m2 grassland 
e9 = percentage cows that will be too old for milk production on farm i
e10	 =	 share	of	land	affected	by	maintained	hedgerows
e11 = KVEM produced on a m2 of grassland without damages
e12 = KVEM produced on a m2 of grassland with damages
e13 = kg phosphate in a KVEM from grassland
e14 = kg phosphate in a KVEM from maize land
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e15 = kg phosphate in a KVEM purchased
e16 = kg phosphate in 100 kg milk
e17 = kg phosphate in a carrying cow
e18 = kg phosphate in a young cattle < 1 year
e19 = kg phosphate in a young cattle > 1 year
e20 = kg phosphate allowed on a m2 of grassland
e21 = kg phosphate allowed on a m2 of maize land
ehi22 = m2 area parcel h on farm i
ei23 = initial m2 land used for hedgerows on farm i
ei24 = maximum m2 of hedgerows that could be maintained in the region
ei25 = number of young cattle < 1 year per cow on farm i
ei26 = number of young cattle > 1 year per cow on farm i
ei27 = initial number of cows on farm i 
e28hi =  maximum amount of hedgerows that could be maintained on parcel h of 
farm i 
e29 = subsistence income farmers
ei30 = percentage cows that can be replaced by young cattle farm i
e31 = KVEM produced on a m2 of maize land without damages
e32 = KVEM produced on a m2 of maize land with damages 
ehi33 =  maximum expected m2 hedgerows that could be maintained on parcel h of 
farm I and its neighbouring parcels
ei34 =  maximum expected m2 hedgerows that could be maintained on farm I and 
its neighbouring parcels
ei35 =  number of groups of parcels and neighbours on which hedgerows occur
e36 = threshold overall biodiversity score 
ea = probability parcel a is a neighbour of parcel h of farm i
ec = probability parcel c is a neighbour of farm i
Within this model the farmer aims to maximize his/her utility, as depicted by 
equation (A1). Utility depends on four farming objectives; profit maximization, 
labour minimization, risk minimization and biodiversity maximization. Whether 
or not a farmer attaches value to each of  these objectives depends on the weights 
for the farmer objectives. If  a farmer does not care about an objective, this objec-
tive will obtain a weight of  zero. 
Profit is the result of  the revenue from milk production, the revenue from 
selling cows that are no longer productive and AES payments, minus the costs 
of  normal production including the costs of  maintaining hedgerows, the costs 
of  labour and the costs of  buying new cows (A2). Labour used on the farm is 
equal to the amount of  labour hours needed for all of  the farms activities (A3). 
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Risk depends on the variance of  the milk price (A4). The overall biodiversity 
score depends on the biodiversity score for the small scale biodiversity type, the 
medium scale biodiversity type, and the large scale biodiversity type (A5). 
There are two commodities that are produced on the farm: milk and biodiver-
sity. The revenue from milk depends on the milk production, which is the result 
of  the number of  cows times the milk production per cow (A6). Of  course, cows 
need to be fed. Feed can be produced on farm, and feed needed in excess of  the 
on-farm production can be purchased from the market (A7). Feed production 
depends on the type of  crop grown (grass or maize) and possible damages to 
production due to shade from the hedgerows. If  more phosphate is produced 
on farm than can be placed on farm land, there is a phosphate surplus that has 
to be removed from the farm (A8). Phosphate produced on farm results from 
phosphate included in the feed minus the phosphate captured in the milk, cows 
and young cattle (A9). Phosphate that can be placed on land is determined by 
multiplying the allowed amount of  phosphate per m2 of  grass or maize with the 
m2 of  grass and maize on the farm (A10). The labour required on the farm is sum 
of  the labour needed for feeding and milking the cows, the labour needed to work 
the farm land and the labour needed to maintain the hedgerows (A11). The total 
amount of  land that can be used in production is the land available on the parcels 
of  the farm minus the land needed for hedgerows (A12). The amount of  land 
used in production can be used for growing grass or growing maize (A13). Land 
used by hedgerows can either be maintained or not maintained (A14). Grassland 
can be divided into grassland with and without damages from hedgerows (A15). 
Maize land can be divided into maize land with and without damages (A16). 
The total amount of  land with damages can be calculated as equal to a share of  
the land used by maintained hedgerows (A17). The total amount of  maintained 
hedgerows cannot exceed the initial amount of  hedgerows (A18). 
In our model we translate the amount of  maintained hedgerows for the small 
scale, medium scale and large scale types of  biodiversity in a biodiversity score. 
The basis for calculating this score is to compare the amount of  maintained 
hedgerows in the model with the maximum amount of  hedgerows that could be 
maintained. For the small scale biodiversity type we consider for each parcel the 
amount of  hedgerows that is maintained on the parcel and its direct neighbours. 
For the medium scale biodiversity type we compare the amount of  hedgerows that 
are maintained on the own parcels of  the farm plus the amount of  hedgerows 
that are maintained on the neighbouring parcels of  the farm. For the large scale 
biodiversity we compare the amount of  hedgerows that are maintained in the total 
region. We use the information on the parcels of  the individual farms to create 
an artificial region. We calculate for each parcel the probability that it neighbours 
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parcel h of  farm i in the sample. For the parcels h of  farm i this probability is 
either 1 or 0 as we now their exact location. For the parcels of  the other farms we 
calculate the probability by determining the number of  potential neighbours. We 
then use the probabilities to calculate an average expected amount of  hedgerows 
maintained on each parcel and its direct neighbours by multiplying the prob-
ability that parcel A neighbours parcel h with the amount of  hedgerows on each 
potentially neighbouring parcel and add the hedgerows maintained on the parcel 
itself  (A19). We multiply the probability that parcel C neighbours farm i with the 
amount of  hedgerows on each potentially neighbouring parcel of  farm i and add 
the hedgerows maintained on farm i itself  to calculate the expected amount of  
hedgerows on the farm and its neighbouring parcels (A20). Using these expected 
amounts of  hedgerows we can calculate the biodiversity scores for small scale, 
medium scale and large scale biodiversity. We calculate the biodiversity scores by 
a logistic function, and the score depends on the ratio of  maintained hedgerows 
and the maximum amount of  hedgerows that could be maintained for that type 
of  biodiversity (A21, A22, and A23). 
Of  course, the sum of  the hedgerows maintained on each of  the parcels of  the 
farmer is equal to the total amount of  hedgerows maintained by the farmer (A24). 
The amount of  maintained hedgerows on each parcel cannot exceed the amount 
of  hedgerows on that parcel (A25).
The number of  cows, number of  young cattle younger than 1 year, number of  
young cattle older than 1 year, the amount of  feed purchased, the phosphate sur-
plus, the m2 of  maize, the m2 of  hedgerows maintained and not maintained, the 
m2 of  grass, the m2 of  grass without damages, the m2 of  grass with damages, the 
m2 of  maize without damages, the m2 of  maize with damages, the total amount of  
land used in production, the number of  old cows sold, the number of  new cows 
on farm and the number of  new cows bought cannot be negative (A26). 
Cows produce manure, which contains minerals. To prevent environmental 
damages due to a surplus of  these minerals used on land, the EU formulated 
regulations that place a limit on the amount of  minerals from manure that can 
be placed on land. The Dutch farmers and government have successfully argued 
that it is safe to put a bit more of  these minerals on the Dutch soil type. This has 
resulted in an EU agreement called derogation, which allows for applying more 
minerals on land if  a farm has at least 80 percent grassland. In order to be viable for 
derogation the farms in our model have to maintain at least 80 percent grassland 
(A27). The number of  young cattle younger than 1 year and young cattle older 
than 1 year are estimated by taking a share of  the number of  cows, where the 
share taken was determined in the farmer interviews and differs for each farmer 
(A28 and A29). The number of  cows cannot exceed the initial number of  cows 
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(A30). The number of  cows sold is larger than or equal to the number of  cows 
that is too old for production (A31). The number of  new cows on farm equals 
the number of  new cows coming from young cattle and the number of  new cows 
bought (A32). The number of  cows on the farm is the result of  the initial number 
of  cows, minus the cows sold plus the new cows (A33). In order for the farm to 
survive the farmer has to reach a certain subsistence income (A34). 
To model the collective AES system the price paid for maintaining hedgerows 
depends on biodiversity achieved in the previous time step (A35).
APPenDIx 4b.   SenSITIvITy AnALySIS
Sensitivity analysis labour
During the interviews, farmers found it difficult to indicate the amount of  labour 
needed to maintain hedgerows. The estimates given covered a wide range. An 
estimation of  0.2 hours per 10 m2 per year seemed reasonable to us given the 
farmers estimates, but we performed a sensitivity analysis to provide insight in 
the effect of  using different amounts of  labour needed in the model. One would 
expect that when the labour needed for maintenance of  hedgerows is increased 
sufficiently, the farmer will stop maintaining his/her hedgerows. At some point 
it will either be too expensive to hire additional labour, or the negative effect 
of  using hired labour on the farmer’s utility will become too large. Figure 4B.1. 
shows the number of  farmers in the AES for different amounts of  labour needed 
to maintain hedgerows and Figure 4B.2. shows the overall biodiversity score for 
different amounts of  labour needed to maintain hedgerows.
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Appendix 4B. Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis labour 
During the interviews, farmers found it difficult to indicate the am unt f labour needed to 
maintain hedgerows. The estimates given covered a wide range. An estimation of 0.2 hours 
per 10 m2 per year seemed reasonable to us given the farmers estimates, but we performed a 
sensitivity analysis to provide insight in the effect of using different amounts of labour needed 
in the model. One would expect that when the labour needed for maintenance of hedgerows is 
increased sufficiently, the farmer will stop maintai ing his/her hedgerows. At some point it 
will either be too expensive to hire additional labour, or the negative effect of using hired 
labour on the farmer’s utility will become too large. Figure 4B.1. shows the number of 
farmers in the AES for different amounts of labour needed to maintain hedgerows and Figure 
4B.2. shows the overall bio iversity score for different amounts of labou  needed to maintain 
hedgerows. 
  
Figure 4B.1. Farmers in AES at the end of the model run for different amounts of labour needed for 
maintenance of hedgerows 
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Figure 4B.1. Farmers in AES at the end of the model run for different amounts of labour 
needed for maintenance of hedgerows
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Figure 4B.2. Overall biodiversity score at the end of the model run for different amounts of labour needed 
for maintenance of hedgerows 
When we ran the model for different amounts of labour required we found no stable solution 
for the biodiversity score in the labour range 0.3-0.7 hours per 10 m2, because farmers kept 
changing their actions in response to each other’s actions. However, the number of farmers 
participating in this labour range stayed constant over the different time steps, and the 
difference in biodiversity score between the final time steps was very small. If no labour 
would be needed to maintain hedgerows all farmers would participate in the AES and the 
maximum biodiversity score would be reached. The amount of labour needed does not 
influence the number of farmers that maintains hedgerows in the range 0.1-0.7 hours per 10 
m2. If the amount of labour required reaches 0.8 hours per 10 m2 a tipping point is reached 
and the number of farmers that maintains hedgerows suddenly goes down to three. Even 
though the number of farmers is constant in the range 0.1-0.7 hours per 10 m2 the overall 
biodiversity score decreases gradually in this range until it also reaches the tipping point at 0.8 
hours per 10 m2 and the overall biodiversity score drops sharply. At this point the negative 
effect of using extra labour on the utility of the farmer outweighs the positive effect of having 
a higher biodiversity on the utility of the farmer. In terms of farmer participation in the AES 
there is no difference between the baseline scenario and the collective AES system, but in 
terms of overall biodiversity score the collective system performs slightly worse when no 
AES payment is available. If no payment is available, there will not only be a negative effect 
on utility through using more hired labour when maintaining hedgerows, but also on profit 
since the costs made for maintaining hedgerows will not be compensated.  
Figure 4B.3. and Figure 4B.4. show the biodiversity scores for the different biodiversity types 
in both the baseline scenario and the collective system.  
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Figure 4B.2. Overall biodiversity score at the end of the model run for different amounts 
of labour needed for maintenance of hedgerows
When we ran the odel for different amounts of  labour required we found no 
stable solution for the biodiversity score in the labour range 0.3-0.7 hours per 
10 m2, because farmers kept changing their actions in response to each other’s 
actions. However, th  number of  farmers participating in this labour range stayed
constant over the different time steps, and the difference in biodiversity score 
between the final time steps was very small. If  no labour would be needed to 
maintain hedgerows all fa mers would participate in the AES and the maximum 
biodiversity score would be reached. The amount of  labour needed does not 
influence the number of  farmers that maintains hedgerows in the range 0.1-0.7 
hours per 10 2. If  the amount of  labour required reaches 0.8 hours per 10 m2 
a tipping poi t is reached and the number o  farmers that maintains h dger ws 
suddenly goes down to three. Even though the number of  farmers is constant in 
the range 0.1-0.7 hours per 10 m2 the overall biodiversity score decreases gradu-
ally in this ra ge until it also re ch s the tipping point at 0.8 hours per 10 m2 
and the overall biodiversity score drops sharply. At this point the negative effect 
of  using extra labour on the utility of  the farmer outweighs the positive effect 
of  having a higher biodiversity on the utility of  the farmer. In terms of  farmer 
participation in the AES there is no difference b tween the baseline scenario and 
the collective AES system, but in terms of  overall biodiversity score the collective 
system performs slightly worse when no AES payment is available. If  no payment 
is available, there will not only be a negative effect on utility through using more 
hired labour when maintaining hedgerows, but also on profit since the costs made 
for maintaining hedgerows will not be compensated. 
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Figure 4B.3. and Figure 4B.4. show the biodiversity scores for the different 
biodiversity types in both the baseline scenario and the collective system. 
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Figure 4B.3. Small scale, medium scale and large scale biodiversity score at the end of the model run in 
the baseline scenario 
 
 
Figure 4B.4. Small scale, medium scale scale and large scale biodiversity score at the end of the model run 
in the collective AES system 
Sensitivity analysis maintenance price 
The AES payment for maintaining hedgerows is 0.3 euro per m2. For this payment six farmers 
are willing to maintain their hedgerows. To see how farmers respond to a changing 
compensation we perform a sensitivity analysis. Figure 4B.5. shows the number of farmers in 
the AES for different maintenance payments and Figure 4B.6. shows the overall biodiversity 
score for different maintenance payments.  
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Figure 4B.3. Small scale, medium scale and large scale biodiversity score at the end of the 
model run in the baseline scenario
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Figure 4B.3. Small scale, medium scale and large scale biodiversity score at the end of the model run in 
the baseline scenario 
 
 
Figure 4B.4. Small scale, medium scale scale and large scale biodiversity score at the end of the model run 
in the collective AES system 
Sensitivity analysis maintenance price 
The AES payment for maintaining hedgerows is 0.3 euro per m2. For this payment six farmers 
are willing to maintain their hedgerows. To see how farmers respond to a changing 
compensation we perform a sensitivity analysis. Figure 4B.5. shows the number of farmers in 
the AES for different maintenance payments and Figure 4B.6. shows the overall biodiversity 
score for different maintenance payments.  
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Figure 4B.4. Small scale, medium scale scale and large scale biodiversity score at the end 
of the model run in the collective AeS system
Sensitivity analysis maintenance price
The AES payment for maintaining hedgerows is 0.3 euro per m2. For this payment 
six farmers are willing to maintain their hedgerows. To see how farmers respond 
to a changing compensation we perform a sensitivity analysis. Figure 4B.5. shows 
the number of  farmers in the AES for different maintenance payments and Fig-
ure 4B.6. shows the overall biodiversity score for different maintenance payments. 
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Figure 4B.5. Farmers in the AES at the end of the model run for different maintenance payments  
  
Figure 4B.6. Overall biodiversity score at the end of the model run for different maintenance payments  
Our sensitivity analysis shows that six farmers are willing to maintain hedgerows even if they 
do not receive a payment at all. A maintenance payment below 0.3 euro per m2 results only in 
a slightly lower amount of hedgerows that are maintained. If we increase the payment for 
maintaining hedgerows, the amount of farmers maintaining hedgerows remains stable in the 
range 0-0.8 euro per m2. If the price is 0.9 euro per m2 the number of farmers maintaining 
hedgerows increases to eight. If we increase the price to 1 euro per m2 all farmers will choose 
to maintain their hedgerows and the maximum biodiversity score will be achieved. This 
suggests that there is a possibility to differentiate payments, shifting payments for the farmers 
that attach a high utility to biodiversity to the farmers that do not attach (a high) utility to 
biodiversity for maintaining hedgerows.  
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Figure 4B.5. Farmers in the AES at the end of the model run for different maintenance 
payments 
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Figure 4B.6. Overall biodiversity score at the end of the model run for different mainte-
nance payments 
Our sensitivity analysis shows that six farmers are willi g to maintain hedgerows 
even if  th y do not receive a payment a  ll. A aintena ce paym nt below 0.3 
euro per m2 results only in a slightly lower amount of  hedgerows that are main-
tained. If  we increase the payment for maintaining hedgerows, the amount of  
farmers i tainin  r ws rema ns stable in the range 0-0.8 euro p r m2. 
If  the price is 0.9 euro per m2 the number of  farmers maintaining hedgerows 
increases to eight. If  we increase the price to 1 euro per m2 all farmers will choose 
to maintain their hedgerows and the maximum biodiversity score will be achieved. 
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This suggests that there is a possibility to differentiate payments, shifting pay-
ments for the farmers that attach a high utility to biodiversity to the farmers that 
do not attach (a high) utility to biodiversity for maintaining hedgerows. 
Sensitivity analysis milk prices
The milk price in our model is the expected average milk price until 2026, which is 
equal to € 34.50 per 100 kg milk. However, milk prices vary over time. Therefore, 
we analysed the effect of  a 10 and 25 percent increase or decrease of  the milk 
price on the biodiversity score. If  we run the scenario with a 10 percent lower 
milk price there are six farmers in the AES, and a small scale biodiversity score of  
0.745, a medium scale biodiversity score of  0.887, a large scale biodiversity score 
of  0.986 and an overall biodiversity score of  0.872 is reached. These biodiversity 
scores are slightly higher than in the baseline scenario. Lowering the milk price 
with 25 percent does not increase the biodiversity score further. Apparently, if  the 
milk price goes down, spending more time on maintaining hedgerows becomes 
a more attractive option, but this effect is limited. If  the milk price increases by 
10 percent there are six farmers in the AES and a small scale biodiversity score 
of  0.740, a medium scale biodiversity score of  0.860, a large scale biodiversity 
score of  0.979 and an overall biodiversity score of  0.860 is reached. These bio-
diversity scores are slightly lower than in the baseline scenario. If  the milk price 
increases with 25 percent there are six farmers in the AES and a small scale 
biodiversity score of  0.737, a medium scale biodiversity score of  0.845, a large 
scale biodiversity score of  0.974 and an overall biodiversity score of  0.852 is 
reached. Apparently, if  the milk price goes up, spending less time on maintaining 
hedgerows becomes a more attractive option. Since the overall biodiversity score 
is above the threshold there is no difference between the results in the individual 
and collective AES system. 
Differentiated payments
A larger number of  farmers can be convinced to participate in the AES if  we dif-
ferentiate payments. In this model experiment we first asked what the minimum 
payment needed to be for each farmer to be in the AES. The lowest compensa-
tion for each farmer to be in the AES is zero for six farmers, 0.9 euro per m2 for 
two farmers and one euro per m2 for one farmer. The total compensation paid 
for maintaining hedgerows would then be 11954 euro. A small scale biodiversity 
score of  0.955, a medium scale biodiversity score of  0.999, a large scale biodiver-
sity score of  0.909 and an overall biodiversity score of  0.954 will be reached. This 
is an improvement compared to the situation without differentiated payments, as 
in the baseline scenario in total 20559 euro is paid for maintaining the hedgerows 
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which results in a biodiversity score of  0.867. The second question in this sce-
nario was what the minimum payment needed to be for each farmer to reach the 
maximum biodiversity score. To ensure the maximum biodiversity score at the 
lowest cost we should pay one farmer no maintenance price, one farmer 0.3 euro 
per m2, one farmer 0.4 euro per m2, one farmer 0.5 euro per m2, one farmer 0.7 
euro per m2, three farmers 0.9 euro per m2 and one farmer 1 euro per m2. The 
total amount paid for maintaining hedgerows is then 39009 euro.

Chapter 5
Effects of changing social influence on participation and 
biodiversity in agri-environmental schemes 
in the netherlands4
4 Paper by Groeneveld, A.N., Peerlings, J.H.M., Bakker, M.M., and Heijman, W.J.M. Submitted to a peer-
reviewed journal.
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AbSTRACT
The Dutch government expects that the recently introduced collective ap-
plication system for agri-environmental schemes (AES) will create a broader 
social support for AES since farmers no longer deal with a large and anony-
mous government but with the farmer collective in their region. The goal 
of  this paper is to analyse whether a change in social influence due to the 
introduction of  the collective AES programme results in a shift towards 
increased farmer participation and a higher level of  biodiversity. To answer 
the research question, we use data from a small sample of  farmers in the area 
of  the Noordelijke Friese Wouden in the Netherlands. The data are used as 
input for a model that captures individual and collective farm behaviour and 
includes biodiversity and social influence. Our results show that the introduc-
tion of  the collective AES programme in combination with social influence 
does not necessarily improve AES participation or biodiversity. Apparently, 
it is important to create the correct kind of  social influence if  biodiversity is 
to be increased.
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5.1. iNTrODuCTiON
To protect the environment from the negative effects of  intensive agricultural 
practices, payments in the form of  agri-environmental schemes (AES or AECS) 
have been offered to European farmers that adjust their farming practices (van 
Dijk et al., 2015; Kleijn & Sutherland, 2003). However, due to insufficient farmer 
participation, the effects of  these AES have been unsatisfactory (Kuhfuss et al., 
2016; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; McKenzie et al., 2013; Whittingham, 2007). In an 
effort to improve the AES programme the 2014 EU Rural Development Regula-
tion (Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013, Article 28) was developed. This regulation 
introduced the option of  group applications for AES, while maintaining the 
possibility to apply on an individual basis as well. In 2016 the Dutch government 
introduced even stricter regulations, by exclusively allowing for joint applications 
by farmer collectives (Ministry of  Economic Affairs, 2016).
The Dutch government expects that the collective AES programme will result 
in more effective nature conservation and lower implementation costs (Ministry 
of  Economic Affairs, 2016). The expected increase in biodiversity should result 
from an improved selection of  potential conservation areas and larger farmer 
participation due to increased social support. The government assumes that the 
collective structure will create a broader social support for AES since farmers no 
longer deal with a large and anonymous government but with the farmer collective 
in their region (Portaal Natuur en Landschap, 2017; Stichting Collectief  Agrarisch 
Natuurbeheer, 2016). Due to an increase in collaboration within the farmer col-
lective farmers might increase their social interaction and a stronger “feeling of  
belonging” might develop (Prager, 2015). During member events of  the farmer 
collective farmers will be able to interact and have the possibility to encourage 
each other to participate in nature conservation (Nieuwenhuizen et al., 2014). In 
other words, an increase in social influence on the decision to participate in the 
AES is expected in the collective, more than in the individual AES programme. 
Scientific literature, including social-psychological models such as the theory 
of  planned behaviour (Ajzen,1991; Lalani et al., 2016) and the value-belief-norm 
theory (López-Mosquera & Sánchez, 2012) stresses that farmers rarely make 
isolated decisions, as they are (socially) influenced by others. Social influence or 
peer pressure reflects the wish to conform to the opinions of  the group and can 
persuade people to change their behaviour (van Dijk et al., 2015; Vargas et al., 
2016). Research by Josefsson et al. (2017) indeed showed that perceived social 
pressure can motivate farmers to participate in nature conservation. Not everyone 
is equally sensitive to social influence; people with extreme opinions are thought 
to be less likely to change their opinions in order to comply with the group (Sun 
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& Müller, 2013). Furthermore, in society there are some people that will have a 
larger social influence on the opinions of  others; these people are referred to as 
opinion leaders (Chen et al., 2016b). In general, people are more likely to comply 
with others that are socio-culturally closer (Estrada & Vargas-Estrada, 2013) and 
from their own network or “in-group” (Leach et al., 2008). 
This interconnectedness of  farmers is reflected in the complex character of  
the land use system. Land use systems are coupled human environment systems 
that exhibit feedbacks between different scale levels and subsystems and interac-
tions between land users (Mitchell et al., 2015; Schouten et al., 2013; Verburg, 
2006). For instance, a feedback might exist between the biodiversity level and the 
individual farmer decisions. Biodiversity in the region is the combined result of  
the individual nature conservation decisions of  farmers. On the other hand, the 
effect of  individual nature conservation decisions might depend on the overall 
biodiversity level in the region. An example of  interactions between land users 
can be observed in the collective AES programme, where farmers interact within 
the farmer collective. The stronger presence of  social influence caused by the 
increased farmer interactions is an important distinction from the individual AES 
programme. 
The goal of  this paper is to analyse whether an increase in social influence due to 
the introduction of  the collective AES programme could result in a shift towards 
increased farmer participation and a higher level of  biodiversity. Here we assume 
a priori that the increase in social influence as expected by the Dutch government 
indeed takes place. To answer the research question we use data from a small 
sample of  farmers in the Noordelijke Friese Wouden, an area in the North of  the 
Netherlands. The data are used as input for a model that captures individual and 
collective farm behaviour and includes biodiversity and social influence. Within 
our model farmers maximize their utility and are linked to other farmers through 
the mutual effect of  all farmers on biodiversity and through social influence. Util-
ity maximization takes place in the multi-objective mathematical programming 
part of  our model (Calker et al., 2006). The increased social influence is captured 
in the opinion dynamics part of  the model, where the weights of  the farmer 
objectives are socially influenced and three scenarios capture different types of  
social influence. In section 2 we discuss the modelling framework.  In section 3 
the study area is introduced, while we describe the method and data in section 
4.  Section 5 introduces the model equations and section 6 outlines the scenarios 
capturing three types of  social influence.  The results are presented in section 7. 
Finally, we conclude and discuss in section 8. 
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5.2. MODElliNg FrAMEWOrK
The landscape in our model exists of  parcels that belong to individual farmers, 
who can be infl uenced by the (wider) farming community. Although each farmer 
makes an individual decision on nature conservation decisions on his/her land, 
(s)he is affected by the surrounding environment as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1. Modelling framework
The value farmers attach to different farming objectives is captured by farmer 
opinions. The farmer opinions are socially infl uenced by the opinions of  other 
farmers (arrow 1). The decisions of  the individual farmer depend on the values 
the farmer attaches to different farming objectives (arrow 2). The individual 
farmer decisions determine nature conservation decisions which have an impact 
on the overall biodiversity in the region (arrow 3). The overall biodiversity in the 
region in turn infl uences the individual farmer decisions (arrow 4). 
5.3. STuDy ArEA
In the northern Dutch province of  Friesland there is a 25,000 ha rural area 
referred to as the Noordelijke Friese Wouden (NFW). The farmers in this area 
are mostly dairy farmers, and the area is well-known for its typical hedgerow 
landscape consisting of  alder belts and wooded banks that divide the farming 
parcels (Oosterveld, 2013; van der Ploeg, Strijker & Hoofwijk, 2010). The quality 
of  the hedgerow landscape is dependent on the maintenance performed by farm-
ers, which impacts the biodiversity level in the region (De Boer, 2003; Besnard 
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& Secondi, 2014). To compensate farmers for the costs of  maintaining these 
hedgerows AES payments are available. Within the NFW a farmer collective ex-
ists that promotes and organizes landscape and nature conservation. If  farmers 
want to apply for the collective AES programme they have to become a member 
of  this collective. The collective contains about 800 members and is tasked with 
the organization and implementation of  the AES. The farmer collective organizes 
meetings and working groups and sends around newsletters and updates. A com-
mission formed by members of  the farmer collective assesses whether farmers 
are performing adequate maintenance of  landscape elements (Noordelijke Friese 
Wouden, 2017). 
5.4. METhOD AND DATA
5.4.1 Model procedure
We develop a hybrid modelling framework that integrates a multi-objective math-
ematical programming model containing biodiversity feedbacks and an opinion 
dynamics model. The model procedure and the input and output for each model 
part are shown in Figure 5.2. 
Farmers can have multiple farming objectives, such as profit maximization, 
risk minimization, labour minimization, and biodiversity maximization. Since the 
weights a farmer attaches to these objectives differ from one farmer to another, 
individual farmer decisions differ as well. The initial weights for these objectives 
are determined by the technique described by Manos et al. (2009) in the next 
section (model part 1). Next, the effect of  social influence (arrow 1 in Figure 
5.1.) is incorporated in the calculated weights in model part 2. If  a farmer is not 
affected by the increase in social influence, the weights in model part 1 and model 
part 2 are the same; if  a farmer is affected, the weights change. The final weights 
are added into the utility functions of  the individual farmers, which form the 
objectives of  the mathematical programming models of  the individual farmers 
in model part 3. In the mathematical models the feedback from the overall biodi-
versity level is included (arrow 4 in Figure 5.1.). The mathematical programming 
models run for 10 time steps, each farmer takes the overall biodiversity in the 
previous time step as given when determining his/her farming decisions. Within 
the mathematical programming models biodiversity scores are calculated and the 
total farmer participation is determined. Each of  the model parts is described 
below. The set of  equations that form the model are presented in section 5.
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Figure 5.2. Model procedure 
Model part 1: determining farmer objectives and calculating weights 
The weights for the farmer objectives are determined in three steps using the 
method of  Manos et al. (2009). Following Manos et al. (2009) we fi rst defi ne 
the set of  objectives that are most important to farmers in their decision mak-
ing. These objectives were elicited by asking the farmers in our sample about 
their objectives and can be grouped into the categories of  profi t maximization, 
labour minimization, risk minimization and biodiversity maximization. Second, 
we obtain the pay-off  matrix for the objectives. In the payoff  matrix the levels of  
each objective that will be achieved when optimizing each objective are compared 
to the actual levels of  the objectives as observed on the farm. In the fi nal step 
the weights that represent the farmers’ preferences are determined using the 
information in the pay-off  matrix. We choose the weights in such a way that 
the deviations between the model outcomes and actually observed amounts of  
each objective are minimized. The mathematical expression of  this minimization 
can be found in appendix A. If  a farmer does not care about an objective, the 
weight we fi nd for this objective will be zero. A more elaborate description of  the 
method including the equations used in determining the weights can be found in 
appendix A. 
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Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model
With an Opinion Dynamics Model (ODM) it is possible to describe social in-
fluence. Social influence captures the effect of  peer pressure or peer influence. 
Within ODM opinions develop during a diffusion process in which members of  a 
social system interact (Ligtenberg & Bregt, 2014).  People take the judgments and 
actions of  people around them into account and their own expressed opinions or 
behaviours might change accordingly (Huang, Tzou & Sun, 2011). In an ODM 
an opinion is represented by a number. The model can be discrete, in which 
case the number is taken from a limited integer set, or continuous in which case 
the number is taken from a continuous real set between zero and one (Huang, 
Tzou & Sun, 2011). Examples of  discrete opinion dynamics models can be found 
in Crokidakis and Forgerini (2010), Galam (2002) and Galam (2003), Javarone 
(2014), and Sood and Redner (2005). Examples of  continuous opinion dynamics 
models can be found in Hegselmann and Krause (2002), Deffuant et al. (2002), 
and Weisbuch, Deffuant and Amblard (2005). Our model is based on the continu-
ous model developed by Sun and Müller (2013). In this model each person starts 
with an initial opinion, which is influenced by interactions with other persons. 
Whether or not someone chooses to adjust his/her opinion depends on the dif-
ference between the own opinion and the opinion of  the person with which the 
interaction takes place (Sun & Müller, 2013). The amount by which someone 
adjusts his/her opinion depends on how strong the social influence is. In our 
research we consider the weights that farmers assign to different objectives as 
opinions. When a farmer interacts with another farmer or group of  farmers, his/
her opinion on the importance of  the farmer objectives might be influenced. In 
this paper we consider three types of  social influence, which are described in 
more detail in the scenarios in section 6. The procedure of  the collective is to 
discuss the possibility of  the AES with all farmers in the region. Therefore, we 
assume that social influence is applied to all farmers, irrespective of  whether they 
are in the AES.
Model part 3: Mathematical programming models 
The individual farmer decisions are captured by multi-objective mathemati-
cal programming models as described in Groeneveld et al. (2017). The models 
describe a dairy farm which converts inputs like cows, feed, land, and labour 
into outputs such as milk, meat, manure, and hedgerows. The model includes 
hedgerows that are located on the farm parcels and can be (partly) maintained 
in return for AES payments. Properly maintaining hedgerows is labour intensive 
and reduces roughage production due to shade but will have a positive effect on 
farm income and the biodiversity level in the region. We assume that the loss in 
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production and the maintenance costs are negligible when the farmer does not 
maintain hedgerows. Hedgerows can either be maintained or not maintained, but 
it is not possible to increase the amount of  hedgerows on the farm. We choose to 
apply this assumption because farmers specified an unwillingness to plant more 
trees during the farm interviews. Profit is defined as the revenue from milk, cows, 
and AES payments minus the costs associated with farming and maintaining 
hedgerows. The amount of  labour used on farm equals the sum of  the amount of  
labour needed for each farm task. The variance in milk prices is used to capture 
risk (see e.g. Berentsen, Kovacs & van Asseldonk, 2012; Kaiser & Messer, 2011; 
Schmit, Boisvert & Tauer, 2001). AES payments are agreed on for a period of  
6 years, therefore once the contract is signed there is no price risk. We make 
the assumption that any farmer that maintains his/her hedgerows is in the AES 
scheme. 
A biodiversity score, based on three indicator species with different key areas 
(area needed to maintain a sustainable population of  the species) is used to cap-
ture biodiversity in our models. Biodiversity scores for an indicator species with 
a small, medium and large scale key area are calculated using a logistic function. 
This function contains the ratio of  maintained to total amount of  hedgerows in 
the key area. If  the ratio is low the biodiversity score is close to zero, if  the ratio 
is high the biodiversity score is close to one. To find the overall biodiversity score 
we take the average of  the small, medium and large scale biodiversity scores as 
described in Groeneveld et al. (2017). More information on the indicator species 
and the biodiversity score calculations can be found in appendix B. 
5.4.2  Data
Available data
General farm data was taken from RVO (2010), Wageningen UR (2015), Blanken 
et al. (2016), Meetjesland (2016) and Remmelink et al. (2016). Information was 
collected on: costs of  feed bought; costs of  removing a possible phosphate sur-
plus; costs of  maintaining cattle; amount of  feed produced on grassland; amount 
of  feed produced on maize land; limits for phosphate application on grassland 
and maize land; milk price; labour costs; percentage cows to be replaced; price of  
new cows; price of  slaughter cows; variance of  the milk price; feed requirements 
per cow, cattle younger than one year and cattle between one and two years; 
phosphate content of  grass, maize, feed bought, bound in milk, bound in carrying 
cows and bound in young cattle; labour hours needed for cultivating maize or 
grass; costs of  cultivating silage maize and grass.
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Data collection
We interviewed nine farmers in the NFW, whose details were provided by the 
farmer collective. Not all of  these farmers were involved in the AES scheme for 
maintaining hedgerows, but all farmers had hedgerows separating their farming 
parcels. During each interview we asked the farmer to define his/her farming ob-
jectives. We brought a map of  each farm and asked the farmer to indicate which 
parcels belonged to his/her farm, what was grown on these parcels, the amount 
and maintenance of  hedgerows on the parcels, and the location of  hedgerows on 
the parcels. Furthermore, we asked about the type of  farm, whether or not the 
farm was certified as organic, the number of  cows and young cattle, the amount 
of  milk produced on the farm, the amount of  land, the different crops, and the 
labour hours worked on farm. One farmer was now out of  business and no 
longer kept cows, but he still owned and maintained his land as he had before. 
In the model we assume this farmer has the average milk production and average 
number of  cows in the region. Table 5.1. shows for each farmer the number of  
parcels, the amount of  hedgerows on the farm, the amount of  hedgerows that are 
maintained on the farm, the total income of  the farmer and the AES payments 
the farmer receives. 
Table 5.1. Data farmers (groeneveld et al., 2017)
Farmer Number of 
parcels
Total m2 
hedgerows
M2 
hedgerows 
maintained
Modelled 
income 
farmer 
in euro
Total 
payments 
received in 
euro
Share of 
payments 
in income
1 15 2335 0 82676 0 0
2 92 33152 33152 228710 9946 0.04
3 7 1988 784 96289 235 0.00
4 22 7517 7517 98022 2255 0.02
5 25 12920 12920 156870 3876 0.02
6 21 10273 0 60060 0 0.00
7 14 5086 0 89732 0 0.00
8 38 800 0 205687 0 0.00
9 54 7917 7273 66800 2182 0.03
total 288 81988 61646 1084846 18494 0.02
The total income of  the farmer is calculated by the model as income of  all 
family members working at the farm, which explains why the incomes mentioned 
are relatively high. 
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The number of  farmers in our sample is small, but with the number of  parcels 
belonging to these farmers (288) making a spatial configuration already quite 
intricate. Our goal is not statistical significance, but to explore the impact of  
the change in social influence due to the introduction of  the collective AES 
programme.  For this purpose the sample size for the mathematical programming 
part of  the model (part 3) is sufficient. For the opinion dynamics part of  the 
model (part 2) the number of  farmers that interact is small. Therefore, we create 
artificially additional farmers which represent the wider farming community with 
which the farmers in our sample interact in the opinion dynamics part of  the 
model, as described in the section on creating additional farmer interactions.  
Creating an artificial landscape  
As described in Groeneveld et al. (2017) the farmers we interviewed did not own 
a contiguous area, which we needed for our simulations. Therefore, we created 
an artificial landscape out of  the 288 parcels belonging to these nine farmers. We 
only have information on the neighbour of  a parcel if  this neighbour belongs to 
the same farmer, since we know how parcels belonging to the same farmer are 
located relative to each other. A specific spatial configuration of  all the parcels 
in the region cannot be expected, therefore we specified for each parcel k the 
probability that it neighboured parcel j of  farm i in the sample. If  two parcels 
belong to the same farmer we know whether or not they are neighbours and the 
probability is either 1 or 0. If  two parcels belong to different farms we calculate 
the probability by looking at the number of  potential neighbours. For instance, 
assume a parcel of  farm 1 has two unknown neighbours and a parcel of  farm 
2 has three unknown neighbours. The parcel of  farm 2 could then be situated 
on any of  the two unknown sides of  the parcel of  farm 1, with any of  its three 
unknown sides. If  there are 100 options to add an unknown neighbour that does 
not belong to farm 1, the probability of  the parcel of  farm 2 to be situated next 
to farm 1 is 
130 
 
Creating an artificial landscape   
As described in Groeneveld t al. (2017) the farmers we i terviewed did not own a contiguous 
area, which we needed for our simulations. Therefore, we created an artificial landscape out 
of the 288 parcels belonging to these nine farmers. We only have information on the 
neighbour of a parcel if this neighbour belongs to the same farmer, since we know how 
parcels belonging to the same farmer are located relative to each other. A specific spatial 
configuration of all the parcels in the region cannot be expected, therefore we specified for 
each parcel k the probability that it neighboured parcel j of farm i in the sample. If two parcels 
belong to the same farmer we know whether or not they are neighbours and the probability is 
either 1 or 0. If two parcels belong to different farms we calculate the probability by looking 
at the umber of potential neighbou s. For instance, assume a parcel of farm 1 has two 
unknown neighbours and a parcel of farm 2 has three unknown neighbours. The parcel of 
farm 2 could then be situated on any of the two unknown sides of the parcel of farm 1, with 
any of its three unknown sides. If there are 100 options to add an unknown neighbour that 
does not belong to farm 1, the probability of the parcel of farm 2 to be situated next to farm 1 
is 1
100
×2×3= 6100. These probabilities are then multiplied with the amount of hedgerows 
maintained on each potential neighbour, thereby determining the expected amount of 
maintained hedgerows. This expected amount of maintained hedgerows is an average amount 
of maintained hedgerows on all possible neighbours, thereby diminishing the impact of 
maintaining a hedgerow on a specific parcel (Groeneveld et al., 2017).  
Mimicking interactions with the wider farm community 
Generally, an ODM would be run on a large group of farmers. In each time step a farmer 
randomly interacts with one of the other farmers in the farming community. If the difference 
in opinion between the two farmers is sufficiently small, both farmers will adjust their 
opinions. This is repeated over many time steps. Our sample is too small for such interactions, 
as farmers would quite often interact with the same farmers. To mimic interactions with the 
wider farm community we construct a normal distribution with a mean equal to the average 
biodiversity weight of our sample and a standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of 
the biodiversity weights in our sample. From this distribution we randomly draw 31 
biodiversity weights. To ensure that the weights are between zero and one, we set the weight 
to zero if the random draw is negative and to one if the random draw exceeds one. If the 
weight is already between zero and one no adjustment is made.  These biodiversity weights 
are then combined with the weights of the original farmers. These 40 weights are then used to 
mimic interaction with farmers from the wider farmer community. The interaction takes place 
during 10 time steps. In each time step each of the 40 farmers interact with a randomly chosen 
other farmer, choosing each time whether or not to changes their own weights. In this way we 
determine the socially influenced weights of the farmers in part 2 of the model (see Figure 
5.2.).  
5.5. Model  
Model part 1: Determining farmer objectives and calculating weights  
To determine the weights attached to each of these objectives, we follow the procedure as 
described by Manos et al. (2009) in which we choose the weights in such a way that we 
minimize the deviations between the observed and calculated value of each objectives. A 
more detailed description and the equations of the Manos technique can be found in appendix 
A.  
hese pro ab lities ar  then multiplied with the amount 
of  hedgerows maintained on each potential neighbour, thereby determining the 
expected amount of  maintained hedgerows. This expected amount of  maintained 
hedgerows is an average amount of  maintained hedgerows on all possible neigh-
bours, thereby diminishing the impact of  maintaining a hedgerow on a specific 
parcel (Groeneveld et al., 2017). 
Mimicking interactions with the wider farm community
Generally, an ODM would be run on a large group of  farmers. In each time step 
a farmer rando ly interacts with o e of  the other f rmers in the far ing com-
munity. If  the difference in opinion between the two farmers is sufficiently small, 
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both farmers will adjust their opinions. This is repeated over many time steps. 
Our sample is too small for such interactions, as farmers would quite often inter-
act with the same farmers. To mimic interactions with the wider farm community 
we construct a normal distribution with a mean equal to the average biodiversity 
weight of  our sample and a standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of  
the biodiversity weights in our sample. From this distribution we randomly draw 
31 biodiversity weights. To ensure that the weights are between zero and one, we 
set the weight to zero if  the random draw is negative and to one if  the random 
draw exceeds one. If  the weight is already between zero and one no adjustment 
is made.  These biodiversity weights are then combined with the weights of  the 
original farmers. These 40 weights are then used to mimic interaction with farm-
ers from the wider farmer community. The interaction takes place during 10 time 
steps. In each time step each of  the 40 farmers interact with a randomly chosen 
other farmer, choosing each time whether or not to changes their own weights. In 
this way we determine the socially influenced weights of  the farmers in part 2 of  
the model (see Figure 5.2.). 
5.5. MODEl 
Model part 1: Determining farmer objectives and calculating weights 
To determine the weights attached to each of  these objectives, we follow the 
procedure as described by Manos et al. (2009) in which we choose the weights in 
such a way that we minimize the deviations between the observed and calculated 
value of  each objectives. A more detailed description and the equations of  the 
Manos technique can be found in appendix A. 
Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model
Each farmer θ starts with an initial weight for objective n gnθ, which is continuous 
and lies between zero and one. A threshold δ (δ ε [0,1]) captures the farmers 
openness to other opinions. A convergence parameter μ (μ ε[0,1]) is defined which 
captures how strong the social influence is. A farmer s who has weight(gns(t)) for 
objective n in time step t has the following social influence on the weight for 
objective n of  farmer θ in time step t (gnθ(t)) equals: 
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Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model 
Each farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 starts with an initial weight for objective n 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃, which is continuous nd lie
between zero and one. A threshold 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1]) captures the farmers openness to other 
opinions. A convergence parameter μ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0,1]) is defined which captures how strong the 
social influence is. A farmer 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 who has weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) for objective n in time step t has the 
following social influence on the weight for objective n of farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 in time step t 
(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) equals:  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) +  𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| <  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (11) 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| ≥  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 
When we adjust the weight for biodiversity, other weights have to be adjusted as well, in 
order for the weights to add up to one. To do this, we change the other weights depending on 
their relative size. The new weight is equal to the amount the biodiversity weight changed 
multiplied by the ratio of the old weight to the sum of the old weight for profit, labour and 
risk. 
Model part 3: Mathematical programming models  
To describe the mathematical programming models we show the general modelling structure. 
A more elaborated description of the mathematical programming models can be found in 
appendix C. In our mathematical programming models the aim of each farmer is to maximize 
utility as presented in equation (2), which is optimized given the constraints described by 
equations (2a) -(2c).  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍) (2) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1   ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧   [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (2a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0            ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
Utility depends on four farmer objectives, which are profit maximization, risk minimization, 
labour minimization and biodiversity maximization. These objectives are defined in equations 
(3)-(6).  
 (1)
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When we adjust the weight for biodiversity, other weights have to be adjusted as 
well, in order for the weights to add up to one. To do this, we change the other 
weights depending on their relative size. The new weight is equal to the amount 
the biodiversity weight changed multiplied by the ratio of  the old weight to the 
sum of  the old weight for profit, labour and risk.
Model part 3: Mathematical programming models 
To describe the mathematical programming models we show the general model-
ling structure. A more elaborated description of  the mathematical programming 
models can be found in appendix C. In our mathematical programming models 
the aim of  each farmer is to maximize utility as presented in equation (2), which 
is optimized given the constraints described by equations (2a) -(2c). 
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Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model 
Each farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 starts with an initial weight for objective n 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃, which is continuous and lies 
between zero and one. A threshold 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1]) captures the farmers openness to other 
opinions. A convergence parameter μ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0,1]) is defined which captures how strong the 
social influence is. A farmer 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 who has weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) for objective n in time step t has the 
following social influence on the weight for objective n of farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 in time step t 
(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) equals:  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) +  𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| <  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (11) 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| ≥  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 
When we adjust the weight fo  biodiversity, other weights have o be adjusted as well, in 
order for the weights to add up to one. To do this, we change the other weights depending on 
their relative size. The new weight is equal to the amount the biodiversity weight changed 
multiplied by the ratio of the old weight to the sum of the old weight for profit, labour and 
risk. 
Model part 3: Mathematical programming models  
To describe th  mathematic l programming models we s ow the general modelling structure. 
A more elaborated description of the mathematical programming models can be found in 
appendix C. In our mathematical programming models the aim of each farmer is to maximize 
utility as presented in equation (2), which is optimized given the constraints described by 
equations (2a) -(2c).  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍) (2) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1   ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧   [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (2a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0            ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
Utility depends on four farmer objectives, which are profit maximization, risk minimization, 
labour minimization and biodiversity maximization. These objectives are defined in equations 
(3)-(6).  
 (2)
Subject to:
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Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model 
Each farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 starts with an initial weight for objective n 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃, which is continuous and lies 
between zero and one. A threshold 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1]) captures the farmers openness to other 
opinions. A convergence parameter μ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0,1]) is defined which captures how strong the 
social influence is. A farmer 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 who has weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) for objective n in time step t has the 
following social influence on the weight for objective n of farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 in time step t 
(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) equals:  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) +  𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| <  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (11) 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| ≥  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 
When we adjust the weight for biodiversity, other weights have to be adjusted as well, in 
order for the weights to add up to one. To do this, we change the other weights depending on 
their relative size. The new weight is equal to the amount the biodiversity weight changed 
multiplied by the ratio of the old weight t  the sum of the old weight for profit, labour and 
risk. 
Model part 3: Mathematical programming models  
To describe the mathematical programming models we show the general modelling structure. 
A more elaborated description of the mathematical programming models can be found in 
appendix C. In our mathematical programming models the aim of each far er is to aximize 
utility as presented in equation (2), which is optimized given th  co straints described by 
equations (2a) -(2c).  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍) (2) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1   ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧   [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (2a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0            ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity level z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
of a resource k; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
Utility depends on four farmer objectives, which are profit maximization, risk minimization, 
labour minimization and biodiversity maximization. These objectives are defined in equations 
(3)-(6).  
 (2a)
131 
 
Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model 
Each farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 starts with an initial weight for objective n 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃, which is continuous and lies 
between z o and one. A threshold 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1]) captures the farmers open ess to other
opinions. A co verg nce parameter μ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0,1]) is defined which captures how strong the 
social influence is. A farmer 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 who has weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) or objective n in time step  has the 
f llow g social influence on the weight for objective n of farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 in time step t
(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) equals:  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) +  𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| <  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (11) 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| ≥  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 
When we a just the weight for biodiversity, other w ights have to be adjusted as w ll, in 
ord r for the weights to add up to one. To do this,  c ange the ther weights dep ndi g on 
their relativ  size. The new weight is equal to the amount th biodiversity weight changed
multiplied by th  ratio of the old weight to the sum of the old weight for prof t, labour an  
risk. 
odel part 3: athematical programming models  
To scribe the mathematical programming odels we sho  the general modelling structure. 
A more elaborated description of the mathematica  programming models can be found in 
appendix C. In our mathematical programming models the aim of each farmer is t  maximize 
utility as presented in equation (2), which is optimiz d given the constraints described by 
equat ons (2a) -(2c).  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍) (2) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1   ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧   [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (2a) 
∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0            ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity l vel z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is th  level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
f a resource k; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
Utility depends on four farmer objectives, which are profit maximization, risk minimization, 
labour minimization and biodiversity maximization. These objectives are defined in equations 
(3)-(6).  
 (2b)
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Model part 2: Opinion Dynamics Model 
Each farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 starts with an initial weight for objective n 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃, which is continuous and lies 
betw en z ro and one. A threshold 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 ∈ [0,1]) captures the farmers open ess to other 
opinions. A co verg nce parameter μ (𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 ∈ [0,1]) is defined which captures how strong the 
social influence is. A farmer 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 who has weight 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) for objective n in time step t has the 
f llowi g social influence on the weight for objective n of farmer 𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃 in time step t 
(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) equals:  
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) +  𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇(𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| <  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 (11) 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 1) 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) if |𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)| ≥  𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 
hen we adjust the weight for biodiversity, other weights have to be adjusted as well, in 
ord r for the weights to add up o one. To do this,  c ange the ther weights dependi g on 
their relativ  size. The new weight is qual t  t  amount t  biodiv rsity w ight changed 
multiplied by th  ratio of the old weight to the sum of t e old w ight for profit, labour an  
risk. 
Model part 3: Mathematical programming models  
To describe the mathematical programming models we show the general modelling structure. 
A more elaborat d descr ption f the athe atical programming models can b  found in 
appendix C. In our mathem tical programming models the aim of ach farmer is t  maximize 
utility as present  in equati  (2), which is optimiz d iven the constraints describe  by 
equations (2a) -(2c).  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛=1 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍) (2) 
Subject to: 
∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1   ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧   [𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧] (2a) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 = 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧=1     𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2b) 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≥ 0            ∀𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 (2c) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 is utility; 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the weight attached to objective n; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) is the normalized value of 
objective n depending on activity l vel z; 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is th  level of activity z, 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total availability 
f a resource k; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of resource k demanded by activity z; 𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the shadow 
price of resource k; 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the total available quantity of resource l; 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 is the quantity of 
resource l demanded by activity z. 
Utility depends on four farmer objectives, which are profit maximization, risk minimization, 
labour minimization and biodiversity maximization. These objectives are defined in equations 
(3)-(6).  
(2c)
here:
U is utility; gn is the weight attached to objecti n; on(rz) is the normalized value 
of  objective n depending on activity l vel z; rz is the lev l f  activity z, bk is the 
total availability of  a resource k; ask is the quantity of  resource k demanded by 
activity z; πk is the shadow price of  reso rce k; dl is the total available quantity of  
resourc  l; czl is the quantity of  resource l demanded by activity z.
Utility depends on four farmer objectives, which are profit maximization, risk 
minimization, labour minimization and biodiversity aximization. These objec-
tives are defined in equations (3)-(6). 
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𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (3)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (5)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
        𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
taken by the farmer; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input prices 
respectively.  
5.6. Scenarios 
Each model run in the mathematical programming model (model part 3) contains ten time 
steps, which refer to the time needed for the farmers to react to each other’s biodiversity 
decisions in the previous time step. In each time step a farmer takes the maintenance decision 
made by the other farmer in the previous time step as given in order to calculate the effect of 
his/her own decisions on the overall biodiversity score. At the start of the model run the 
maintenance decisions of the other farmer are as specified during the interviews. The 
biodiversity feedback is included in all scenarios. In all the scenarios containing social 
influence we assume that the convergence parameter is equal to 0.5.  
No social influence scenario 
In this scenario there is no social influence. This means the weights do no change in part 2 of 
the model and the farmers maintain their original weight in the mathematical programming 
models in model part 3.  
Basic social influence scenario 
In this scenario we assume that farmers will maintain the same threshold δ and convergence 
parameter μ for the interaction with each of the other farmers in the community. We report 
 (3)
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𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (3)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (5)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
        𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the producti n process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
taken by the farmer; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and i put prices 
respectively.  
5.6. Scenarios 
Each model run in the mathematical programming model (model part 3) contains ten time 
steps, which refer to the tim  needed for the farmers to react to ach other’s biodiv rsity 
decisions in the previous time st p. In eac  time step a farmer takes the maintenance decision 
made by the other farmer in the previous time step as given in order to calculate the effect of 
his/her own decisions on the overall biodiversity score. At the start of the model run th  
maintenance decisions of the other farmer are as specified during the int rviews. The 
biodiversity fe dback is included in ll scenarios. In all the sce arios containing social 
influence we assume that the convergence p rameter is equal to 0.5.  
No social influence scenario 
In this scenario there is no social influence. This means the weights do no change in part 2 of 
the model and the farmers maintai  th ir original weight in th  mathematical programming 
models in model part 3.  
Basic social influence scenario 
In this scenario we assume that farmers will maintain the same threshold δ and convergence 
parameter μ for th  interaction with ach of the other farmers in th  c mmunity. We report 
 (4)
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𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (3)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (5)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 =  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
        𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
tit  f hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the producti n process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
t ken by the farm r; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
bi iversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology s t; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 v ctor of output and i put pric s 
respectively.  
5.6. Scenarios 
Each model run in the mathematical programming model (model part 3) contains ten time 
steps, which refer to the tim  needed for the farmers to react to ach other’s biodiv rsity 
deci ions in the previous time st p. In eac  ti e step a farmer takes the maintenance decision 
made by the other farmer in the previous time step as given in order to calculate the effect of 
his/her own decisions on the overall biodiversity score. At the start of the model run th  
aintenance decisions of the other farmer are as pecified during the int rviews. The 
biodiversity fe dback is included in ll scenarios. In all the sce arios containing social 
influence we assume that the convergence p ameter is equal to 0.5.  
No social influence scenario 
In this scenario there is no social influence. This means the weights do no change in part 2 of 
the model and the farmers mainta  th ir original weigh  in th  mathematical programming 
models in model part 3.  
Basic social influence scenario 
In this scenario we assume that farmers will maintain the same threshold δ and convergence 
parameter μ for th  interaction with ach of the other farmers in th  c mmunity. We report 
 (5) 
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𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (3)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (5)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
        𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 (6)  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
tit  f hedgerows maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labour; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the producti n process; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labo r endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
t ken by the farm r; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 varia ce milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 a ount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 overall biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small scale biodiversity s ore; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium scale 
bi iversity scor ; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodiversity score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) technology set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and variable inputs respectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 v ctor of output and i put prices 
respectively.  
5.6. Scenarios 
Each model run in the mathematical programming model (model part 3) contains ten time 
steps, which refer to the tim  needed for the farmers to react to ach other’s biodiv rsity 
deci ions in the previous time st p. In eac  ti e step a farmer takes the maintenance decision 
made by the other farmer in the previous time step as given in ord r to calculate the effect of 
his/her own decisions on the overall biodiversity score. At the start of the model run the 
aintenance decisions of t e ther farmer are as pecified during the int rviews. The 
biodiversity fe dback is included in ll scenario . In all the sce arios containing social 
influence we assume that the convergence p ameter is equal to 0.5.  
No social influence scenario 
In this scenario there is no social influence. This means the weights do no change in part 2 of 
the model and the farmers maintai  th ir original weight in th  mathematical programming 
models in model part 3.  
Basic social influence scenario 
In this scenario we assume that farmers will maintain the same threshold δ and convergence 
parameter μ for th  interaction with each of the other farmers in th  community. We report 
 (6) 
Subject to: 
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𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗=1 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + (𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜)𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) (3)  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿  (4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1
2 (5)  
4  
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
3
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏=1
3
        𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 = 1,2,3 6  
Subject to:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘,𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 > 0 
Where:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂1 profit; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 price of regular output j; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 quantity of regular output j; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 price of input m; 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 
quantity of input m; 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 AES payment hedgerows; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 cost of maintaining hedgerows; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 
quantity of hedger ws maintained; 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 costs of hired labou ; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 quantity labour used on the 
farm; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 labour required in the production pr cess; 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 initial labour endowment; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂3 risk 
taken b  the farmer; 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 risk aversion coefficient; 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1 variance milk price; 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦1 amount of milk 
produced; 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂4 ov all biod versity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 small ca e biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇2 medium cal
biodiversity score; 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇3 large scale biodivers ty score; 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇(𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙,𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) te hn logy set; 𝒚𝒚𝒚𝒚,𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙 vector 
of outputs and a iable nputs espectively; 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑,𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 vector of output and input pric s 
respectivel . 
5.6. Scenarios 
Each model run in the mathematical programming model (model part 3) contains ten time 
steps, which refer to the time needed for the farmers to react to each other’s biodiversity 
de isions in the previous ime step. In each ti e step a farmer takes the mainte ance decision 
made by the other farmer in th  pr vious ti e step as given in order to calcul te th  effect of 
his/ er w  d cisions on  overall bi div rsity score. At the st rt of t  model run the 
inte ance d cisi ns of the other farmer ar  as pecif ed du ing t e int rviews. Th  
b o iver ity f dback is included in all enar os. In all the scen ios cont i ing social 
influ nce w  assume that h  conv rgence par met r s qual t  0.5.  
No social influence scenario 
In this scenario there is no social influence. This means the weights do no change in part 2 of 
the model and the farmers maintain their original weight in the mathematical programming 
models in model part 3.  
Basic ocial influence scenario 
In this scenario we assume that farmers will maintain the same threshold δ and convergence 
parameter μ for the interaction with each of the other farmers in the community. We report 
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Where: 
O1 profit; pj price of  regular output j; vj quantity of  regular output j; wm price of  
input m; xm quantity of  input m; yo AES payment hedgerows; wo cost of  maintain-
ing hedgerows;  yo quantity of  hedgerows maintained; wL costs of  hired labour; O2 
quantity labour used on the farm;  LR labour required in the production process; LI 
initial labour endowment; O3 risk taken by the farmer; e risk aversion coefficient; 
v1 variance milk price; y1 amount of  milk produced; O4 overall biodiversity score; 
μ1 small scale biodiversity score;  μ2 medium scale biodiversity score; μ3 large scale 
biodiversity score; T(y, x, yo, L) technology set; y,x vector of  outputs and variable 
inputs respectively;  p,w vector of  output and input prices respectively. 
5.6. SCENAriOS
Each model run in the mathematical programming model (model part 3) contains 
ten time steps, which refer to the time needed for the farmers to react to each 
other’s biodiversity decisions in the previous time step. In each time step a farmer 
takes the maintenance decision made by the other farmer in the previous time step 
as given in order to calculate the effect of  his/her own decisions on the overall 
biodiversity score. At the start of  the model run the maintenance decisions of  
the other farmer are as specified during the interviews. The biodiversity feedback 
is included in all scenarios. In all the scenarios containing social influence we 
assume that the convergence parameter is equal to 0.5. 
No social influence scenario
In this scenario there is no social influence. This means the weights do no change 
in part 2 of  the model and the farmers maintain their original weight in the 
mathematical programming models in model part 3. 
Basic social influence scenario
In this scenario we assume that farmers will maintain the same threshold δ and 
convergence parameter μ for the interaction with each of  the other farmers in 
the community. We report results for a low threshold (0.25), an intermediate 
threshold (0.5) and a high threshold (0.75). If  the threshold is low, farmers will 
only adjust their opinion if  the difference in opinions is small (when they interact 
with like-minded farmers). If  the threshold is large farmers will also adjust their 
opinion if  the difference in opinions is large. 
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Follow-the-leader scenario
In this scenario the farmers care most about the opinion of  a specific farmer 
who is the opinion leader of  the group.  This specific farmer is chosen from our 
original sample, and not from the distribution that we created. In this scenario 
the farmer will maintain a threshold and convergence parameter of  0.75 for the 
opinion leader, and a threshold and convergence parameter of  0.25 for the other 
farmers. This means that the farmer is more likely to adjust his/her opinion when 
(s)he interacts with the opinion leader than with another farmer. Also, the amount 
by which the farmer adjusts his/her opinion is larger when the farmer interacts 
with the opinion leader.
Network scenario
In this scenario we consider the effect of  social influence if  it is applied through 
a network structure. Farmers care only about the opinions of  their network or 
“in-group”. Farmers that are small in terms of  the number of  cows (100 cows or 
more) form a network, as well as farmers that are large in terms of  the number 
of  cows (less than 100 cows). For farmers that are not in the in-group of  the 
farmer the threshold is set to zero, which means the farmer will not adjust his/
her opinion after interacting with someone outside his/her network. For farmers 
that are in the in-group of  the farmer we present the results if  farmers maintain 
a small (0.25), medium (0.5) or large (0.75) threshold. 
5.7. rESulTS
No social influence scenario
If  there is no social influence, five farmers are participating in the AES and the 
overall biodiversity score is 0.723. Each of  the farmers faces a trade-off  between 
contributing to biodiversity plus receiving AES payments and the labour needed 
for AES plus the decrease in roughage production. Farmers choose the optimal 
choice that results in the highest utility.
Basic social influence scenario
The average number of  farmers in the collective AES programme for different 
levels of  the threshold are shown in Figure 5.3. The threshold reflects the differ-
ence between the farmers own opinion and the opinion of  the farmer with whom 
the interaction takes place, for values below the threshold the farmer will adjust 
his/her opinion.  
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Figure 5.3. Average number of farmers in the AES programme in the basic social influence scenario over 
ten model runs at the end of time step ten for different threshold values 
If the threshold is 0.25 the change in weights is very small and the optimal choice of the 
farmer only changes a little compared to the situation without additional social influence due 
to the introduction of the collective AES programme. If the threshold is 0.5 or 0.75 on average 
one more farmer participates in the AES programme due to the additional social influence. 
Due to the change in his/her weights the optimal decision of this farmer changes, and the 
highest utility can be achieved by participating in the AES. The fact that in this scenario one 
more farmer will participate due to social influence is due to the relatively high average 
biodiversity weight in the sample on which we base the farmer interactions. Since the farmers 
are randomly assigned other farmers they interact with, the resulting number of farmers in the 
AES might differ over the different model runs. The minimum number and maximum number 
of farmers over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.3. A more 
detailed indication of the variety in the different runs is provided in appendix D.    
Figure 5.4. shows the average overall biodiversity score at the end of the model run.  
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Figure 5.3. Average number of farmers in the AES programme in the basic social influ-
ence scenario over ten model runs at the end of time step ten for different threshold val-
ues
If  the th eshold is 0.25 the change in weigh s is very small and the optimal choice 
of  the farmer only changes a little compared to the situation without additional 
social influence due to the introduction of  the collective AES programme. If  
the threshold is 0.5 or 0.75 on average one more farmer participa es in the AES 
progra me due to the additional social influence. Due to the change in his/her 
weights the optimal decision of  this farmer changes, and the highest utility can 
be achieved by participating in the AES. The fact that in this scenario one more 
farmer will participate du to social influe ce is ue to the relatively high av rage
biodiversity weight in the sample on which we base the farmer interactions. Since 
the farmers are randomly assigned other farmers they interact with, the resulting 
number of  farmers in the AES might differ over the different model runs. The 
minimum number and maximum number of  farmers over all the model runs are 
indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.3. A more detailed indication of  the 
variety in the different runs is provided in appendix D.   
Figure 5.4. shows the average overall biodiversity score at the end of  the model 
run. 
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Figure 5.4. Average overall biodiversity score in the basic social influence scenario over ten model runs at 
the end of time step ten for different threshold values 
When the threshold is 0.25 there is only a very small change in the farmers’ objective 
weights, resulting in only a slightly higher average overall biodiversity score. This slight 
increase is caused by a slight increase in maintenance of farmers that already participated in 
the AES when there was no social influence.  If the threshold is 0.5 or 0.75 the average 
overall biodiversity score is a bit higher than if there is no social influence. This increase is 
caused by the maintenance of the additional farmer that joins the AES due to social influence. 
The variation for the overall biodiversity score in the different model runs for the same 
threshold value is small, as shown by the minimum and maximum biodiversity score over all 
the model runs.   
Follow‑the‑leader scenario 
In Figure 5.5. we show the average number of farmers in the AES at the end of time step ten 
for different opinion leaders.  
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Figure 5.4. Average overall biodiversity score in the basic social influence scenario over 
ten model runs at the end of time step ten for different threshold values
When the threshold is 0.25 there is only a very small change in the farmers’ 
objective weight , resulting in only a sli tly high r average overall biodiversity 
score. This slight increase is caused by a slight increase in maintenance of  farmers 
that already participated in the AES when there was no social influence.  If  the 
threshold is 0.5 or 0.75 he average overall biodiversity score is a bit higher than 
if  there is no social influence. This increase is caused by the maintenance of  the 
additional farmer that joins the AES due to social influence. The variation for the 
overall biodiversity score in the different model runs for the same threshold value 
is small, as shown by the minimum and maximum biodiversity score over all the 
model runs.  
Follow-the-leader scenario
In Figure 5.5. we show the average number of  farmers in the AES at the end of  
time step ten for different opinion leaders. 
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Figure 5.5. Number of farmers in the AES in the follow-the-leader scenario at the end of time step ten for 
different opinion leaders  
The average number of farmers in the AES at the end of time step ten is slightly higher than in 
the baseline scenario if the opinion leader is farmer 1, 3,4,7,8 or 9. If one of the other farmers 
is the opinion leader the average number of farmers in the AES does not change compared to 
the baseline scenario. However, there is variation in between the different model runs when 
farmer 1, 3,4,7,8 or 9 is selected as opinion leader. The minimum number and maximum 
number of farmers over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.5. 
In Figure 5.6. we show the average overall biodiversity score at the end of time step ten for 
different opinion leaders.  
 
Figure 5.6. Overall biodiversity score in the follow-the-leader scenario at the end of time step ten for 
different opinion leaders 
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Figure 5.5. Number of farmers in the AES in the follow-the-leader scenario at the end of 
time step ten for differ nt opinion lead rs 
The average number of  farmers in the AES at the end of  time step ten is slightly 
higher than in the baseline scenari  if  the opinion leader is farmer 1, 3,4,7,8 
or 9. If  one of  the other farmers is the opinion leader the average number of  
farmers in the AES does not change compared to the baseline scenario. However, 
there is variati n in betwe n the different model runs when farmer 1, 3,4,7,8 or 
9 is selected as opinion leader. The minimum number and maximum number of  
farmers over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.5.
In Figure 5.6. we show the average overall biodiversity score at the end of  time 
step ten for different opinion leaders. 
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Figure 5.5. Number of farmers in the AES in the follow-the-leader scenario at the end of time step ten for 
different opinion leaders  
The average number of farmers in the AES at the end of time step ten is slightly higher than in 
the baseline scenario if the opinion leader is farmer 1, 3,4,7,8 or 9. If one of the other farmers 
is the opinion leader the avera  number of farmers in the AES does n t change compared to 
the baseline scenario. However, there is variation in between the different model runs when 
farmer 1, 3,4,7,8 or 9 is selected as opinion leader. The minimum number and maximum 
number of farmers over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.5. 
In Figure 5.6. we show the average overa l bio ity score at he end of time step ten for 
different opinion leaders.  
 
Figure 5.6. Overall biodiversity score in the follow-the-leader scenario at the end of time step ten for 
different opinion leaders 
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Figure 5.6. Overall biodiversity score in the follow-the-leader scenario at the end of time 
step ten for different opinion leaders
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The average overall biodiversity score increases slightly if  there is interaction with 
an opinion leader, except when farmer 6 is selected as the opinion leader. If  
farmer 6 is selected there is a small decrease in the average overall biodiversity 
score. The minimum number and maximum biodiversity score over all the model 
runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.6., as one can see the variation 
is small.
The number of  farmers in the AES or the overall biodiversity score is not 
always exactly the same if  the biodiversity weight of  the opinion leader are the 
same. This is caused by a difference in the other weights of  the opinion leaders, 
which also influences the optimal decisions of  the farmer. 
Network scenario
The average number of  farmers in the collective AES programme for different 
levels of  the threshold are shown in Figure 5.7.
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The average overall biodiversity score increases slightly if there is interaction with an opinion 
leader, except when farmer 6 is selected as the opinion leader. If farmer 6 is selected there is a 
small decrease in the average overall biodiversity score. Th  mi imum number and maximum 
biodiversity score over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.6., as 
one can see the variation is small. 
The number of farmers in the AES or the overall biodiversity score is not always exactly the 
same if the biodiversity w ight of the opinion lead r are the sam . This is caused by a 
difference in the other weights of the opinion leaders, which also influences the optimal 
decisions of the farmer.  
Network scenario 
The average number of farmers in the collective AES programme for different levels of the 
threshold are shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5.7. Average number of farmers in the AES programme in the network scenario over ten model 
runs at the end of time step ten for different threshold values 
The average number of farmers in the AES does not increase due to social influence when the 
threshold is set to 0.25. However, if the threshold is set to 0.5 or 0.75 the average number of 
farmers in the AES does increase. The minimum number and maximum number of farmers 
over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.7. It is important to 
realise that these results depend on the formation of the in-group and the weights of the 
farmers in our sample. The average overall biodiversity score is shown in Figure 5.8.  
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Figure 5.7. Average number of farmers in the AES programme in the network scenario 
over ten model runs at the end of time step en for diffe ent threshold values
The average number of  farmers in the AES does  i crease due to soc al influ-
ence when the threshold is set to 0.25. However, if  the threshold is set to 0.5 or 
0.75 the average number of  farmers in the AES does increase. The minimum 
number and maximum number of  farmers over all the model runs are indicated 
by a dot and a square in Figure 5.7. It is imp rtant to realise t at these results 
depend on the formation of  the in-group and the weights of  the farmers in our 
sample. The average overall biodiversity score is shown in Figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.8. Average overall biodiversity score in the network scenario over ten model runs at the end of 
time step ten for different threshold values 
The average overall biodiversity score is almost equal to the baseline scenario if the threshold 
is 0.25. If the threshold is 0.5 or 0.75 the average overall biodiversity score is higher in the 
network scenario, due to the increase in social influence. The minimum and maximum 
biodiversity score over all the model runs are indicated by a dot and a square in Figure 5.8. 
Weights farmer objectives 
The weights we determined using the technique of Manos et al. (2009) are presented in 
appendix E. As a check, we also asked the farmers about the weights that they would attach to 
the farming objectives. These weights differed from the weights we calculated as can be seen 
in appendix E. Although the calculated weights also have a higher standard deviation, on 
average the calculated and reported weights are quite similar as shown in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2. Difference between calculated and reported weights, standard deviations in brackets 
Average weights Weight 
profit 
Weight 
risk 
Weight 
labour 
Weight 
biodiversity 
Calculated 0.381 
(0.45) 
 
0.082 
(0.10) 
 
0.140 
(0.33) 
 
0.397 
(0.41) 
 
Reported 0.356 
(0.17) 
0.057 
(0.04) 
0.277 
(0.10) 
0.310 
(0.27) 
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Figure 5.8. Average overall biodiversity score in the network scenario over ten model 
runs at the end of time step ten for different thres old values
The average overall biodiversity score is almost equal to the baseline scenario if  
the thre hold is 0.25. If  the thresh ld is 0.5 or 0.75 the average overall biodiversity 
score is higher in the network scenario, due to the increase in social influence. The 
minimum and maximum biodiversity score over all the model runs are indicated 
by a dot and a square in Figure 5.8.
Weights farmer objectives
The weights we determined using the technique of  Manos et al. (2009) are pre-
sented in appendix E. As a check, we also asked the farmers about the weights 
that they would attach to the farming objectives. These weights differed from 
the weights we calculated as can be seen in app ndix E. Although the calcul ted 
weights also have a higher standard deviation, on average the calculated and 
reported weights are quite similar as shown in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2. Difference between calculated and reported weights, standard deviations in 
brackets
Average weights Weight  
profit
Weight  
risk
Weight  
labour
Weight  
biodiversity
Calculated 0.381  
(0.45)
0.082
(0.10)
0.140
(0.33)
0.397
(0.41)
Reported 0.356
(0.17)
0.057
(0.04)
0.277
(0.10)
0.310
(0.27)
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5.8. CONCluSiONS AND DiSCuSSiON
Our results show that if  the introduction of  the collective AES programme leads 
to social influence farmer participation and biodiversity might be positively af-
fected, but the effect might be small or non-existent as well. The exact effect 
cannot be told beforehand and depends on the strength of  the social influence, 
the like-mindedness of  farmers and the type of  social influence that is applied. 
However, the effect of  social influence seems to be rather small, especially in 
terms of  biodiversity.
Apparently, it is important to create the correct kind of  social influence if  
biodiversity is to be increased. If  farmers only change their opinions if  they 
interact with like-minded farmers, there is likely no effect of  the collective AES 
programme. On the other hand, if  farmers are very open to the opinions of  other 
farmers and there are enough biodiversity loving farmers in the region the collec-
tive AES programme might have a small positive effect. These findings have some 
interesting implications for policy design. Promoting a system with more social 
influence is not necessarily beneficial and there is a good chance that the effect 
of  social influence is limited. Promoting social influence seems only worthwhile 
if  farmers are open to other opinions and enough farmers in the region care for 
biodiversity already.
The possibility that social influence might play a role in farmer efforts to con-
serve nature is in line with results found by Josefsson et al. (2017). Similarly, 
van Dijk et al. (2015) and Runhaar et al. (2017) found that social capital, shared 
norms, relations of  trust and social pressure will influence farmers’ intention 
to cooperate and to participate in AES. The necessity of  taking both personal 
characteristics and feedbacks from the environment into account when modelling 
people’s decision-making, as we have done in our model, is confirmed by research 
of  Phipps et al. (2013) and Johnstone and Hooper (2016). 
The sample considered in our model is quite small, and the biodiversity weights 
we find are considerable. To check these weights we also asked the farmers 
outright about the weights they would attach to each of  the farmer objectives. 
The reported weights differ from the calculated weights, but both the average 
reported biodiversity weight (0.31) and the average calculated biodiversity weight 
(0.40) are relatively high. This could be explained by the fact that our sample 
exists of  farmers in an area that is known for its biodiversity and cultural values. 
This could very well mean that the weights we found for biodiversity are higher 
than the average weights one would expect from farmers in the Netherlands. This 
would mean that farmers in our sample are more likely to participate in the AES. 
Chapter 5
152
However, the mechanisms for social influence as shown in the paper would not 
change if  the objective weights are different.  
We are aware that there are limitations to our results. First, our biodiversity 
measure is a crude approximation of  real biodiversity; therefore our biodiversity 
scores should only be seen as an indication of  the effect on biodiversity and be 
interpreted with care. Second, we show the mechanisms of  social influence, but 
we are aware of  the fact that the precise extent of  social influence is hard to 
determine and therefore the strength of  the social influence we assumed could 
deviate from reality. Finally, the sample considered in our research is small, and 
one should be careful in generalizing these results. Nevertheless, despite these 
limitations we think this paper adds to the debate on the effects and implementa-
tion of  AES payments. 
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APPENDix 5A.   DETErMiNiNg ThE WEighTS OF ThE FArMEr 
Objectives 
To determine the weights attached to each of  these objectives, we follow the 
procedure as described by Manos et al. (2009). We calculate the weights in three 
steps. In the first step we define a set of  n objectives f1(q),f2(q)...fn(q) by asking 
the farmers in the sample about their farming objectives. Here q represents the 
constraints a farmer encounters when setting the level of  the objective. 
The next step is to define the pay-off  matrix for the objectives. The pay-off  
matrix shows the value of  each objective when optimizing each of  the objectives 
and has the following set up: 
Objectives/attributes f1(q),f2(q)...fn(q)
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Appendix 5A. Determining the weights of the farmer objectives  
To determine the weights attached to each of these objectives, we follow the procedure as 
described by Manos et al. (2009). We calculate the weights in three steps. In the first step we 
define a set of n objectives𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) by asking the farmers in the sample about 
their farming objectives. Here q represents the constraints a farmer encounters when setti  
t e level of the objective.  
The next step is to define the pay-off matrix for the objectives. The pay-off matrix shows the 
value of each objective when optimizing each of the objectives and has the following set up:  
Objectives/attributes 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗          𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A1) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1     𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ 
The objective mentioned at the top of the column is optimised subject to q. The levels 
achieved by the different objectives when optimizing the objective at the top are listed in the 
column below. Thus, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be interpreted as the value of objective i when we 
optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞). The optimal value for each objective can be found on the diagonal 
of the pay-off matrix.  
The last step in obtaining the weights is to solve the following system of equations:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (A2)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀       
Subject to 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A3) 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1   (A4) 
Where:  
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the elements of the pay-off matrix and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the i-th objective that is 
actually observed in the current production plan of the farmer, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the negative deviation 
from the observed and calculated value of the i-th objective (i. e.𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗), 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the positive 
deviation from the observed and calculated value of the i-th objective.  
 (A1)
The objective mentioned at the top of  the column is optimised subject to q. The 
levels achieved by t  diff rent objectives when optimizing the objective at th  
top are listed in the column below. Thus, the element fiv can be interpreted as the 
value of  objective i when we optimize objective fv(q). The optimal value for each 
objective can be found on the diagonal of  the pay-off  matrix. 
The last step in obtaining the weights is to solve the following system of  equations: 
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Appendix 5A. Determining the weights of the farmer objectives  
To determine the weights attached to each of these objectives, we follow the procedure as 
described by Manos et al. (2009). We calculate the weights in three steps. In the first step we 
defin  a set of n objectives𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) by asking the farmers in the sample about 
their farming objectives. Here q represents the constraints a farmer encounters when setting 
the level of the objective.  
The next step is to define the pay-off matrix for the objectives. The pay-off matrix shows the 
value of each objective when optimizing each of the objectives and has the following set up:  
Objectives/attributes 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗          𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A1) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1     𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ 
The objective mentioned at the top of the column is optimised subject to q. The levels 
ac ieved by th  different objectives when optimizing the objective at the top are listed in the 
column below. Thus, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be interpreted as the value of objective i when we 
optimize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞). The optimal value for each objective can be found on the diagonal 
of the pay-off matrix.  
The last step in obtaini g the weights is to solve t  following system of equations:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (A2)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀       
Subject to 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A3) 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1   (A4) 
Where:  
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the elements of the pay-off matrix and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the i-th objective that is 
actually observed in the current production plan of the farmer, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the negative deviation 
from the observed and calculated value of the i-th objective (i. e.𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗), 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the positive 
deviation from the observed and calculated value of the i-th objective.  
 (A2)
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ppendix 5A. Determining the weights of the farmer objectives  
To determine the weights attached to each of these objectives, we follow the procedure as 
described by Manos et al. (2009). We calculate th weights in three steps. In the first step we 
fine a set of n objec ives𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) by ask ng the farm r  in the sample about
their farming objectives. Here q represents the constrai ts a farmer encounters when setting 
 level of the objective.  
The next step is to define the pay-off matrix for the objectives. The pay-off matrix shows the 
value of each objective when optimizing each of the objectives and h s the following set up: 
Objectives/attribut s 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗          𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A1) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1     𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ 
The objective mentioned at the top of the column is optimised subject to q. The levels 
achieved by the different objectives when opti iz ng the objective at the top are listed in the 
column b low. Thus, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be int rpreted as th  value of objectiv  i when we 
opti ize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞). The op imal valu for each objec ive can be f und on the diagonal 
f he pay-off matrix.  
The last step in obtaining the weights is to solve the following system of equations:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (A2)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀       
Subject to 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A3) 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1   (A4) 
Where:  
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the elements of the pay-off matrix and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the i-th objective that is 
actually observed in the current production plan of t e f rmer, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 s the n gative deviation 
from the observed and calculated val e of the i-th obj ctive (i. e.𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗), 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 s the positive 
devia ion from the observed and calc lated value of the i-th objective.  
Subject to
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Appendix 5A. Determining the weights of the farmer objectives  
To d termine the weights attached to each of these objectives, we follow the procedure as 
described by Manos et al. (2009). We calcula e th  weights in three steps. In the first step we 
fine a set of n objectives𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞),𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) by ask ng the farmers in the sample about 
the r farming objectives. Here q repr sents the constrai ts a farm r encounters wh n etting 
 level of the objective.  
The next step is to define the pay-off matrix for the objectives. The pay-off matrix shows the 
value of each objective when optimizing each of the objectives and h s the following set up:  
Objectiv s/attri utes 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓∗    𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞   𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2
∗ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A1) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1     𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ 
The objective mentioned at the top of the column is optimised subject to q. The levels 
achieved by the different objectives when pti izing the objective at the top are listed in the 
column below. Thus, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be interpreted as th  valu  of bjectiv i when we 
opti ize objective 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞). Th  optimal value for each objective can be f und on the diagonal 
f the pay- ff matrix.  
The last step in obtaining the weights is to solve the following system of equations:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (A2)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀       
Subject to 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A3) 
𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   4
Where:  
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 a  the elements of the pay-off matrix and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the i-th objective that is 
actually obs rv d in the current production plan of the f rmer, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the negative deviation 
from the obs rv d and calculated val e f the i-th objectiv  (i. e.𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗), 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 s t e pos tive 
devi ion from the obs rved d calc lated value f the -th objective.  
 (A3)
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Appendix 5A. Determining the weights of the farmer objectives  
To determine the weights attached to each of these objectives, we follow the procedure as 
described by Manos et al. (2009). We calculate th  weights in three steps. In the first step we 
fine a set of n objectives𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞), 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) by asking the farm r  in the sample about 
their far ing objectives. Here q represents the constrai ts a farmer encounters when setting 
t  level of the objective.  
The next step is to define the pay-off matrix for the objecti es. The pay-off matrix shows the 
valu  of each objective when optimizing each of the objectives and h s the following set up:  
Objective /attributes 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) … 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞) 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1∗      𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓21     𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2∗          𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (A1) 
… 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞)                        𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛1     𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛∗ 
The objective mentioned at the top of the column is optimised subject to q. The levels 
achieved by the different objectives when opti izing the objective at the top are listed in the 
column below. Thus, the element 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be interpreted as th  value of objectiv  i when we 
opti iz  obj ctive 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞). The optimal valu  for each objective can be f und on the diagonal 
f the pay-off matrix.  
The last step in obtaining the weights is to solve the f llowing system of equations:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∑ ((𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ×
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 ) (A2)  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 1,2, … ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀       
Subject to 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (A3) 
∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1   (A4) 
Where:  
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the elements of the pay-off matrix and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of the i-th objective that is 
actually observed in the current production plan of t e f rmer, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the n gative deviation 
from the observed and calculated val e of the i-th obj ctive (i. e.𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗), 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the positive 
deviation from the observed and calculated value of the i-th bjective.  
 (A4)
here: 
fiv are t  elements of  th  pay-off  matrix and fi is th  value of  th  i-th objec ve
that is actually observed in the current production plan of  the farmer, ndi is the 
negative deviation from the observed and calculated value of  the i-th objective 
(i.e. fi – fi*), pdi is the positiv deviati n from the obs rved and calculated value of  
the i-th objective. 
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APPENDix 5B.   iNDiCATOr SPECiES AND BiODiVErSiTy SCOrES 
As a measure of  biodiversity we calculate biodiversity scores based on three 
example species. These three species are used to represent the biodiversity in the 
area and are chosen in such a way that the size of  the area needed to maintain a sus-
tainable population (key area) of  each species differs. The key area can be divided 
over different habitat areas (maintained hedgerows) as long as these hedgerows 
are within the dispersion capacity of  the species. The dispersion capacity indicates 
the distance over which an organism is able to move from one habitat area to 
the next (Reijnen et al., 2001; Reijnen et al., 2007). To determine the total area 
that is available to a species, the habitat areas that are within dispersion capacity 
of  each other are summed up. If  this total area is equal to or larger than the key 
area a sustainable population of  the species can be maintained. Grashof-Bokdam 
et al. (2009), Reijnen et al. (2001), Reijnen et al. (2007), Elands et al. (2005) and 
Kwakernaak et al. (2015) have analysed biodiversity using the concepts of  key 
areas and dispersion capacity before. 
We focus on the plant species false oat-grass (Arrhenatherum elatius), the 
butterfly species purple hairstreak (Favonius quercus) and the plant species large-
flowered hemp-nettle (Galeopsis speciosa). Each of  these species can occur in 
well-maintained hedgerows (Floron, 2017; Vlindernet, 2017; Dijkstra, 2017). 
False oat grass has a small scale key area of  1,000 m2, the purple hairstreak has 
a medium scale key area of  5 ha and the large-flowered hemp-nettle has a large 
scale key area of  10 ha. The dispersion capacity of  these species is such that they 
are able to move between the hedgerows in our study area (expert judgement). 
Due to its small scale key area a sustainable population of  false oat can already 
be maintained on a single farming parcel plus its direct neighbours. To maintain 
a sustainable population of  the purple hairstreak maintaining the hedgerows on 
an area equal to the farm size plus its directly neighbouring parcels is sufficient. 
Due to its large scale key area a sustainable population of  the large-flower hemp 
nettle can only result from maintaining all the hedgerows in the region. In reality, 
one can imagine that only a part of  the hedgerows in each key area is maintained. 
The ratio of  maintained to total hedgerows in the defined key areas (i.e. parcel 
plus neighbours, farm plus neighbours, all parcels in region) is translated in a bio-
diversity score using a logistic function. We specify the logistic function in such 
a way that the biodiversity score will be relatively high before a certain threshold 
and relative low below a certain threshold. To find the overall biodiversity score 
we take the average of  the small, medium and large scale biodiversity scores. 
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APPENDix 5C.   MAThEMATiCAl PrOgrAMMiNg MODElS
The model simulates the decisions of  nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke 
Friese Wouden”. We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is cal-
culated as the sum of  the weights the farmer attaches to each of  the objectives 
times the normalized value of  each objective. The objectives of  the farmer are 
profit maximization (C2), labour minimization (C3), risk minimization (C4) and 
biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is maximized subject to constraints (C2-
C35).
Objective: 
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to each of t e tives times the normalized value of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk minimization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C1)
Subject to: 
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as th  sum of the 
weights th  farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized val e of each 
objective. The objectives of th  farmer are profi  maxi ization (C2), labour minimiz tion 
(C3), risk minimization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is maxi i ed 
subject to co straints (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C2)
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
e model simulates he decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that th  farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as th  sum of the 
weights th  farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized val e of each 
objective. The objectives of th  farmer are profit maxi ization (C2), labour minimiz tion 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is axi i ed 
subject to co straints (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C3)
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that th  farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as th sum f the 
weights th farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized val e of each 
objective. The objec ives of th  farmer are profit max iza ion (C2), labour minimiz tion 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Uti ity is ax ed 
subject to co strain s (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 9  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C4)
142 
 
Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that th  farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as th sum of the 
weights th farmer at aches to ea h of the bjectives times t  normalized val e f each 
objective. The objec ives of th  farmer are profit max iza ion (C2), l bour minimiz tion 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and bi diversity maximization (C5). Uti ity is ax ed 
subject to co strain s (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 0  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 9  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C5)
142 
 
Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that th  farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as th  sum of the 
weights th  farmer attaches to each of the objectives times t  normalized val e of each 
objective. The objec ives of th  farmer are profit max iza ion (C2), l bour minimiz tion 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and bi diversity aximization (C5). Uti ity is ax ed 
subject to co strain s (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 0  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 9  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C6)
142 
 
Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized val e of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maxi ization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is axi ized 
subject to co straints (C2-C35). 
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5 =  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  ( 10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C7)
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine d iry farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized value of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk minimization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  ( 1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2 (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  9  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 8 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   2
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3
 (C8)
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endix 5C. Mathemat cal programming models 
The mo el simulat s the deci ions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to ach of the objectives times the normalized value of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk minimization 4) and biodiversity maxi ization (C5). Utility is maximized 
ject to constraints (C2-C35).  
jective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
ject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (C3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  (C8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 5 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  (C9) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  (C10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   (C11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 8 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 (C12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  (C13) 
 (C9)
142 
 
Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attac es to each of the objectives times the normalized value of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is maximized 
subject to constraints (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (C3) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2  4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=
3
  ( 5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  (C6) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  7
5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6)  8
5 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  ( 9) 
16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 1
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   2
, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3
 (C10)
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized value of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk minimization (C4) and biodiversity maximization (C5). Utility is maximized 
subject to constrain s (C2-C35).  
Obj ctiv :  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 − ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   (C2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2 (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  5  
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
3
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚= − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  7
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  9
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   11) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 8 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   2
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3
 (C11)
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Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to each of the objectives times the normalized value of each 
objective. The objectives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), labour minimization 
(C3), risk minimization (C4) and biodiversity maxi ization (C5). Utility is maximized 
subject to constraint  (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   2
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … ,10  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ( 3) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  (C4) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 =
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
(C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  (C7) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16)  ( 8) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  (C9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   11) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   12) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 8 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  3
 (C 2)
142 
 
Appendix 5C. Mathematical programming models 
The model simulates the decisions of nine dairy farmers in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden”. 
We assume that the farmer optimizes utility (C1). Utility is calculated as the sum of the 
weights the farmer attaches to each of the objectives times t  normalized value of each 
objective. The obj ctives of the farmer are profit maximization (C2), l bour minimization 
(C3), risk mini ization (C4) and bi diversity maximization (C5). Utility is maximized 
subject to constraint  (C2-C35).  
Objective:  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗
2
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
∗  −  𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∗  (C1) 
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 1, . . ,4; 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, . . ,9   
Subject to:  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤9𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 −  𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤10𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24   ( 2) 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1, … , 0  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  3  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
2  4  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
3
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
3
  (C5) 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ∗ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4  6
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32  7  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5  max ( 0, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6)  8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖15 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚11𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚12𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚13 +  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚31𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚32𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚14 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚15 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚16  − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚17 −
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚18 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚19  ( 9) 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖16 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚20 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚21  10) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚5 + ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
8
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚=6   ( 1  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∑ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 − 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23   ( 2) 
ℎ = 1, . . ,𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6  ( 3)  (C13)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  ( 15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  ( 6) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  ( 17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C14)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  ( 14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  ( 5) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C15)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  ( 7) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 ( 9) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C16)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  ( 22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C17)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 14  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 2 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  2
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C18)
Chapter 5
156
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (C17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
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(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
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)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C19)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (C17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
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)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
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)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
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𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
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  (C22) 
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1
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𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C20)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (C17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C21)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  8
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 9
 (C22)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  9
 (C23)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (C17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   ( 24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C24)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   8
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   ( 4) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  6
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  7
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 8
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  9
 (C25)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  8
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 =
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  (C22) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗ (
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   ( 24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  6
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 6𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 9
 (C26)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  8
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  ( 21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  ( 2) 
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 =
1
(
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   4
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  5
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  9
 (C27)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  (C16) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  (C17) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23  (C18) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 (C19) 
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 (C20) 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  1
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  2
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
1
(
 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
  3
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  (C26) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  (C27) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C28) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  (C29) 
 (C28)
143 
 
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9  (C14) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12  (C15) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14  6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 4 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒10  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2   8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎19 9
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 1, . . ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴   
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
+ ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐=1 ∗ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐20 20  
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 1, . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =
∑ (
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖10
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖33
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
)𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖35
⁄
  (C21) 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1
(1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖21
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖34
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
  2  
 
𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
1
 
 
 
1+𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
(−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∗((
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 
)−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽))
)
 
 
 
  (C23) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1   (C24) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖28  (C25) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖5, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖6, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖7, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖9, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖11, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖12, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖13, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖14, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖24 ≥ 0  C 6
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖8 ≥  𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖18 ∗ 0.8  7
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖25𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  8
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖26𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  9 (C29)
144 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  ( 30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  ( 31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  ( 32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 ( 33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  ( 34) 
Add for the collective AES programme setting:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   (C35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0   
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
LRi = labour hours required on farm i 
 (C30)
144 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 7  30
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 2 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  31
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  32
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 33
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9  34
Add for the collective AES programme setting:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   (C35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0   
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
LRi = labour hours required on farm i 
 (C31)
144 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 7  30
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  31
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  32
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 33
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 9  34
Add for the collective AES programme setting:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   (C35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0   
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
LRi = labour hours required on farm i 
 (C32)
144 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  ( 30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  ( 31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  (C32) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 (C33) 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (C34) 
Add for the collective AES programme setting:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   (C35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 0   
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
LRi = labour hours required on farm i 
 (C33)
144 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 7  30  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  31  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 3 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  32  
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 33  
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≥  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  (C34) 
Add for the collective AES programme setting:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   (C35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/ ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 0   
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i 
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i 
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score  
Oi1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i 
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by farmer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i 
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
LRi = labour hours required on farm i 
 (C34)
Add for the collective AES programme setting: 
144 
 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (C30) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 ≥ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒9 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27  (C31) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖30 ∗ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖17  C 2
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1 =  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖27 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖22 + 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖23 C 3
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒29  C 4
Add for the collective AES programme setting:  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 > 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   (C35) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖1
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
+
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖3
9
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1
9
)/3 ≤ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒36  𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜=2 = 0   
Where:  
Ui = utility of farmer i 
Oi1 = profit farmer i in euros 
O 2 = labour hours used on farm i 
3 risk taken by farmer i 
4 overall biodiversity sco e 
1* = maximum profit in euros farmer i could obtain 
2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i 
3 ini  risk that could be taken by farmer  
4 ax overa l iodiversity score farm r i could obtain 
gi1 = weight attached to profit maximization by fa mer i 
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i 
3 risk minimization by farmer i 
4 biodiversity maximization by farmer i 
LRi = labour hours requi ed on farm i 
 (C35)
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Where: 
Ui = utility of farmer i
Oi1	 =	 profit	farmer	i	in	euros
Oi2 = labour hours used on farm i
Oi3 = risk taken by farmer i
Oi4 = overall biodiversity score 
Oi1*	 =	 maximum	profit	in	euros	farmer	i	could	obtain
Oi2* = minimum labour hours that could be used on farm i
Oi3* = minimum risk that could be taken by farmer i
Oi4* = max overall biodiversity score farmer i could obtain
gi1	 =	 weight	attached	to	profit	maximization	by	farmer	i
gi2 = weight attached to labour minimization by farmer i
gi3 = weight attached to risk minimization by farmer i
gi4 = weight attached to biodiversity maximization by farmer i
LRi = labour hours required on farm i
LIi = initial labour hours available on farm i
α = speed parameter
β = biodiversity parameter
v1 = variance milk price
μi1 = biodiversity score small scale biodiversity type for farmer i
μi2 = biodiversity score medium scale biodiversity type for farmer i
μi3 = biodiversity score large scale biodiversity type
yi1 = milk produced on farm i (in 100 kgs)
p1 = price milk in euro per 100 kg 
p2 = price old cows in euro per cow 
po = price maintained hedgerows in euro per m2
w1 = maintenance costs in euro per cow
w2 = maintenance costs in euro per young cattle < 1 year
w3 = maintenance costs in euro per young cattle > 1 year
w4 = costs per KVEM feed in euro
w5 = costs of removing a kg of excess phosphate in euro
w6 = costs of maintaining a m2 of maize in euro
w7 = costs of maintaining a m2 hedgerows in euro
w8 = costs of maintaining a m2 of grass in euro
w9 = costs of hiring an hour of labour in euro
w10 = costs of buying one more cow in euro per cow
xi1 = number of cows on farm i 
xi2 = number of young cattle < 1 year on farm i 
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xi3 = number of young cattle > 1 year on farm i 
xi4 = KVEM feed purchased by farm i
xi5 = kg phosphate surplus on farm i
xi6 = m2 maize land on farm i
xi7 =  m2 maintained hedgerows on farm i 
xi8 = m2 grassland on farm i 
xi9 = m2 hedgerows not maintained on farm i
xhi10 =  expected m2 maintained hedgerows on parcel h of farm i and its neigh-
bouring parcels
xi11 = m2 grassland without damage from hedgerows on farm i
xi12 = m2 grassland with damage from hedgerows on farm i 
xi13 = m2 maize land without damage from hedgerows on farm i
xi14 = m2 maize land with damage from hedgerows on farm i
xi15 = kg phosphate produced on farm i
xi16 = kg phosphate that can be placed on land farm i
xi17 = number of new cows bought by farm i
xi18 = total m2 land used in production on farm i
xha19 = m2 hedgerows maintained on neighbour a of parcel h on farm i
xhc20 = m2 hedgerows maintained on neighbour c of farm i
xi21 = m2 hedgerows maintained on farm i and its neighbouring parcels
xi22 = number of (old) cows sold by farm i
xi23 = number of new cows on farm i
xi24 = number of new bought by farm i
xhi25 = m2 hedgerows maintained on parcel h of farm i
e1 = KVEM needed per cow
e2 = KVEM needed per young cattle < 1 year
e3 = KVEM needed per young cattle > 1 year
ei4 = 100 kg milk produced per cow on farm i
e5 = labour hours needed per cow
e6 = labour hours needed per m2 maize land
e7 = labour hours needed per m2 maintained hedgerows 
e8 = labour hours needed per m2 grassland 
e9 = percentage cows that will be too old for milk production on farm i
e10	 =	 share	of	land	affected	by	maintained	hedgerows
e11 = KVEM produced on a m2 of grassland without damages
e12 = KVEM produced on a m2 of grassland with damages
e13 = kg phosphate in a KVEM from grassland
e14 = kg phosphate in a KVEM from maize land
e15 = kg phosphate in a KVEM purchased
159
Effects of changing social influence on participation and biodiversity in AES
C
ha
pt
er
 5
e16 = kg phosphate in 100 kg milk
e17 = kg phosphate in a carrying cow
e18 = kg phosphate in a young cattle < 1 year
e19 = kg phosphate in a young cattle > 1 year
e20 = kg phosphate allowed on a m2 of grassland
e21 = kg phosphate allowed on a m2 of maize land
ehi22 = m2 area parcel h on farm i
ei23 = initial m2 land used for hedgerows on farm i
ei24 = maximum m2 of hedgerows that could be maintained in the region
ei25 = number of young cattle < 1 year per cow on farm i
ei26 = number of young cattle > 1 year per cow on farm i
ei27 = initial number of cows on farm i 
e28hi =  maximum amount of hedgerows that could be maintained on parcel h of 
farm i 
e29 = subsistence income farmers
ei30 = percentage cows that can be replaced by young cattle farm i
e31 = KVEM produced on a m2 of maize land without damages
e32 = KVEM produced on a m2 of maize land with damages 
ehi33 =  maximum expected m2 hedgerows that could be maintained on parcel h of 
farm I and its neighbouring parcels
ei34 =  maximum expected m2 hedgerows that could be maintained on farm I and 
its neighbouring parcels
ei35 =  number of groups of parcels and neighbours on which hedgerows occur
e36 = threshold overall biodiversity score 
ea = probability parcel a is a neighbour of parcel h of farm i
ec = probability parcel c is a neighbour of farm i
The farmer objective is to optimize his/her utility, as described by equation (C1). 
Four farmer objectives are included in the utility function, profit maximization, 
labour minimization, risk minimization and biodiversity maximization. If  a farmer 
does not value one of  these  objectives, this objective will receive a zero weight. 
Profit is calculated as revenue minus costs (C2). Revenue results from milk 
production, selling cows too old for production and AES payments. Costs are 
determined as the costs of  normal production plus the costs of  maintaining 
hedgerows. If  we add the labour needed for each of  the farmer objectives we 
find the total amount of  labour used on the farm (C3). To calculate risk we look at 
the variance of  the milk price (C4). We add the score for the small scale, medium 
scale and large scale biodiversity type to find the overall biodiversity score (C5). 
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The farm produces milk and biodiversity. By multiplying the number of  cows 
times the milk production per cow we find the total milk production (C6). Grass 
and maize grown on the farm can be used as feed; if  more feed is needed than 
produced the rest of  the feed can be purchased from the market (C7). The amount 
of  feed produced on the farm depends on the type of  crop that is planted and 
the amount of  damage to the crops due to shade resulting from the hedgerows. 
A certain amount of  phosphate is allowed on farm land, any phosphate in excess 
of  this amount has to be removed from the farm (C8). The total amount of  
phosphate on the farm is the sum of  phosphate in the feed minus the phosphate 
bound in milk, cows and young cattle (C9). The amount of  phosphate allowed 
on land is found by multiplying the phosphate allowed per m2 grass or maize 
with the m2 grass and maize on the farm (C10). By adding the amount of  labour 
required for feeding and milking the cows, working on the land and maintaining 
the hedgerows we find the farms total labour requirement (C11). Land available 
for production is the result of  deducting the land needed for hedgerows from 
the land available on the parcels of  the farm (C12). Land can either be used in 
the production of  maize or the production of  grass (C13). Hedgerows can be 
divided in maintained and unmaintained hedgerows (C14). Grass land and maize 
land are separated in land with and without damages from hedgerows (C15 and 
C16). A share of  the land used by maintained hedgerows is used to determine the 
amount of  land with damages (C17). It is not possible to increase the amount of  
maintained hedgerows above the initial amount of  hedgerows (C18). 
We determine the ratio of  maintained to total hedgerows as the basis for calcu-
lating biodiversity scores. For the small scale biodiversity score this ratio compares 
the maintained to total hedgerows on a farming parcel and its direct neighbours. 
For the medium scale biodiversity score this ratio compares the maintained to 
total hedgerows on a farm plus its direct neighbouring parcels. For the large scale 
biodiversity score this ratio compares the maintained to total hedgerows in the 
whole region. The biodiversity score in our model is determined by a logistic 
function. A logistic function has been used before by Natuhara and Imai (1999) to 
link environmental variables to species richness. The logistic function captures an 
abrupt switch from a high to a low biodiversity score in a continuous way; thereby 
making it is possible to solve the model. In our function a high ratio of  main-
tained to total hedgerows is translated in a biodiversity score close to one. A small 
ratio is translated to a biodiversity score close to zero. The biodiversity scores are 
determined in equations (C21, C22, C23). The speed parameter α regulates how 
quickly the biodiversity score changes from close to zero to close to one, a higher 
α means a faster switch. In the model we arbitrarily set the speed parameter to 
30, which means the transition from a low to a high biodiversity score will be 
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fast. The biodiversity parameter β regulates at what ratio of  maintained to total 
hedgerows the switch from a high to a low biodiversity score takes place. The 
biodiversity parameter is set to 0.7, which means that the biodiversity score will 
be low for a ratio smaller than 0.8. 
To create an artificial region we combine the information on the parcels on 
the individual farms. For each parcel the chance that it neighbours parcel h of  
farm i is determined. For all parcels h of  farm i we know exactly how they are 
located relative to each other, and the probability is either 0 or 1. For parcels 
that do not belong to farm i we determine the potential neighbours and use 
this information to calculate the probability. The average expected amount of  
maintained hedgerows on the parcels a neighbouring parcel h is then determined 
by summing the multiplication of  the probability that each parcel a neighbours 
parcel h and the amount of  hedgerows on each parcel a. We add the amount 
of  hedgerows maintained on parcel h itself  to this expected amount to find the 
amount of  hedgerows maintained on parcel ha and its direct neighbouring parcels 
(C19). Likewise we multiply the probability that each parcel c neighbours farm i 
with the hedgerows maintained on each parcel c to calculate the expected amount 
of  hedgerows maintained on the direct neighbours of  farm i. To this amount we 
add the hedgerows maintained on farm i to calculate the amount of  hedgerows 
maintained on farm i and its direct neighbouring parcels (C20). If  we add the 
hedgerows maintained on each of  the farms parcels we find the total amount of  
hedgerows maintained by the farmer (C24). One cannot maintain more hedge-
rows on the parcel than are available on that parcel (C25). 
The amount of  cows, young cattle younger than 1 year, young cattle older than 
1 year, feed purchased, phosphate surplus, maize, hedgerows maintained and not 
maintained, grass, grass without damages, grass with damages, maize without 
damages, maize with damages, land used in production, old cows sold, new cows 
on farm and new cows bought cannot be negative (C26). 
Minerals are contained within the manure produced by cows. In order to avoid 
environmental damages as a result of  a surplus of  these minerals used on land, 
the EU designed regulations that limit the amount of  minerals from manure that 
is allowed on land. After the Dutch farmers and government successfully claimed 
that more minerals could be put on the Dutch farm land without hurting the 
environment the EU agreed to derogation. This allows the Dutch farmers to 
place more minerals on land as long as the farm has at least 80 percent grassland. 
Therefore we assume that the farms in our model need to have at least 80 percent 
grassland (C27). For a certain percentage of  the number of  cows young cows 
should be kept to replace them, this percentage was solicited during the farm 
interviews (C28 and C29). It is not possible to exceed the initial number of  cows 
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(C30). Cows can be sold, the number of  cos sold is larger than or equal to the 
amount of  old cows (C31). New cows can either be bought or come from the 
young cattle raised to replace old cows (C32). The final number of  cows on the 
farm is equal to the initial cows minus the cows sold plus the new cows (C33). If  
the farm wants to survive a certain subsistence income is necessary (C34). 
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Figure 5D.1. Histograms basic social influence scenario 
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Figure 5D.1. histograms basic social influence scenario
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Follow-the-leader scenario
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Follow‑the‑leader scenario 
 
 
Figure 5D.2. Histograms follow-the-leader scenario  
Figure 5D.2. histograms follow-the-leader scenario
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Network scenario
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Network scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5D.3. Histograms network scenario 
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APPENDix 5E.   iNiTiAl WEighTS 
Table 5E.1. initial objective weights calculated by the technique of Manos et al. (2009) 
Farmer Weight 
profit
Weight risk Weight 
labour
Weight 
biodiver-sity
Sum of 
weights
1 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
2 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.894 1.000
3 0.606 0.032 0.000 0.362 1.000
4 0.000 0.264 0.000 0.736 1.000
5 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.859 1.000
6 0.740 0.000 0.260 0.000 1.000
7 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
8 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
9 0.081 0.194 0.000 0.725 1.000
Table 5E.2. initial objective weights reported during the interviews 
Farmer Weight 
profit
Weight risk Weight 
labour
Weight 
biodiver-sity
Sum of 
weights
1 0.300 0.000 0.300 0.400 1.000
2 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.400 1.000
3 0.670 0.000 0.330 0.000 1.000
4 0.273 0.180 0.273 0.273 1.000
5 0.330 0.130 0.270 0.270 1.000
6 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
8 0.600 0.000 0.400 0.000 1.000
9 0.330 0.000 0.220 0.450 1.000
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The objective of  this thesis was to determine if  thresholds, cumulative effects, and 
feedbacks and interactions can be responsible for unexpected system behaviour 
in land use systems. To do so, the Dutch dairy sector was taken as an example of  
a complex adaptive system. Four sub questions were formulated, each looking at 
one of  the hypothesized mechanisms of  land use change. We will first discuss the 
findings for each of  these sub questions separately, followed by a synthesis and 
discussion of  these findings. 
The first sub question in chapter 2 concerned thresholds and asked whether 
the abolishment of  the milk quotas would lead to a shift towards larger and more 
intensive farms in the Netherlands. For this sub question the Dutch dairy farms 
and their environment were considered as the land use system. We showed that 
a sudden shift towards intensive dairy farming can occur when milk quotas are 
abolished, but only if  a threshold in farm size is passed. The second sub question 
in chapter 3 concerned cumulative effects and asked how the uptake of  a new 
farming practice for processing of  organic waste into compost in the “Friese 
Meren” in the Dutch province of  Friesland was influenced by economies of  
scale, learning, and changing social norms. In this case the dairy farms in the 
“Friese Meren” and their environment was considered as the land use system. 
Our findings were that a large uptake of  organic waste could only be explained by 
a combination of  economies of  scale, learning and changing social norms. The 
third sub question in chapter 4 concerned feedbacks and asked what the effect 
would be on the resilience of  the system of  the shift from an individual to col-
lective application for agri-environmental contracts in the Netherlands and how 
the resilience of  the land use system was affected by the value farmers attach to 
biodiversity. In this case the land use system studied encompasses the dairy farms 
in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden” and their environment. We showed that the 
introduction of  the collective AES programme results in a loss of  resilience of  
the hedgerow landscape, in the sense that a shift towards low biodiversity in the 
Noordelijke Friese Wouden might be intensified due to the biodiversity and pay-
ment feedback that are in place in the collective AES programme. The decrease 
in resilience is stronger when biodiversity is valued less by the farmers. Finally, 
the fourth sub question in chapter 5 concerned interactions and asked whether 
social influence due to the introduction of  the collective AES system in the Neth-
erlands would result in a shift towards increased farm participation and a higher 
level of  biodiversity. Again, the land use system studied consisted of  the dairy 
farms in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden” and their environment. We illustrated 
how the participation of  farms in the AES programme to maintain hedgerows 
in the Noordelijke Friese Wouden might be subject to social influence, but that 
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an increase in social influence does not necessarily result in a shift towards higher 
farmer participation or more biodiversity.
These findings show that thresholds, cumulative effects, and feedbacks and 
interactions can be responsible for unexpected system behaviour in land use 
systems. Thresholds might explain both regime shifts and inertia in the land use 
system. If  the system is close to a threshold a small change in the environment 
can be the onset of  a shift, while a system that is far from the threshold will be 
much more resilient. The relevance of  thresholds is also pointed out by Marston 
(2015) who uses an historical perspective and identifies examples of  the thresholds 
that led to the adoption of  sustainable agricultural practices. Unexpected system 
behaviour might also be due to the existence of  cumulative effects of  different 
drivers of  the land use system. In order to properly understand land use systems, 
all drivers of  the system and their interaction need to be considered. Looking at 
each driver separately may result in a skewed perception of  the system and lead 
to wrong predictions on system behaviour. This is in accordance with findings 
from Morris & Rowe (2014) who point out how cumulative effects of  human 
influences change the vegetation in the great basin in the United States. Feedbacks 
have the potential to explain unexpected system behaviour as well. Feedbacks 
from higher scale levels influence individual farm decisions, and these individual 
farm decisions in turn send a signal to the higher scale levels. Positive feedbacks 
can increase the effect of  a driver of  land use change, being self-reinforcing. 
Negative feedbacks can prevent changes from happening, by reinforcing the 
current state of  the system. The importance of  understanding feedbacks in the 
land use system is also pointed out by Verburg (2006). An analysis on research 
of  feedbacks in land use systems performed by Chen et al. (2016a) further con-
firms the importance of  including feedbacks in the analysis of  land use systems. 
Finally, we found that interactions between the agent of  a land use system have 
the potential to explain unexpected system behaviour. Social influence created by 
farmers’ interaction can increase the uptake of  an innovation or policy measure. 
On the other hand, social influence also has the potential to decrease the shift, 
making the land use system more resilient. In their research Miyasaka et al. (2017) 
also indicate the complex character of  human environment (i.e. land use) systems 
caused by feedback loops between agents and their environment and interaction 
between the agents. However, although we showed that each of  the mechanisms 
can be responsible for unexpected system behaviour, we also showed that this is 
not always the case, and depends on the specific characteristics of  the land use 
system under consideration.
By taking into account the possible effects of  thresholds, cumulative effects, 
and interactions and feedbacks policy makers might be better prepared for unex-
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pected system behaviour. The effect of  abolishing or introducing a production 
limitation on farmers behaviour might be much better anticipated if  the role of  
thresholds in farming choices are understood. As long as the farm is far from the 
threshold, its decisions will not be constrained by the limitations and its decisions 
with and without the production limitations do not differ. If  the farm produces 
at a level above the threshold, its decisions will differ between the situation with 
and without limitations. Promoting a new farming practice might be much easier 
if  cumulative effects can be generated, for instance by both reducing the costs 
of  the new practice and by creating opportunities for farmers to learn from each 
other. Anticipating the effect of  a new type of  agri-environmental schemes is 
aided by considering feedbacks and interactions, and simulating the right type 
of  social influence might even result in better results of  the new scheme. Thus, 
taking complexity elements into account can help to predict how land use sys-
tems will react to policies and global change, thereby offering insights to improve 
policy design. If  complexity is not taken into account one might be surprised 
by seemingly unexpected responses of  the land use system see e.g. Mandemaker 
et al. (2014), who states that real world agricultural land use systems can only 
be meaningfully described by looking at complex system behaviour. Likewise, 
Temu, Rudebjer & Chakeredza (2010), Li et al. (2010), Ligmann-Zielinska & Sun 
(2010), and Strapasson (2015) use a complex systems approach to analyse land use 
dynamics. The exact way these complexity elements should be taken into account 
during the policy making process was not explicitly studied in this thesis, this 
would be an interesting topic for further research. Further research might also 
investigate how often these unexpected system responses actually occur, given 
the fact that current policies already aim for smooth transitions and are often 
implemented in small steps. 
The results of  this thesis are impacted by the choices we made when perform-
ing our research. We discuss a number of  these choices and their implications. We 
first discuss some theoretical issues, followed by a discussion on the data and a 
discussion on the mathematical programming models used in this research. 
Theory
In this thesis we analyse different mechanisms of  land use change in the Dutch 
dairy sector. We do not incorporate all mechanisms in each of  the papers, but 
concentrate on one or a few mechanisms at the time. By not including all of  the 
mechanisms at the same time, we miss the effects and emergent behaviour that 
might occur from the interaction and combination of  the different mechanisms. 
With the abolishment of  the milk quotas in chapter 2 we have an example of  the 
role thresholds can play in land use systems. We realise we take a limited view on 
Chapter 6
172
complexity in this chapter, as the modelled shift does not result from interactions 
between farms or from feedbacks between scale levels, but only from the thresh-
olds formed by the constraints. However, the contribution of  this chapter is to 
show that that the system (i.e. farm) will only respond to changes once a certain 
threshold is reached. Moreover, the abolishment of  the milk quota system can be 
regarded as part of  a complex system on a high scale in which member states of  
the EU, the EU and other countries and the WTO interact via policy and market. 
In the introduction of  an innovation we see an example of  cumulative effects. 
These cumulative effects are studied for the uptake of  on-farm processing of  
organic waste in chapter 3. We realise that the mechanisms that drive innovation 
in our research are not exhaustive and other mechanisms might play a role as well, 
potentially changing our results. In the introduction of  a collective AES system 
we see an example of  the role feedbacks can play in land use systems, as well as 
an example of  interactions as described in chapters 4 and 5. We focus on the 
feedbacks and interactions of  the farms within our case study, but we don’t take 
the effect of  other land users into account. Feedbacks or social influence from the 
wider community could potentially impact the farm decisions as well.  
The models developed in this thesis are normative models, designed to under-
stand the mechanisms of  land use change. In this normative approach we are 
concerned with the actions that should be taken to maximize a certain specified 
objective (Frisvold, Bagavathiannan & Norsworthy, 2017). The model shows the 
effects of  mechanisms assuming they are important, but it does not prove or 
test the existence of  these mechanisms in land use systems in a CAS setting. The 
existence and importance of  these mechanisms have been discussed by other 
authors. For instance, Shi, Yin & Lv (2017) show the impact of  interactions and 
feedbacks on forest cover change. Besides explaining the importance of  feed-
backs and interactions, Miyasaka et al. (2017) show how a threshold can lead to 
an abrupt land use change. Morris & Rowe (2014) point at the importance of  
cumulative effects due to human influence, while Nogueira Terra & Ferreira dos 
Santos (2012) develop a method to measure the cumulative effects on a landscape. 
The utility function applied in our research is an additive utility function. We 
assume each objective included in the utility function has a weight which does 
not vary with the level of  the objectives. This implies for example an absolute 
coefficient of  risk-aversion. Within our utility function, an agent will be equally 
risk averse for a low income and a high income. Examples of  other models with 
an absolute risk aversion coefficient are Arata et al. (2017) and Cortignani & 
Severini (2012). However, since the income consequences of  risk taken in our 
model are relatively small compared to the total income, this seems an appropriate 
assumption. 
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We viewed the Dutch dairy sector as an example of  a complex adaptive system. 
This seems to be a reasonable choice given the characteristics of  the dairy sector: 
individual dairy farms each make their own decisions, which together determine 
the characteristics of  the sector. There are interactions between dairy farms 
and feedbacks from the higher scale level, for instance through the milk price. 
Global demand for milk products has increased, while the number of  farms has 
decreased. The sector has to deal with increasing volatility and uncertainty in the 
prices paid for farming products and ongoing technological change. Furthermore 
there is an increasing societal pressure for sustainable farming practices (Klerkx & 
Nettle, 2013). This makes the dairy sector a dynamic sector, and interesting from 
a complexity point of  view. In our research we showed that the possibility of  a 
shift does exist. However, one should keep in mind that the Dutch dairy sector 
is heavily regulated, which might limit the possibility of  shifts, i.e. make the dairy 
sector resilient. The dairy sector might not be completely representative for all 
types of  land use systems, but we still think that the results from this thesis have 
the potential to increase our understanding of  responses of  land use systems in 
general. 
Data
Two commonly used sources of  farm data are the FADN and the farm structure 
data of  Statistics Netherlands. Unfortunately, the FADN data is only represen-
tative at the national level. Therefore, it cannot automatically be assumed it is 
representative for our regional case studies. Moreover, the data is not always 
publicly available, and not all the variables of  interest in this thesis are included 
in the database. Therefore we used farm interviews and data from other sources 
as inputs for our models. Monte Carlo-like procedures were used to extent the 
number of  farmer or farmer interactions in chapters 3 and 5. 
Because of  the small data samples the results from our model should be in-
terpreted with caution, and extrapolation would require running our model for 
a larger number of  empirical observations. However, this thesis focuses on new 
developments in policies or innovations. This automatically implies that data are 
scarce. By focusing on small sample groups we are able to give an indication of  
what might happen due to these changes and offer insights in the mechanisms of  
land use change. 
The samples in this thesis might suffer from sample selection bias, due to the 
way they are constructed. Selection bias occurs when the subjects included in 
the sample differ in a systematic way from the subjects that are not included in 
the sample. For example, in chapter 3 we only selected farms that indicated they 
are interested in composting ignoring other farms. There are several methods of  
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constructing a sample. The most basic method is the random sampling technique, 
in which participants are selected from the population in such a way that the 
sample is equally likely to contain every possible combination of  participants. 
Ideally, we would have liked to include random samples in our model. 
The sample in chapter 3 contains farms that are in a pilot study for on-farm 
processing of  organic waste. It might very well be that the farms that are partici-
pating in this pilot are not representative for the average farm in the region. On 
the other hand, the farms in the pilot are the farms that are aware of  the existence 
of  the technique and have the necessary information to make a decision. In the 
fourth and fifth chapter the farms in our sample are collected by the Noordelijke 
Friese Wouden. Even though we asked the collective to not only include farms 
that were strongly nature oriented, it is possible that the farms in our sample 
are selected because they had strong ties to the farm collective. This would then 
result in another sample selection bias. In future research we could consider ways 
to deal with sample selection bias e.g. via collecting more farm data, linking our 
samples with others (e.g. farm accountancy data or farm survey data) or using 
adjusted methods (e.g. farm weighing). 
Table 6.1 presents an overview that compares the number of  cows, the milk 
production and the amount of  land in our samples to the averages for the Neth-
erlands and Friesland. The table shows that the sampled farms are relatively large.
Table 6.1. Number of cows, milk production and land in sample and on average in 2016 
(CBS, 2017b; CrV 2016)
Number of cows Milk production 
per cow in kg
Ha of land on farm
Sample organic waste 161 9071 85
Sample NFW 129 8243 77
The Netherlands 97 8500 52
Friesland 114 8500 66
Model
In all of  our chapters we apply mathematical programming. Mathematical pro-
gramming models are quite intuitive, and therefore appealing to policymakers 
and other stakeholders. Using mathematical programming models allows us to 
incorporate real-life constraints, and to simulate changes in these constraints. 
In mathematical models a clear connection between economic, bio-physical and 
ecological aspects of  the farm can be made (Buysse, Huylenbroeck & Lauwers, 
2007). Mathematical programming models can be used to calculate responses 
to policy and technological changes. Examples of  studies where mathematical 
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programming models are used for policy analysis are Doole & Pannell (2011), 
Sweeney et al. (2017) and Viaggi, Raggi & Gomez y Paloma (2010). Examples of  
mathematical models that are used to study technological change are Schneider, 
McCarl & Schmid (2007) and Johnson, Masters & Preckel (2006). By definition a 
model is a simplification of  reality, and can never capture all of  the aspects of  re-
ality. Mathematical programming models are generally used for the identification 
of  optimal decisions subject to constraints. Although it is not standard practice, 
we think mathematical programming models can be used to reveal a potential 
disposition of  a land use system for regime shifts. These models could potentially 
reveal non-linear responses of  system properties to prices and availability of  
resources, and shadow prices that can be calculated within the model could be 
used to determine tipping points. 
The downside of  the mathematical programming technique as applied in this 
thesis is the fact that the current situation is not necessarily the outcome of  our 
normative mathematical programming models i.e. the models are not calibrated 
to historical data. However, this also implies that basic knowledge of  the farming 
system is sufficient to construct the model (Buysse, Huylenbroeck & Lauwers, 
2007) and the relatively low data requirement suits our small samples. Although 
the model is less suited to formulate exact predictions on the level of  farming 
objectives, we can still show the mechanisms at work and the trends that can be 
expected. The model could be calibrated to the original situation using positive 
mathematical programming (PMP) techniques (Helming, 2005; Howitt, 1995); 
however, this would make the model no longer suitable to study regime shifts 
as PMP would make the model outcomes continuous (Buysse, Huylenbroeck & 
Lauwers, 2007). In many instances this is a desirable property, but in this thesis 
we are looking for regime shifts and tipping points and our model should be able 
to reflect “jumpy” behaviour. 
When studying complex adaptive systems mathematical programming models 
might not be the most obvious choice, and alternatives are available. Econometric 
models are well suited to determine the elements of  a land use change. A combi-
nation of  a mathematical programming model and an econometric model could 
also be used, as illustrated by Peerlings & Polman (2009). Unfortunately, these 
models require large datasets with historic data or stated behaviour, which makes 
their use problematic in situations when data is scarce as is the case when evaluat-
ing a new policy or innovation. Another alternative would be to use Agent Based 
Modelling (ABM). ABM provides a way to simulate the actions of  individual 
agents, who each follow relatively simple behavioural rules. These rules typically 
take the form of  if-else statements, where agents carry out certain behaviour if  
a specified condition is met (Crooks & Heppenstall, 2012). ABM is often used 
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to analyse a system with real-world entities, and can test and represent social 
theory which cannot easily be described by mathematical formulas. Agent Based 
Models can be computationally quite intensive, and are very sensitive to small 
variations in interaction rules. Although we think ABM could have been used for 
the analysis in this thesis as well, we prefer to use the mathematical programming 
models since they are well suited to create a detailed representation of  the farm-
ing system management (Shrestha, Barnes & Ahmadi, 2016). In this thesis we 
show how mathematical programming models can offer a more sophisticated way 
of  capturing individual decision making, while still maintaining the advantages of  
ABM in terms of  capturing interactions and feedbacks, in a system of  heterogo-
nous agents. As a recommendation for further research one could consider the 
possibility to combine ABM and mathematical programming models, the research 
of  Schouten (2013) could be considered as a good start for this.  
Another recommendation for further research is to further investigate the 
possibilities for estimation and validation of  the models. The best approach for 
further estimation and validation depends on the purpose of  the model. For a 
more applied-sciences model, which can be used by policymakers to predict the 
effect of  different policy options the model would have to be better calibrated 
to the actual decision-making processes of  land users. Alternatively, if  one is 
interested in a model that is better suited for theory development the “empirical 
noise” would have to be eliminated and the number of  agents in the model would 
have to be increased. This would result in a more stylized output, allowing for 
experiments to further explore regime shift phenomena. 
For a policy maker it would be interesting to understand the signals that might 
indicate eminent regime shifts, as well as measures that could be taken to prevent 
or promote regime shifts. This thesis contains exploratory research, using nor-
mative models to systematically analyse feedbacks, cumulative effects, feedbacks 
and interactions as mechanisms of  land use change. This provides some initial 
indications for understanding signals of  regime shifts and policy measures, but 
further research e.g. using experiments and econometric analysis is needed to 
extend this knowledge.
Despite the limitations of  this research, we showed that considering thresholds, 
cumulative effects, and feedbacks and interactions in land use systems can help to 
understand the occurrence of  inertia and regime shifts in these systems. 
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Land use systems determine our well-being to a considerable extent, and there-
fore many policies have been formulated to regulate them. If  land use systems are 
not fully understood, policies may fail due to the nonlinearities in and complex 
character of  the land use system. An improved understanding of  the responses 
of  land use systems can help to predict how land use systems will react to policies 
and global change, thereby offering insights to improve policy design. Therefore, 
the aim of  this thesis is to improve our understanding of  sudden transitions in 
land use systems.
Regime shifts are a well-known concept within the study of  ecological systems. 
In ecology, amongst other disciplines, the term regime shift is used to describe a 
sudden, rapid transition of  a system from one stable state to another once a certain 
tipping-point is passed (Rietkerk et al., 2004; Scheffer et al., 2001). When studying 
land use systems this concept can be useful as well, as it can be used to describe 
a situation where small changes in circumstances might lead to abrupt responses 
or a situation where a change in circumstances evokes no response from the land 
use system at all. The existence of  regime shifts in land use systems might be 
explained by the occurrence of  thresholds, cumulative effects and feedbacks and 
interactions. Of  course, these mechanisms are not the only possible explanations 
for regime shifts. However, in this thesis we investigate the hypothesis that these 
three mechanisms can be held responsible for unexpected system behaviour.    
In a system susceptible to regime shifts (at least) two alternative stable states 
exists (Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003), a phenomenon referred to as bi-stability (or 
multi-stability). The states are relatively stable in the sense that a small change 
in the driver will – most of  the times - not lead to a clear change in the system 
property. A gradual process might take place which decreases the attraction of  the 
current state relative to the attraction of  the other state, without any changes oc-
curring. In this case the driver gradually builds up pressure until a certain threshold 
is reached and the system moves to the new state. Pressure on the system to move 
towards a different stable state does not necessarily result from a single driver, but 
can also result from the cumulative effects of  several drivers. In this case several 
drivers work together to set off  a shift within the system. Each of  the drivers 
separately might not be strong enough to lead to a change, but a specific combina-
tion of  these drivers might push the system past a tipping point. Interactions and 
feedbacks can provide an explanation for abrupt responses as well as for inertia 
within the system. Agent interaction can take place when agents communicate, 
but can also take place when they observe each other. Social norms, networks and 
informal rules are a product of  such agent-interaction, as are learning and social 
influence (Bell & Hernandez, 2017; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Maru, McAllister 
& Smith, 2007). Feedbacks can refer to positive feedbacks or negative feedbacks. 
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A positive feedback is self-reinforcing, and can lead to a point-of  no return, after 
which the system changes (Manson, 2001). A negative feedback reinforces the 
current state of  the system, leading to a more stable system (Keane, 2016).
The aim of  this thesis is to determine if  thresholds, cumulative effects, and 
feedbacks and interactions responsible for unexpected system behaviour in land 
use systems. To do so we take the Dutch dairy sector as an example. Given its 
importance for land use in the Netherlands and the large degree of  policy inter-
vention it is an ideal sector to study land use systems. Taking the main research 
question as our starting point we define four sub-questions that we address in 
chapters 2-5 in this chapter. 
The first sub question in chapter 2 concerned thresholds and asked whether 
the abolishment of  the milk quotas would lead to a shift towards larger and more 
intensive farms in the Netherlands. For this sub question the Dutch dairy farms 
and their environment were considered as the land use system. We showed that 
a sudden shift towards intensive dairy farming can occur when milk quotas are 
abolished, but only if  a threshold in farm size is passed. The second sub question 
in chapter 3 concerned cumulative effects and asked how the uptake of  a new 
farming practice for processing of  organic waste into compost in the “Friese 
Meren” in the Dutch province of  Friesland was influenced by economies of  
scale, learning, and changing social norms. In this case the dairy farms in the 
“Friese Meren” and their environment was considered as the land use system. 
Our findings were that a large uptake of  organic waste could only be explained by 
a combination of  economies of  scale, learning and changing social norms. The 
third sub question in chapter 4 concerned feedbacks and asked what the effect 
would be on the resilience of  the system of  the shift from an individual to col-
lective application for agri-environmental contracts in the Netherlands and how 
the resilience of  the land use system was affected by the value farmers attach to 
biodiversity. In this case the land use system studied encompasses the dairy farms 
in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden” and their environment. We showed that the 
introduction of  the collective AES programme results in a loss of  resilience of  
the hedgerow landscape, in the sense that a shift towards low biodiversity in the 
Noordelijke Friese Wouden might be intensified due to the biodiversity and pay-
ment feedback that are in place in the collective AES programme. The decrease 
in resilience is stronger when biodiversity is valued less by the farmers. Finally, 
the fourth sub question in chapter 5 concerned interactions and asked whether 
social influence due to the introduction of  the collective AES system in the Neth-
erlands would result in a shift towards increased farm participation and a higher 
level of  biodiversity. Again, the land use system studied consisted of  the dairy 
farms in the “Noordelijke Friese Wouden” and their environment. We illustrated 
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how the participation of  farms in the AES programme to maintain hedgerows 
in the Noordelijke Friese Wouden might be subject to social influence, but that 
an increase in social influence does not necessarily result in a shift towards higher 
farmer participation or more biodiversity.
These findings show that thresholds, cumulative effects, and feedbacks and 
interactions can be responsible for unexpected system behaviour in land use 
systems. Thresholds might explain both regime shifts and inertia in the land use 
system. If  the system is close to a threshold a small change in the environment 
can be the onset of  a shift, while a system that is far from the threshold will 
be much more resilient. Unexpected system behaviour might also be due to the 
existence of  cumulative effects of  different drivers of  the land use system. In 
order to properly understand land use systems, all drivers of  the system and their 
interaction need to be considered. Looking at each driver separately may result 
in a skewed perception of  the system and lead to wrong predictions on system 
behaviour. Feedbacks have the potential to explain unexpected system behaviour 
as well. Feedbacks from higher scale levels influence individual farm decisions, 
and these individual farm decisions in turn send a signal to the higher scale levels. 
Positive feedbacks can increase the effect of  a driver of  land use change, being 
self-reinforcing. Negative feedbacks can prevent changes from happening, by 
reinforcing the current state of  the system. Finally, we found that interactions 
between the agent of  a land use system have the potential to explain unexpected 
system behaviour. Social influence created by farmers’ interaction can increase the 
uptake of  an innovation or policy measure. On the other hand, social influence 
also has the potential to decrease the shift, making the land use system more 
resilient. However, although we showed that each of  the mechanisms can be 
responsible for unexpected system behaviour, we also showed that this is not 
always the case, and depends on the specific characteristics of  the land use system 
under consideration.
By taking into account the possible effects of  thresholds, cumulative effects, 
and interactions and feedbacks policy makers might prevent being surprised by 
unexpected system behaviour. The effect of  abolishing or introducing a produc-
tion limitation on farmers behaviour might be much better anticipated if  the 
thresholds in farming choices are known. As long as the farm is far from the 
threshold, his decisions will not be constrained by the limitations and his decisions 
with and without the production limitations do not differ. If  the farm produces 
at a level above the threshold, his decisions will differ between the situation with 
and without limitations. Promoting a new farming practice might be much easier 
if  cumulative effects can be generated, for instance by both reducing the costs 
of  the new practice and by creating opportunities for farmers to learn from each 
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other. Anticipating the effect of  a new type of  agri-environmental schemes is 
aided by considering feedbacks and interactions, and simulating the right type 
of  social influence might even result in better results of  the new scheme. Thus, 
taking complexity elements into account can help to predict how land use systems 
will react to policies and global change, thereby offering insights to improve policy 
design.
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